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 I 
 ‘Game Theory’ is the formal study of conflict and cooperation. The theory is based on a set of tools that have 
been developed in order to assist with the modelling and analysis of individual, independent decision makers. 
These actions potentially affect any decisions, which are made by other competitors. Therefore, it is well 
suited and capable of addressing the various issues linked to wireless communications.  
This work presents a Green Game-Based Hybrid Vertical Handover Model. The model is used for 
heterogeneous wireless networks, which combines both dynamic (Received Signal Strength and Node 
Mobility) and static (Cost, Power Consumption and Bandwidth) factors. These factors control the handover 
decision process; whereby the mechanism successfully eliminates any unnecessary handovers, reduces delay 
and overall number of handovers to 50% less and 70% less dropped packets and saves 50% more energy in 
comparison to other mechanisms. 
A novel Game-Based Multi-Interface Fast-Handover MIPv6 protocol is introduced in this thesis as an extension 
to the Multi-Interface Fast-handover MIPv6 protocol. The protocol works when the mobile node has more 
than one wireless interface. The protocol controls the handover decision process by deciding whether a 
handover is necessary and helps the node to choose the right access point at the right time. In addition, the 
protocol switches the mobile nodes interfaces ‘ON’ and ‘OFF’ when needed to control the mobile node’s 
energy consumption and eliminate power lost of adding another interface.  The protocol successfully reduces 
the number of handovers to 70%, 90% less dropped packets, 40% more received packets and 
acknowledgments and 85% less end-to-end delay in comparison to other Protocols. 
Furthermore, the thesis adapts a novel combination of both game and auction theory in dynamic resource 
allocation and price-power-based routing in wireless Ad-Hoc networks. Under auction schemes, destinations 
nodes bid the information data to access to the data stored in the server node. The server will allocate the 
data to the winner who values it most. Once the data has been allocated to the winner, another mechanism 
for dynamic routing is adopted. The routing mechanism is based on the source-destination cooperation, power 
consumption and source-compensation to the intermediate nodes. The mechanism dramatically increases the 
seller’s revenue to 50% more when compared to random allocation scheme and briefly evaluates the reliability 
of predefined route with respect to data prices, source and destination cooperation for different network 
settings. 
Last but not least, this thesis adjusts an adaptive competitive second-price pay-to-bid sealed auction game and 
a reputation-based game. This solves the fairness problems associated with spectrum sharing amongst one 
primary user and a large number of secondary users in a cognitive radio environment. The proposed games 
create a competition between the bidders and offers better revenue to the players in terms of fairness to 
more than 60% in certain scenarios. The proposed game could reach the maximum total profit for both 
primary and secondary users with better fairness; this is illustrated through numerical results. 
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1  
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Motivations 
 
Recent advances in Access Networks have made voice, data and multimedia 
communications ubiquitous and have knowingly/unknowingly changed our life styles.  
However, important challenges still stand in the way of widespread use of wireless 
applications; power consumption, lack of spectrum, end user acceptance and 
interoperability. In fact, the complexity of mobility and traffic models, together with the 
dynamic topology and the unpredictability of link quality that characterize wireless 
networks made the application of mathematical analysis to such networks an extremely 
useful tool for determining the performance bottlenecks [1].  Game theory [2-4], and its 
application for qualitative decision making in such scenarios is of tremendous importance. 
Its ability to model individual, independent decision makers whose actions potentially affect 
all other decision makers makes it particularly attractive for analyzing the performance of 
wireless networks. It actually consists of a set of analytical tools that predict the outcome of 
complex interactions among rational entities, where rationality demands a strict adherence 
to a strategy based on perceived or measured results. 
Looking around us we can easily see that wireless networks are growing increasingly 
less structured. However, the dynamic interactions arising in these networks make it 
difficult to analyze and predict performance, inhibiting the development of wireless 
technologies. Thus, in order to deal with such challenging demands, a constant and 
thorough research is required for improving the existing protocols, developing new 
standards and technologies. 
Chapter 1 
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The research presented in this thesis is motivated by the following issues: 
1. Portable devices with multiple wireless interfaces, switching between interfaces, 
handover latency and power consumption turns to be the most important issues in 
heterogeneous wireless networks  which are the focus of current research [5]. The 
research presented in this thesis addresses solutions for enhancing user and/or the 
application ability to choose the right interface at the right time, eliminating the 
handover latency and reducing energy consumption in heterogeneous wireless 
networks. 
2. Recent extensions to Mobile IPv6 [6] such as the Fast-handover MIPv6 Protocol [7-8], 
which aims at improving the handover latency by redirecting traffic to the new 
access point when the handoff occurs and the Multi-Interface Fast Handover MIPv6 
Protocol [9], which works when the mobile node has multiple wireless interfaces; 
aims to reduce the number of lost packets, reducing handover latency and improving 
overall throughput. Yet, neither Fast-handover MIPv6 Protocol nor Multi-interface 
Fast-handover MIPv6 Protocol offer the user and/or the application the ability to 
choose when a handoff is needed or not and which access point to choose in terms 
of Quality of Service (QoS) and how to cut power consumption. 
 
The above two points are linked to each other, as when we look to the problem we can 
see that a game-based model/mechanism can be used to control the handover process and 
decide when to switch between interfaces and which interface to go with. 
 
3. Because of increasing demand for wireless services and rising cost to provide these 
services, we must choose how to allocate these services in a fair manner. Future 
wireless networks will be integrated into every aspect of daily life, and therefore 
could affect our life in a magnitude similar to that of the Internet and cellular 
phones. Thus, there is a fundamental need to understand how to design and control 
wireless applications that lies beyond what the currently theory can provide [10-11].    
4. One of the main reasons which limit our ability to introduce new wireless services 
and improve the current ones such as providing ubiquitous internet access or make 
the current services less expensive or even increase the data rate of current systems 
is, according to conventional wisdom, we currently suffer from a shortage of 
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spectrum. In reality, much of the spectrum sits idle at any given time, this is because 
system designers usually give each system exclusive access to a block of spectrum in 
order to prevent interference between adjacent systems. Therefore, a model that 
allows different wireless systems share spectrum without causing excessive harmful 
interference to other neighbors is needed. Such system would increase the amount 
of communications that can take place in a given amount of spectrum, which would 
defiantly lead to a revolution in the world of wireless services and applications. 
  
1.2 Aims and Objectives  
 
The aims of the research presented in this thesis can be summarized by the following 
points: 
1. The research aims to design a game theory based vertical handover model for 
mobile nodes with multiple interfaces. 
2. The research aims to use game theory in Multi-interface Fast-handover MIPv6 
(MFMIPv6), works when the mobile node has more than one wireless interface.  
3. The research aims to adopt both game and auction theory to fairly allocate resources 
and improve traffic routing in ad hoc wireless networks. 
4. The research also aims to propose a solution to fairly share the spectrum in Cognitive 
Radio networks [12-13], by adopting both auction and game theory tools.  
 
The research primarily focuses on achieving the following objectives:  
 
1. In the case of heterogeneous multihomed wireless portable devices, the introduced 
mechanism must give the user and/or the application the ability to manage the 
handover decision process and select an appropriate interface when a handover is 
needed. The model should reduce the node’s power consumption problem by 
controlling the state of the interfaces, when to switch the interfaces ‘ON’ and ‘OFF’. 
2. The Green Game-based MFMIPv6 protocol should allow the mobile node to control 
the handover decision process by deciding whether a handover is needed or not and 
should help the mobile node to choose the ‘best’ access point when more than one 
available. This protocol should control the device power expenditure throughout 
controlling when to switch the second interface ‘ON’ and ‘OFF’. 
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3. A mechanism that insures a fair allocation of resources in Ad-Hoc networks, which 
should take into account the competitive behavior between players in the game in 
order to make sure that the user who values the resources more will have a better 
chance in gaining access to it. The dynamic game-based routing mechanism the 
research aiming to achieve should insure a reliable path between the source and 
destination and should give the intermediate node the chance to decide whether to 
participate in any route or not based on power consumption and source 
compensation. 
4. The competitive Auction game-based spectrum sharing mechanism the research 
aiming to achieve should provide a dynamic ability to assign spectrum between 
secondary users in different scenarios. The mechanism should provide a fair share 
between secondary users when the number of users increases dynamically. It should 
adapt itself to the changes occurred during the sharing time, such as changes in the 
channel quality and when users retreat from their share.  
 
1.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This thesis contributes to knowledge by designing two game theory based interface 
selection and handover models for mobile nodes with multiple wireless interfaces, aiming at 
reducing the unnecessary handovers and reduces the handover latency by controlling the 
handover decision process and insuring that the mobile node will choose the access point, 
which offers better QoS if handover is needed. 
Furthermore, the thesis presents a novel auction and game-based mechanism for both 
resource allocation and price and power based routing in Ad-Hoc networks. Beside, a similar 
combination of both auction and game theory is proposed to fairly assign free spectrum to a 
group of secondary users in Cognitive Radio networks.  
The key contributions are summarized as follows: 
1. Hybrid vertical handover model for heterogeneous wireless networks, which aims at 
reducing the number of unnecessary handovers mobile nodes with multiple 
interfaces of different technologies experience in real scenarios. The model consists 
of a game-controller that aims to control the handover decision process. 
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a. Dynamic and Static handover controller to reduce the number of 
unnecessary handovers and insure the continuity of node 
communications’ links. 
b. A game-decision model to choose the right interface and when a 
handover is needed. 
c. A game-controller to choose the right access point when multiple access 
points operate in the same area. 
d. A game-controller to keep the unused interfaces ‘OFF’ until a handover is 
needed, in order to reduce the overall power consumption generated by 
the nodes’ interfaces. 
 
2. Game-based Multi-Interface Fast-handover Mobile IPv6 protocol as an extension to 
the Multi-Interface fast-handover mobile IPv6 protocol works when the mobile node 
has more than one wireless interface. 
a. Green game-based interface selection mechanism to control the 
handover decision process by deciding a handover is needed or not and 
choosing the right access point when more than one access point can 
offer an acceptable service to the mobile node. 
b. Similar to (1.d.), the mechanism decides to turn ‘ON’ the second interface 
when the received signal strength received from the serving access point 
goes just below a predefined threshold value. 
 
3. Auction and game based dynamic resource allocation and price and power routing 
mechanisms in Ad-Hoc wireless networks. Under auction schemes, end-users bid the 
information data to access the data stored in the server. The server allocates the 
data to the user who values it the most. The routing mechanism is based on the 
source-destination cooperation, how much the source will compensate the 
intermediate nodes to define a more reliable path and how much will cost (in terms 
of transmission power) intermediate nodes to forward packets to the end-user. 
a. Both first and second-price sealed-auctions are examined to ensure 
higher source revenue and fairer allocation of resources. 
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b. A power and price based routing mechanism; where the intermediate 
nodes decide whether it is appropriate to participate in any route or not 
based on how much the source compensates each intermediate node and 
how much energy the node has before participating in the named route. 
 
4. Dynamic game-based reputation model and auction and game-based dynamic 
spectrum sharing mechanism in Cognitive Radio networks. Auctions are used to 
improve primary users’ revenue and a game-model is used to insure a fair share is 
allocated between secondary users. 
a. Both first and second-price sealed auctions are tested to ensure 
acceptable revenue to the primary user. 
b. Defining the pros and cons of three main spectrum sharing game models, 
namely; optimum, competitive and cooperative spectrum sharing games. 
c. A combination of both auction and competitive game models are used to 
shape a novel spectrum sharing mechanism. Users with high priority 
traffic and value the offered spectrum more than others will get better 
chance to get more of the offered spectrum. 
d. A game-based reputation mechanism between secondary users to 
arrange access to the offered spectrum. A secondary-primary user is 
defined between secondary users who will be responsible of arranging 
fair share between secondary users.  
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
The initial phase of my research focused on literature review; relevant research 
articles, books, research papers which includes conference proceedings and journal papers, 
IEEE standards, progress and proposals of IEEE task groups, and different white papers on 
Game Theory and its applications on Mobile IPv6, heterogeneous wireless networks, 
resource allocation and routing in Ad-Hoc networks and Spectrum sharing in Cognitive Radio 
were studied.  During this stage, basic definitions, types and classifications of games were 
examined and issues related to mobile IPv6 and its recent extinctions, routing and resource 
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allocations in Ad-Hoc networks and spectrum sharing in Cognitive Radio networks were 
identified. 
Literature review was followed by mathematical study of different parameters and 
scenarios for each case was carried out using different variables and strategies according to 
the needs and settings of each individual case. Not only the performance of each proposed 
solution was tested but it also helped in developing a different perspective. Such as, looking 
at the issues of interface selection when the mobile device has more than one interface, fair 
allocation of resources, power-price-based routing in ad hoc networks and fair spectrum 
sharing in Cognitive Radio networks. 
In the final stage, development of simulation models of different interface selection 
mechanisms based on static or dynamic factors have been implemented in order to 
compare them with the solutions introduced through this research. Apart from 
implementing the proposed protocols, Fast-handover Mobile IPv6 and Multi-interface Fast-
handover Mobile IPv6 protocols were also implemented for comparison. Furthermore, 
game-based routing mechanisms and spectrum sharing models were implemented for the 
same reasons. The proposed models and various components were designed and tested in 
NS-2 and MATLAB. NS-2 [14] is an open source simulator and new models can be easily 
implemented using either C++ or Tool Command Language (TCL). However, applying 
matrices and mathematical equation into TCL is relatively difficult, and requires multiple 
header files and classes to be included. On the other hand, MATLAB provides easy, 
interactive environment and fast numerical algorithms. It allows matrix manipulation, 
plotting of functions and data, Implementation of algorithms, creation of user interfaces and 
interfacing with programs in other languages.  
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter two gives an introduction to the basic 
concepts of Game Theory. The aim is to supply sufficient information to understand the 
applications of game theory in this thesis. A brief history of the game, previous work and the 
most common types of games are discussed in details; the reasons behind applying game 
theory in telecommunications systems are examined.  
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 In chapter three, a novel Vertical Handover model for heterogeneous wireless 
networks is explained in details, which aims to reduce the number of unnecessary 
handovers and reduce the energy consumption in mobile node. A Game Theory-based 
decision model is introduced, which controls the handover decision process and insures that 
the mobile node will choose the right access point at the right time. 
Based on that model, chapter four describes the main applications of game theory in 
mobile IPv6 networks. In a few words, details about previous researches and the reasons 
behind them are explained throughout the chapter. Throughout it sections, a novel game-
based green interface/network selection mechanism is proposed, which is an extension to 
the multi-Interface Fast-handover Mobile IPv6 Protocol, works when the mobile node has 
more than one wireless interface. The mechanism controls the handover decision process 
by deciding whether a handover is needed or not and helps the node to choose the right 
access point at the right time. What’s more, the mechanism switches the mobile nodes 
interfaces ‘ON’ and ‘OFF’ when needed to control the mobile node’s energy consumption 
and improves the handover latency.  
 Chapter five focuses on adopting a novel combination of both game and auction 
theories in dynamic resource allocation and routing in wireless Ad-Hoc networks. Under 
auction schemes, destinations nodes bid the information data to access to the data stored 
in the server node. Their bids are based on either the first or second-price sealed bids 
auctions, which accumulate throughout the repeated bidding process over time. The server 
will allocate the data to the winner user who values it the most. Throughout this chapter, 
both mechanisms have been investigated to prove that they yield to similar utilities in terms 
of seller’s revenue and overall system efficiency. Once the data been allocated to the winner 
node, another mechanism for dynamic routing in Ad-Hoc wireless networks is adopted in 
this chapter, based on Game Theory. The routing mechanism is based on the source-
destination cooperation and how much the source will compensate the intermediate nodes 
to define a more reliable path. The simulation results prove that the introduced auction 
mechanism dramatically increases the seller’s revenue whether he decide to choose the first 
or second-price auction. Moreover, the results briefly evaluate the reliability of predefined 
route with respect to the data prices and source and destination cooperation for different 
network settings. 
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Chapter six explains an adaptive competitive second-price pay-to-bid sealed auction 
game as solution to the fairness problem of spectrum sharing among one primary user and a 
large number of secondary users in cognitive radio environment. Throughout the chapter, 
three main spectrum sharing game models are compared, namely; optimal, cooperative and 
competitive game models introduced as a solution to the named problem. Also, this chapter 
proves that the cooperative game model is built based on achieving Nash equilibrium 
between players and provides better revenue to the sellers and bidders in the game. 
Furthermore, the cooperative game is the best model to choose when the number of 
secondary users changes dynamically, but only when the number of competitors is low. As 
in practical situations, the number of secondary users might increase dramatically and the 
cooperative game will lose its powerful advantage once that number increases. As a result, 
the proposed mechanism creates a competition between the bidders and offers better 
revenue to the players in terms of fairness. Combining both; second-price pay-to-bid sealed 
auction and competitive game model will insure that the user with the better channel 
quality, a higher traffic priority and a fair bid will get a better chance to share the offered 
spectrum. It is shown by numerical results the proposed mechanism could reach the 
maximum total profit for secondary users with better fairness. The other solution 
introduced in chapter six is done by a reputation-based game between secondary users. The 
game aims to elect one of the secondary users to be a secondary-Primary user and arrange 
the access to other secondary users. It is shown by numerical results that the proposed 
game managed to give a better chance to secondary users to use the spectrum more 
efficiently and improve the primary user revenue. 
 Finally, this thesis is summarized in chapter seven and some ideas for future 
proposals are included based on the research carried out in this work.   
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2  
 
Game Theory: An Introduction 
 
2.1 Game Theory: A Brief History 
 
'Game Theory' is a mathematical concept, which deals with the formulation of the 
correct strategy that will enable an individual or entity (i.e., player), when confronted by a 
complex challenge, to succeed in addressing that challenge. It was developed based on the 
premise that for whatever circumstance, or for whatever 'game', there exists a strategy that 
will allow one player to 'win'. Any business can be considered as a game played against 
competitors, or even against customers. Economists have long used it as a tool for 
examining the actions of economic agents such as firms in a market. 
The ideas behind game theory have appeared through-out history [1], apparent in 
the bible, the Talmud, the works of Descartes and Tzu, and the writings of Darwin [2]. 
However, some argue that the first actual study of game theory started with the work of 
Bernoulli, a mathematician born in 1700 [3]. Although his work the “Bernoulli’s Principles” 
formed the basis of jet engine production and operations, he is credited with introducing 
the concepts of expected utility and diminishing returns. Others argue that the first 
mathematical tool was presented in England in the 18th century, by Bayes, known as “Bayes’ 
Theorem”; his work involved using probabilities as a basis for logical conclusion *3+. 
Nevertheless, the basis of modern game theory can be considered as an outgrowth of a 
three seminal works; a “Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of 
Wealth” in 1838 by Cournot, gives an intuitive explanation of what would eventually be 
formalized as Nash equilibrium and gives a dynamic idea of players best-response to the 
actions of others in the game. In 1881, Francis Edgeworth expressed the idea of competitive 
equilibrium in a two-person economy. Finally, Borel, suggested the existence of mixed 
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strategies, or probability distributions over one's actions that may lead to stable play. It is 
also widely accepted that modern analysis of game theory and its modern methodological 
framework began with John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern book [4]. 
We can say now that “Game Theory” is relatively not a new concept, having been 
invented by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 [4].  At that time, the 
mathematical framework behind the concept has not yet been fully established, limiting the 
concept's application to special circumstances only [5]. Over the past 60 years, however, the 
framework has gradually been strengthened and solidified, with refinements ongoing until 
today [6].  Game Theory is now an important tool in any strategist's toolbox, especially 
when dealing with a situation that involves several entities whose decisions are influenced 
by what decisions they expect from other entities. 
In [4], von Neumann and Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical 
theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not 
only would this reform economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded 
has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to 
optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league 
baseball salary negotiations [6]. In addition, it is today established throughout both the 
social sciences and a wide range of other sciences. 
Game Theory can be also defined as the study of how the final outcome of a 
competitive situation is dictated by interactions among the people involved in the game 
(also referred to as 'players' or 'agents'), based on the goals and preferences of these 
players, and on the strategy that each player employs. A strategy is simply a predetermined 
'way of play' that guides an agent as to what actions to take in response to past and 
expected actions from other agents (i.e., players in the game). 
In any game, several important elements exists, some of which are; the agent, which 
represents a person or an entity having their own goals and preferences. The second 
element, the utility (also called agent payoff) is a concept that refers to the amount of 
satisfaction that an agent derives from an object or an event. The Game, which is a formal 
description of a strategic situation, Nash equilibrium, also called strategic equilibrium, which 
is a list of strategies, one for each agent, which has the property that no agent can change 
his strategy and get a better payoff. 
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Normally, any game  has three components: a set of players, a set of possible 
actions for each player, and a set of utility functions mapping action profiles into the real 
numbers. In this chapter, the set of players are denoted as , where  is finite with, 
. For each player the set of possible actions that player  can 
take is denoted by , and , which is denoted as the space of all action profiles is equal to: 
     (2-1) 
Finally, for each , we have A R, which denotes ’s player utility function. Another 
notation to be defined before carrying on; suppose that   is a strategy profile and 
 is a player; and then denote player  action in  and  denote the actions 
of the other   players.  
In this chapter, some famous examples of games, some important definitions used in 
games and classifications of games are presented. Throughout this chapter, a mathematical 
proof is presented to show when mixed strategy games can be valid and invalid in different 
scenarios. 
 
2.2 Examples of Games 
 
2.2.1 Prisoners’ Dilemma 
 
In 1950, Professor Tucker of Princeton University invented the Prisoner’s Dilemma *7-8], 
an imaginary scenario that is without doubt one of the most famous representations of 
Game Theory. In this game, two prisoners were arrested and accused of a crime; the police 
do not have enough evidence to convict any of them, unless at least one suspect confesses. 
The police keep the criminals in separate cells, thus they are not able to communicate 
during the process. Eventually, each suspect is given three possible outcomes: 
1) If one confesses and the other does not, the confessor will be released and the other 
will stay behind bars for ten years (i.e. -10); 
2) If neither admits, both will be jailed for a short period of time (i.e. -2,-2); and 
3) If both confess, both will be jailed for an intermediate period of time (i.e. six years in 
prison, -6). 
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The possible actions and corresponding sentences of the criminals are given in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1: Prisoners’' Dilemma game. 
2
nd
 Criminal 
Cooperate Defect 
 
Cooperate -2, -2 -10, 0 
Defect 0, -10 -6, -6 
 
To solve this game, the dominating strategy of each player must be found, which is 
the best response of each player regardless of what the other player will play. From player 
one’s point of view, if player two cooperates (i.e. not admitting), then he is better off with 
the defect (i.e. blaming his partner). If player two defects, then he will choose defect as well. 
The same will work with player two. In the end, both prisoners conclude that the best 
decision is to defect, and are both sent to intermediate imprisonment. 
 
2.2.2 Battle of the Sexes 
 
Another well know game is the battle of the sexes [4-6], in which two couple argues 
where to spend the night out. In this example, she would rather attend an audition of Swan 
Lake in the opera and he would rather a football match. However, none of them would 
prefer to spend the night alone. The possible actions and corresponding sentences of the 
couple are given in Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2: Battle of the Sexes game. 
Female 
Ballet Football 
 
Ballet 2, 4 0, 0 
Football 0, 0 4, 2 
It is easy to see that both of them will either decide to go to the ballet or to the 
football match, as they are much better off spending the evening alone. 
Male 
 
1
st
 Criminal 
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2.3 Nash Equilibrium 
 
Definition: Nash Equilibrium exists in any game if there is a set of strategies with the 
property that no player can increase her payoff by changing her strategy while the other 
players keep their strategies unchanged [1-3]. These sets of strategies and the 
corresponding payoffs represent the Nash Equilibrium. More formally, a Nash equilibrium is 
a strategy profile  such that for all ,  
      (2-2) 
where ã, denotes another action for the player  [1-3]. We can simply see that the 
action profile (defect, defect) is the Nash Equilibrium in the prisoners dilemma game and 
the actions profile (ballet, ballet) and (football, football) are the ones for the battle of the 
sexes game. 
 
2.4 Pareto Efficiency 
 
Definition: Pareto efficiency is another important concept of game theory. This term 
is named after Pareto, an Italian economist, who used this concept in his studies and 
defined it as; “A situation is said to be Pareto efficient if there is no way to rearrange things 
to make at least one person better off without making anyone worse off” *9]. 
More Formally, an action profile  is said to be Pareto if there is no action 
profile   such that for all , 
        (2-3) 
In another word, an action profile is said to be Pareto efficient if and only if it is impossible 
to improve the utility of any player without harming another player. 
In order to see the importance of Pareto efficiency, assume that someone was walking 
along the shore on an isolated beach finds a £20 bill on the sand. If bill is picked up and kept, 
then that person is better off and no one else is harmed. Leaving the bill on the sand to be 
washed out would be an unwise decision. However, someone might argue the fact that the 
original owner of the bill is worse off. This is not true, because once the owner loses the bill 
he is defiantly worse off. On the other hand, once the bill is gone he will be the same 
whether someone found it or it was washed out to the sea. This will lead us to another 
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argument; assume there are two people walking on the beach and they saw the bill on the 
sand. Whether one of them will pick up the bill and the other will not get anything or they 
decide to split the bill between themselves. Who gains from finding the bill is quite different 
in those scenarios but they all avoid the inefficiency of leaving it sitting on the beach. 
 
2.5 Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium  
 
In any game, someone will find pure and mixed strategies; a pure strategy has a 
probability of one, and will be always played. On the other hand, a mixed strategy has 
multiple purse strategies with probabilities connected to them.  A player would only use a 
mixed strategy when she is indifferent between several pure strategies, and when keeping 
the challenger guessing is desirable, that is when the opponent can benefit from knowing 
the next move. Another reason why a player might decide to play a mixed strategy is when a 
pure strategy is not dominated by other pure strategies, but dominated by a mixed strategy. 
Finally, in a game without a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium, a mixed strategy may result in a 
Nash Equilibrium. 
From the battle of the sexes game, we can see the mixed strategy Nash equilibria are 
the action profile (ballet, ballet) and (football, football). In order to drive that, we will 
assume first that the women will go to the ballet and the man will play some mixed strategy 
σ. Then the utility of playing this action will be . 
Then, , therefore in another word, the women gets ‘4’ 
some percentage of the time and ‘0’ for the rest of the time. Assuming the women will be 
going with her partner to the football match, then , she will get 
‘0’ some percentage of the time and ‘2’ for the rest of the time. Setting the two equations 
equal to each other and solving for σ, this will . This means that in this mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium, the man is going to the ballet third of the time and to going to 
the football match two-third of the time. Taking another look to the Table 2-2 , we can see 
that the game is symmetrical against the strategies, which means that the women will 
decide to go the ballet two-third of the time and third of the time to go to the football 
match. 
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In order to calculate the utility of each player in this game, we need to multiply the 
probability distribution of each action by the user strategy, as shown in Table 2-3. We can 
simply see that the utility of both players is ‘4/3’, which means that if they will not 
communicate with each other to decide where to go, they are both better-off to use mix 
strategies. 
 
Table 2-3: Pure and Mixed Strategies, Battle of the Sexes example. 
Female 
Ballet (2/3) Football (1/3) 
 
Ballet (1/3) 2, 4 0, 0 
Football (2/3) 0, 0 4, 2 
 
2.6 Valid and Invalid Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 
 
This section shows how mixed strategies can be invalid with games in general forms. 
Recalling the prisoner’s dilemma game from the previous section, where we going to solve 
the general class of the game by removing the numbers from the table and use the 
following variables; 
 
Table 2-4: Valid and Invalid Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium, Prisoners' Dilemma example. 
2
nd
 Criminal 
Cooperate Defect 
 
Cooperate B, b D, a 
Defect A, d C, c 
 
Where we have,  and . We will simply start to solve 
this game the same way we did before, we will start looking for the dominate strategies. 
From the player one point of view, if player two cooperate then player one will not as 
. If player two defect, then player one will defect as well as . Doing the same thing 
Male 
 
2/9 
 
1/9 
 
2/9 
 
4/9 
 
1
st
 Criminal 
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for player two; if player one confess, then player two will defect as . If player one 
defect, then player two will defect as well as . Then, the only sensible equilibrium will 
be (Don’t confess, Don’t confess). 
To make sure that there are no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this scenario, we 
need to find the utility of player two confessing as a function of some mixed strategy of 
player one. That is, some percentage of the time player two will get  and for the rest of the 
time will get . Mathematically this will be; . Then, we do the 
same to find what the utility of player two will be as function of player one mixed strategy. 
This can be shown as; . To find the mixed strategy,  must be 
equal to , and that will lead us to the following equation; 
                                              (2-4) 
In order to proof that this is a valid mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, the following 
condition must be satisfied;  (i.e. no event can occur with negative probability 
and no event can occur with probability greater than one). That is the probability that this 
strategy will happen is grater than zero and not less than one. For the first case, when 
, the nominator and the denominator must be both positive or negative, otherwise, 
this mixed strategy will be invalid. Recalling our assumption, , then the 
nominator must be grater than zero, the denominator must be grater than zero as well. That 
is , which can be re-arranged as , at this point we cannot 
be sure whether this will give us the right answer of whether this is a valid mixed strategy or 
not as there will be some times where  is grater than  and some times where it is 
not. So, for the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for this game does exist,    must be less 
than or equal to one. This will lead us to the following equation: 
                     (2-5) 
That is , which can be solved to , which is not right as this 
violate or rule that , so this is an invalid mixed strategy. Thus, we proved that there is 
no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this game and the two players will defect. 
On the other hand, if we work for the example of the Battle of the Sexes game. Table 
(2-5) shows the game in general format, were we removed the numbers again and used the 
following variables;  and  . Following the same procedure we 
used in the previous example, we can solve for the man mixed strategy when his partner 
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goes to watch the match, which will lead us to the following equality: 
, as the women get  some percentage of the time and get c the rest of the 
time. If she decides to go to the ballet, the equality becomes; . 
Now, taking these two equations to solve for the man mixed strategy, we can finally get: 
       (2-6) 
 
Table 2-5: Valid and Invalid Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium, Battle of the Sexes example. 
Female 
Ballet Football 
 
Ballet A, b C, c 
Football C, c B, a 
 
In order to prove that this mixed strategy is valid, the same condition used before 
must be satisfied, . That is, , we already have , then the numerator 
is positive and greater than zero. For the denominator to be positive,  must be 
positive. That is , which can be arranged as  , which proves 
that the denominator is positive as this is always true. 
We must prove that  to prove the validity of such mixed strategy. That means 
we must prove the following; , which can be arranged to the following 
, which is true as we already mentioned that . 
Thus, we have proved that there exist three equilibriums in this game, the two 
players can go the Ballet or to the match together or each one of them can go to their 
preferred show with a probability of . 
 
2.7 Classification of Game theory 
 
Games can be classified into different categories according to certain significant 
features. The terminology used in game theory is inconsistent, thus different terms can be 
used for the same concept in different sources. A game can be classified according to the 
number of players in the game, it can be designated as a one-player game, two-player game 
Male 
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or n-players game (where n is greater than ‘2’). In addition, a player need not be an 
individual person; it may be a nation, a corporation, or a team comprising many people with 
shared interests. 
 
2.7.1 Non-Cooperative and Cooperative (Coalition) Games 
 
A game is called non-cooperative when each agent (player) in the game, who acts in 
her self interest, is the unit of the analysis. While the cooperative (Coalition) game treats 
groups or subgroups of players as the unit of analysis and assumes that they can achieve 
certain payoffs among themselves through necessary cooperative agreements [10]. 
In non-cooperative games, the actions of each individual player are considered and 
each player is assumed to be selfish, looking to improve its own payoff and not taken into 
account others involved in the game. So, non-cooperative game theory studies the strategic 
choices resulting from the interactions among competing players, where each player 
chooses its strategy independently for improving its own performance (utility) or reducing 
its losses (costs). On the other hand, Cooperative game theory was developed as a tool for 
assessing the allocation of costs or benefits in a situation where the individual or group 
contribution depends on other agents actions in the game [11]. The main branch of 
cooperative games describes the formation of cooperating groups of players, referred to as 
coalitions, which can strengthen the players’ positions in a game. 
In Telecommunications systems, most game theoretic research has been conducted 
using non-cooperative games, but there are also approaches using coalition games [12]. 
Studying the selfishness level of wireless node in heterogeneous ad-hoc networks is one of 
the applications of coalition games. It may be beneficial to exclude the very selfish nodes 
from the network if the remaining nodes get better QoS that way [13]. 
 
2.7.2 Strategic and Extensive Games 
 
One way of presenting a game is called the strategic, sometimes called static or 
normal, form. In this form the players make their own decisions simultaneously at the 
beginning of the game, the players have no information about the actions of the other 
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players in the game. The prisoner’s dilemma and the battle of the sexes are both strategic 
games.  
Alternatively, if players have some information about the choices of other players, 
the game is usually presented in extensive, sometimes called as a game tree, form. In this 
case, the players can make decisions during the game and they can react to other players’ 
actions. Such form of games can be finite (one-shot) games or infinite (repeated) games 
[14]. In repeated games, the game is played several times and the players can observe the 
actions and payoffs of the previous game before proceeding to the next stage. 
 
2.7.3 Zero-Sum and Non-Zero Sum Games 
 
Another way to categorize games is according to their payoff structure. Generally 
speaking, a game is called zero-sum game (sometimes called if one gains, another losses 
game, or strictly competitive games) if the player’s gain or loss is exactly balanced those of 
other players in the game [14]. For example, if two are playing chess, one person will lose 
(with payoff ‘-1’) and the other will win (with payoff ’+1’). The win added to the loss equals 
zero. Given that sometimes a loss can be a gain, real life examples of zero-sum game can be 
very difficult to find. Going back to the chess example, a loser in such game may gain as 
much from his losses as he would gain if he won. The player may become better player and 
gain experience as a result of loosing at the first place. 
In telecommunications systems, it is quite hard to describe a scenario as a zero-sum 
game. However, in a bandwidth usage scenario of a single link, the game may be described 
as a zero-sum game. 
 
2.7.4 Games with Perfect and Imperfect Information 
 
A game is said to be a perfect information game if each player, when it is her turn to 
choose an action, knows exactly all the previous decisions of other players in the game. 
Then again, if a player has no information about other players’ actions when it is her turn to 
decide, this game is called imperfect information game. As it is hardly ever any user of a 
network knows the exact actions of the other users in the network, the imperfect 
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information game is a very good framework in telecommunications systems. Nevertheless, 
assuming a perfect information game in such scenarios is more suitable to deal with. 
 
2.7.5 Games with Complete and Incomplete Information 
 
In games with “complete information”, all factors of the game are common 
knowledge to all players [6, 14]. That is, each individual player is fully aware of other players 
in the game, their strategies and decisions and the payoff of each player. As a result, a 
complete information game can be represented as an efficient perfectly competitive game. 
On the other hand, in the “incomplete information” games, the player’s dose not has all the 
information about other players in the game, which made them not able to predict the 
effect of their actions on others. 
One of the very well known types of such games is the sealed-bid auctions, in which 
a player knows his own valuation of the good but does not knows the other bidders’ 
valuation. A combination of incomplete but perfect information game can exist in a chess 
game, if one player knows that the other player will be paid some amount of money if a 
particular event happened, but the first player does not know what the event is. They both 
know the actions of each other, perfect information game, but does not know the payoff 
function of the other player, incomplete information game. 
 
2.7.6 Rationality in Games 
 
The most fundamental assumption in game theory is rationality [15]. It implies that 
every player is motivated by increasing his own payoff, i.e. every player is looking to 
maximize his own utility. von Neumann and Morgenstern justified the idea of maximizing 
the expected payoff in their work in 1944 [4]. However, previous studies have shown that 
humans do not always act rationally [16]. In fact, humans use a propositional calculus in 
reasoning; the propositional calculus concerns truth functions of propositions, which are 
logical truths (statements that are true in virtue of their form) [17]. For this reason, the 
assumption of rational behaviour of players in telecommunications systems is more 
justified, as the players are usually devices programmed to operate in certain ways. 
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2.7.7 Evolutionary Games 
 
Evolutionary game theory started its development slightly after other games have 
been developed [18]. This type of game was originated by Smith formalization of 
evolutionary stable strategies as an application of the mathematical theory of games in the 
context of biology in 1973 [19]. The objective of evolutionary games is to apply the concepts 
of non-cooperative games to explain such phenomena which are often thought to be the 
result of cooperation or human design, for example; market information, social rules of 
conduct and money and credit. Recently, this type of games has become of increased 
interest to scientist of different background, economists, sociologists, anthropologists and 
also philosophers. One of the main reasons behind the interest among social scientists in 
the evolutionary games rather than the traditional games is that the rationality assumptions 
underlying evolutionary game theory are, in many cases, more appropriate for the 
modelling of social systems than those assumptions underlying the traditional theory of 
games [20]. 
 
2.8 Applications of Game Theory in Telecommunications 
 
Communications systems are often built around standard, mostly open ones, such as 
the TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol [21]) standard in which the 
internet is based. Devices that we use to access these systems are being designed and built 
by a diversity of different manufactures. In many cases, these manufacturers may have an 
incentive to develop products, which behave “selfishly” by seeking a performance 
advantage over other network users at the cost of overall network performance [22]. On the 
other hand, end users may have the ability to force these devices in order to work in a 
selfish manner. Generally speaking, the maximizing of a player’s payoff is often referred to 
as selfishness in a game. This is true in the sense that all the players try to gain the highest 
possible utility of their actions. However, a player gaining a high utility does not necessarily 
mean that the player acts selfishly. As a result, systems that are prepared to cope with users 
who behave selfishly need to be designed. If the designs of such systems are possible, 
designers should make sure that selfish behaviour within the system is unprofitable for 
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individuals. When designing such system is not possible, they should be at least aware of the 
impact of such behaviour on the operation of the specified system. 
One important thrust in these efforts focuses on designing high-level protocols that 
prevent users from misbehaving and/or provide incentives for cooperation. To prevent 
misbehaviour, several protocols based on reputation propagation have been proposed in 
the literature, e.g., [23], [24]. The mainstream of existing research in telecommunications 
networks focused on using non-cooperative games in various applications such as 
distributed resource allocation [25], congestion control [26], power control [27], and 
spectrum sharing in cognitive radio, among others. This need for non-cooperative games led 
to numerous tutorials and books outlining its concepts and usage in communication, such as 
[28], [29]. Another thrust of research analyzes the impact of user selfishness from a game 
theoretic perspective, e.g., [22], [30]. Since the problem is typically too involved, several 
simplifications to the network model are usually made to facilitate analysis and allow for 
extracting insights. For example, in [22], the wireless nodes are assumed to be interested in 
maximizing energy efficiency. At each time slot, a certain number of nodes are randomly 
chosen and assigned to serve as relay nodes on the source- destination route. The authors 
derive a Pareto optimal operating point and show that a certain variant of the well known 
TIT-FOR-TAT algorithm converges to this point. In [22], the authors assume that the 
transmission of each packet costs the same energy and each session uses the same number 
of relay nodes. Another example is [30], which studies the Nash equilibrium of packet 
forwarding in a static network by taking the network topology into consideration. More 
specifically, the authors assume that the transmitter/receiver pairs in the network are 
always fixed and derive the equilibrium conditions for both cooperative and non-
cooperative strategies. Similar to [22], the cost of transmitting each packet is assumed fixed. 
It is worth noting that most, if not all of, the works in this thrust utilize the repeated game 
formulation, where cooperation among users is sustainable by credible punishment for 
deviating from the cooperation point. 
Cooperative games have also been widely explored in different disciplines such as 
economics or political science. Recently, cooperation has emerged as a new networking 
concept that has a dramatic effect of improving the performance from the physical layer 
[23], [24] up to the networking layers [25]. However, implementing cooperation in large 
scale communication networks faces several challenges such as adequate modelling, 
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efficiency, complexity, and fairness, among others. In fact, several recent works have shown 
that user cooperation plays a fundamental role in wireless networks. From an information 
theoretic perspective, the idea of cooperative communications can be traced back to the 
relay channel [31]. More recent works have generalized the proposed cooperation 
strategies and established the utility of cooperative communications in many relevant 
practical scenarios, such as [25], [26] and [32]. In another line of work, in [27], the authors 
have shown that the simplest form of physical layer cooperation, namely multi hop 
forwarding, is an indispensable element in achieving the optimal capacity scaling law in 
networks with asymptotically large numbers of nodes. Multi-hop forwarding has also been 
shown to offer significant gains in the efficiency of energy limited wireless networks [28], 
[29]. These physical layer studies assume that each user is willing to expend energy in 
forwarding packets for other users. This assumption is reasonable in a network with a 
central controller with the ability to enforce the optimal cooperation strategy on the 
different wireless users. The popularity of ad-hoc networks and the increased 
programmability of wireless devices, however, raise serious doubts on the validity of this 
assumption, and hence, motivate investigations on the impact of user selfishness on the 
performance of wireless networks. The following chapters will be full of more details about 
the applications of game theory in wireless telecommunications systems, including 
applications of game theory in interface selections mechanisms, Mobile IPv6 protocol 
extensions, resource allocations and routing in Ad-Hoc wireless network and spectrum 
sharing in Cognitive Radio networks. 
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2.9 Summary 
 
This chapter gives a detailed insight in the game theory definition, classifications and 
applications of games in telecommunications. Prisoners Dilemma and the Battle of the Sexes 
games have been discussed in details, showing different strategies from the players and 
discussing the expected outcome of such games. Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Efficient 
terms are discussed in details with detailed examples. Moreover, we have discussed mixed 
strategies in games and mathematically proved that a mixed strategy in Prisoners’ Dilemma 
example does not exist. We have also proved that a mixed strategy exists in the battle of the 
sexes game. Finally, after classifying games into different categories, an introduction to the 
applications of game theory in Telecommunications is given. 
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3  
 
Design of Game-Based Green Hybrid Vertical Handover 
Model for Heterogeneous Multihomed Wireless Portable 
Devices 
 
 
3.1 Introduction and Motivation 
 
Nowadays, wireless network access is increasingly popular since wireless communication 
offers interesting advantages: it allows movements during communications and network 
access at a fair rate among nodes.  Generally speaking, Mobile IPv6 [1-2] is designed to 
manage Mobile Nodes (MNs’) movements between wireless IPv6 networks. The protocol 
provides unbroken connectivity to IPv6 MNs when they move from one wireless point to 
another in a different subnet, an operation known as layer three handover. However, a MN 
cannot receive IP packets on its new point of attachment until the handover ends. This time 
includes the new prefix discovery on the new subnet, the new care-of address 
establishment, and the time needed to notify the correspondents and home agent about 
the new locality of the MN. This time is called handover latency [3-5]. 
Already, mobile Internet hosts are often equipped with several network interfaces or are 
at least able to connect to such interfaces. These interfaces may use different access 
technologies such as Bluetooth, WLAN and 3G cellular. For this purpose, a few mobile host 
multihoming protocols supporting handovers between interfaces have been proposed. The 
most advanced protocols are able to move single traffic flows independently of each other. 
However, the current solutions do not propose any means for the user to be able to 
dynamically influence the interface selection during operation. Different access technologies 
and access operators offer several types of price and quality. Therefore, a mobile user must 
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be able to affect on the interface selection so that the most suitable of the available 
interfaces is used. Changes in the availability or characteristics of an access network may 
result in a situation, where the user wants to move already established traffic flows from 
one interface to another. 
 
3.2 Multihoming: Definition and Services 
 
There are many examples of Multihoming cases but not real formal definition. We can 
see two basic scenarios: The first is a node with a single network interface, which has been 
assigned multiple IP addresses, and the second is multiple network interfaces on a same 
network node [6]. We can add a third case in higher scale Site Multihoming: When "a 
network site has more than one connection to the public Internet". Multihoming can 
provide us with numerous services: 
1. Redundancy/Fault-tolerance: When an address is not any more reachable, when a 
link goes down or a router has a failure, the reachability to the Internet can be 
provided by the use of other addresses, links or routes. The continuity of the 
connectivity should be transparent for the applications. 
2. Load Sharing: The multihomed host/site should be able to distribute upstream and 
downstream traffic between his interfaces/border routers. 
3. Traffic Policy: The multihomed host/site should be able to define some policy to 
manage the network traffic for reasons of costs, traffic requirements, uses 
conditions, social policy, etc... 
Nevertheless, depending on the service offered, there are many problems to resolve: 
1) Routing scalability: Multi-homing heavily increases the size of routing tables. 
Actually, it is a problem mainly for router located in the backbone of the Internet. 
Theses routers have no default route and must know every route for all top-
providers. For many people it is one of the most important points because it is 
essential to other benefits. 
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2) Transport-Layer Transparency: Change of address/link/router after a multi-homing 
decision should be transparency for transport-layer session. Otherwise, the benefits 
of the Redundancy/Fault-Tolerance are less. 
3) DNS Issues, It is a client host issue: How to deal with multiple addresses for one 
single host. 
4) Packet Filtering/Ingress Filtering: In general, a provider filters his customer’s traffic 
and permit only transient to the Internet packets with addresses that it provided to 
them. 
5) Address selection: For provide benefits of load sharing and policy behaviour, the network 
node must make source and destination address selection for each packet or stream of 
packets. 
 
3.3 Horizontal and Vertical Handoffs in Heterogynous Wireless Networks 
 
At present, researchers consider the Heterogeneous networks to become the main focus 
in the development toward the next generation wireless networks. In the heterogeneous or 
sometimes called converged networks [6-7], both Horizontal Handoff (HHO) (known as 
intra-technology handoff) and Vertical Handoff (VHO) (known as inter-technology handoff) 
[8-9] might take place as illustrated in Figure 3.1. HHO, Occurs when the mobile user 
switches between different networks Accesses Points (AP) of the same kind (e.g., handoff 
among 802.11 APs). VHO, Involves two different network interfaces that usually represent 
different technologies (e.g. Handoff from 802.11 to Bluetooth). One of the main features 
that distinguish between VHO and HHO is symmetry. While, HHO is a symmetric process, 
VHO is an asymmetric process in which the MN moves across two different networks with 
different characteristics. That is where the concept of ‘preferred network’ came from, which 
is the network that offers a better QoS to the MN as compared to the around networks. One 
of the main problems that every MN equipped with multiple interfaces of different 
technologies faces is the ping-pong effect [8-9], which occurs when the MN moves around 
the edges of the AP’s coverage areas as the MN will face multiple signals from different APs 
of different technologies. The MN will be in favour to switch to the AP that offers the 
highest Received Signal Strength (RSS), which might be any of the surrounding ones and 
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that’s will lead to increase the number of unnecessary handovers. We can say that HHO can 
reduce such a problem, as the MN will switch from one AP to another of the same 
technology and in some cases of the same service provider. The ping-pong effect often leads 
to reduce the overall system throughput by causing repeated interruption to the service, 
which leads to increase the overall end-to-end delay, number of lost packets and number of 
retransmissions.  
 
 
Figure 3-1: Horizontal and Vertical Handovers example. 
 
The process of VHO consists of two main scenarios; moving out of the preferred network 
(MO) and moving into the preferred network (MI). It is highly desirable to keep the MN 
within the coverage of the preferred network, as long as the named network satisfies the 
user requirements. This can improve both, the resource utilization of access networks as 
well as the user perceived QoS. What's more, the handoff mechanism should be seamless, 
minimizing user involvement, while dynamically adapting to the wireless channel state, 
network layer characteristics and application requirements.  
Typically, the process of handover can be divided into three main steps [10], System 
Discovery, Handoff Decision and Handoff Execution. The system discovery phase helps the 
MN to determine which network can be accessed and the services available in each 
network. On the other hand, during the handoff decision phase, the MN decides which 
network to connect. The decision may be based on various QoS parameters such as, the 
available bandwidth, service cost, transmit power, current battery life of the mobile device, 
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and the user's/application’s preferences. Finally, during the handoff decision phase, the 
connection needs to be moved from the previous AP and a new connection to be created 
with the new AP in a seamless manner. This phase also includes the authentication and 
authorization, re-routing all users’ traffic through the new route, and the transfer of user's 
context information. 
A seamless handoff can be defined as a handoff scheme that guarantees an ongoing 
connectivity to all the mobile device applications when the handoff occurs; it aims to 
maintain end-to-end data service to overcome any link failure or handoff events. A range of 
seamless handoff techniques have been proposed [12-24], they can be classified into two 
classes; network layer and upper layer approaches (i.e. transport and session layers). 
Seamless handoff solutions, whether network layer or upper layer approaches, are often 
complex to implement and operate. The network layer approach needs upgrading every 
existing router without mobile IP capabilities. Furthermore, the upper layer solution 
requires an update to all existing applications and servers not supporting it. The high cost 
behind implementing these two solutions reduces the chances of implementing them in 
reality. Although, these solutions managed to reduce both handover latency and packet 
loss, they are often considered impartial by the majority of service providers and are still 
rarely deployed in real life.  
A Universal Seamless Handoff Architecture (USHA) was proposed in [14] to deal with 
both horizontal and vertical handoff scenarios with minimal changes in infrastructure, which 
requires deployment of handoff servers only in the Internet. USHA is an upper layer 
solution; yet, instead of introducing a new session layer or a new transport protocol as in 
the upper layer handoff approach, it achieves seamless handoff by following the 
middleware design philosophy, integrating the middleware with existing Internet services 
and applications. USHA is based on the fundamental assumption that handoff, either 
vertical or horizontal, only occurs on overlaid networks with multiple Internet access 
methods (i.e. seamless handoff), which translates to zero waiting time in bringing up the 
target network interface when the handoff event occurs. If coverage from different access 
methods fails to overlap, it is possible for USHA to lose connectivity to the upper layer 
applications. 
In multiple network environments (i.e., different AP’s from different technologies), the 
problem of VHO is one of the main challenges for seamless mobility as it is not possible to 
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define a single parameter by which the mobile device will decide whether the handoff is 
needed or not. Some of the most important factors are: 
1. Service Cost in : one of the major issues that influence the customer’s 
choice is the cost of accessing the network. The network providers may well 
provide a variety of billing plans and options that will probably influence the 
customer’s choice of network and thus handoff decision. 
2. Power Consumption in : generally speaking, wireless devices often operate 
on limited battery life. When the battery level decreases, leaving a network with 
low power consumption might alter the user/mobile device from handing off to 
another network. 
3. Channel Capacity in : a user/mobile device will defiantly be interested 
in staying with a network with a higher offered bandwidth as this will ensure 
lower call dropping and call blocking probabilities, hence higher throughput. 
4. Mobility in : when a mobile device crosses a network having small 
coverage area at high speed, the chances are very low to support a handoff 
process as there is a big chance of a back hand off to the original network. 
5. RSS in : The signal strength has a great role in the HHO decisions due to its 
comparability between the current attachment point RSS and that of the 
candidate attachment points. However, In VHO, the RSSs are incomparable due 
to VHO’s asymmetrical nature. However, they can be used to determine the 
availability as well as the condition of different networks. If more than one 
candidate networks are available, the MN should associate itself with the one 
having the strongest RSS as it does in HHO. 
 
3.4 Hybrid Vertical Handover Model (HVHM) for Multihomed Portable 
Devices 
 
Definition: HVHM is a game-based handoff scheme that maintains the connectivity 
of all applications on the wireless mobile device when the handoff occurs. It aims to provide 
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continuous end-to-end data service in the face of any link break or handoff events, which 
should provide low latency and minimum packet loss. 
In order to design such a model, the decision by which the best network is to be 
chosen may be based on  fixed factors such as the bandwidth offered by the visited network 
(i.e., channel capacity), the cost of using the service, power consumption of the active 
interface, and battery life of the mobile device. On the other hand, other dynamic factors 
must be considered in any handoff decision to improve the effectiveness of the network 
usage. Dynamic factors include the RSS from the access point, which would help in deciding 
whether a handoff is needed or not, and the speed of the MN, as some network might not 
support mobility, especially if the node is moving with relatively high speed. 
Game Theory [25] can be a great help in deciding when to choose the best AP, as 
explained earlier, it is a mathematical concept that deals with the formulation of the correct 
strategy that will enable an individual or entity (i.e., player), when confronted by a complex 
challenge, to succeed in addressing that challenge. The MN interfaces will act as players and 
their individual strategies will be able to choose the AP that offers a better QoS (i.e. payoff 
to the node). Table 3-1 below shows the matrix format of this game, each column 
represents the QoS parameters of each AP, while the rows show the compatible interfaces. 
The results of each interface (i.e. player in the game) actions are represented as A, B and C, 
which can be taken as the payoff of the MN when choosing the named interface. 
 
Table 3-1: Matrix format of the game selection process. 
 
QoS Parameters 
AP#1 AP#2 AP#3 
Interface#1 A,-,- -,-,- -,-,- 
Interface#2 -,-,- -,B,- -,-,- 
Interface#3 -,-,- -,-,- -,-,C 
 
Since each interface will be compatible with at least one AP, the mechanism will not 
be complicated. The winner will be calculated easily throughout a game-based score 
function. In fact, if the MN moves across multiple AP of the same technology, the 
mechanism will only check the compatible interface and choose the winning AP. Nash 
equilibrium can be achieved easily when the MN reach to the decision of which AP to 
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choose. Once the QoS received from this AP is acceptable, the mechanism will force the MN 
to stay with the named AP until a handoff is needed.  
Previous works dealing with VHO, which to the author’s knowledge are very few and 
include simple extensions to the common HHO techniques. Throughout this literature, we 
have recorded three main approaches for VHO algorithms. The first approach combines the 
RSS with other parameters such as network loading [7-10]. In the second approach, artificial 
intelligence techniques are used, where several parameters are combined in the handoff 
decision such as network conditions and MN’s mobility [11]. Finally, the third approach 
combines service cost, power consumption, and available bandwidth in a cost function 
estimated for the available access networks, which is then used in the MN handoff decision 
[13-14]. Several papers followed the same approach of the one introduced in [12]; the 
authors introduced a policy enabled handoff. This system separates the decision making 
from the handoff mechanism. The introduced system allows users to express policies on 
what is the “best” wireless system at any moment and make tradeoffs among network 
characteristics and dynamics such as cost, performance and power consumption. In [15] a 
generic vertical handoff decision function is proposed, which gives an indication of whether 
or not a handoff is needed based on different weighted factors and metric qualities such as 
financial cost, quality of service, power requirements, and user preferences. The 
performance of the whole system is considered by taking VHO decisions by providing users’ 
needs in a decision strategy model introduced in [16]. The introduced strategy selects the 
best network based on the highest RSS and lowest Variation of received signal strength 
(VRSS), thus it reduce the number of unnecessary handoffs, which ensures a better system 
performance. In [17], the handoff decision is based on a time adaptive scheme by adjusting 
interface activating intervals based on the user’s movement and the actual network 
performance. In [27], the authors defined a system-wise entity that is activated when a user 
is in an area with over-lapping access technologies and needs to decide what is the best 
technology to be used in order to optimize the overall system performance metric in terms 
of throughput and capacity limitations. In [28], the authors proposes a dynamic decision 
model to deicide “best” network at “best” time moment to handoffs. The proposed DVH 
decision model based on dynamic factors, such as RSS values and velocity of the mobile 
node. On the other hand, in [29], the authors proposed an Autonomic Handover Manager 
(AHM) based on the autonomic computing concept to decide the best network interface to 
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handover in 4G networks. The proposed model decides the appropriate policy for the 
specific service or application without the user’s intervention using the context information 
from the mobile terminal (i.e. type of application and its requirement and device power 
status), the network (i.e. reachability of access points) and the user (i.e. user settings, 
application settings and willingness to pay).  
 Previous models that used either static parameters (cost, power consumption, 
bandwidth, etc…) or only one dynamic parameter (RSS and node mobility), intended to 
improve the system performance, except the work of [29]. However, none of these systems 
combined game theory with the two types of parameters in one model (i.e. static and 
dynamic factors) to use the advantages of learning ability and dominate strategies in games. 
In the following sections a game-based hybrid handoff mechanism is introduced, which uses 
both RSS and MN velocity as dynamic factors all together with static factors including 
service cost, Link capacity, and power consumption to improve the system performance. 
Although, in [30], the authors introduced a game-theoretic model to help the node to select 
a better AP in terms of load and distance, they did not take into account user and/or 
application requirement, the mobility of the node and they consider the case of HHO only. 
Figure 3-2 shows the proposed HVHM decision model, a handoff control centre (HCC), 
monitors the various inputs collected from the network interfaces and their APs, analyze 
this information and took handoff decisions. The HCC also provides the connection between 
the network interface and the upper layer applications. HCC consist of six components; 
Network Analysis (NA), Network Discovery (ND), Hybrid Handoff decision (HHD), Game-
based Controller (GC), system monitor(SM) and Handoff executor (HE). NA is in charge of 
monitoring the status of each network interface in the MN (i.e. network offered bandwidth, 
user charges to access the service, and energy consumption of network interface) and 
analyzing these information based on the calculated score function. SM monitors and 
reports system information (i.e. battery life, application needs and user preferences) to NA 
module. ND module discovers all the available networks at fixed time intervals. It monitors 
the mobility of MN, the RSS of the AP, selects the candidate networks and assigns them 
priorities. 
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Figure 3-2: HVHM decision model. 
 
Finally, the HHD module takes the decision based on the results received from GC, for 
selecting the “best” network to handoff, based on the inputs from NA and ND modules to 
GC. Each component is explained in more details below: 
i. Network Discovery (ND): this model’s objective is to identify all available networks 
and assign priorities to them. This process is divided into two parts; 
1) The network will be added to the candidate list if the RSS is higher than its 
threshold value and its mobility threshold is greater than the velocity of the 
MN. We assume that  is the set of available network 
interfaces in our MN, and  is the total number of available networks. 
, is the set of threshold values of velocities 
for a MN for the respective networks.  is the 
set of threshold values of RSS of respective networks. The set of values of 
differences between the RSS and its threshold value is represented by 
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. The set of eligible candidate networks into 
which the handoff can take place is represented by CN. 
, is the set of priorities of the jth network, and 
. The mechanism scans all networks and compares the MN 
velocity with, if it satisfies the condition, the mechanism scans the AP’s RSS 
value, and assign higher priority to APs with higher RSS. The network AP and 
MN is observed for the RSS and mobility respectively at the specified time 
intervals and the decisions are taken as the algorithm below to select the 
candidate networks, assuming that the MN is currently in network : 
If  then 
For all  where  
If  then 
 
 
 
2) Network Assignment part: the network with the higher RssDiff will be 
assigned with a high priority. This is because a higher RssDiff means the MN is 
nearer to the AP of the named network and hence the MN can stay in that 
cell for longer before looking to handoff to another network. This will reduce 
the number of unnecessary handoffs and improve the overall performance of 
the system. The priorities are assigned according to the following algorithm, 
assuming that  networks are available in the list; 
While  Do 
if  then 
 
else if  then 
 
else if , the list will be ordered in an ascending order then 
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ii. System Monitor (SM): the objectives of this model is to monitor the current battery 
level of the MN and record the user preferences for various networks based on the 
current battery life, network offered bandwidth, service charges and energy 
consumption by their interface card. 
iii. Network Analysis (NA): this module is to keep a record of the network 
characteristics, the offered bandwidth by the network (BWn), energy consumption of 
using network access device (Pn), and the service charge of the network (Cn). After 
that, it will forward all these information along with the data received from the 
previous stages to the game controller. 
iv. Game-based Controller (GC): this module is based on a static score function S, which 
is a static-based function of the following parameters; 
     (3-1) 
Where, SCn is the static score function of network n. Normalization is needed to 
ensure that the sum of the values in different units is meaningful. Generally, if there are k 
factors to consider the score function, the score function of the interface i will be a sum of k 
weighted factors. 
 (3-2) 
In the equation,  represent the weight of factor  of interface  defined according 
to user and/or application needs, and  is the normalized score value of factor  for 
interface . For our model; 
    (3-3) 
Where , , and  are the weight factors for the offered bandwidth, service 
cost, and the power consumption by the network interface respectively, these parameters 
can be defined from the user or the application preferences. , , and  are the 
normalized values of interface i’s offered bandwidth, power consumption and service cost 
respectively. Whereas; 
 
 
  (3-4) 
Chapter 3: Design of Game-Based GHVHM for Heterogeneous Multihomed Wireless MN’s. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 42 
The coefficients , , and  are assumed to be greater than or equal to zero and less 
than one. The exponential functions have been used to increase the sensitivity of the 
functions to the respective parameters they are related to. Finally, they are inversed in 
order to bind the functions to a value between zero and one. It can be observed from these 
equations that high bandwidth value contributes proportionately to the SC function, 
whereas cost and power consumption contribute inversely to SC. This is because, an 
interface having a better bandwidth is a better choice to the MN, while an interface costing 
more or a link consuming more power is a poor choice to the MN. 
v. Hybrid Handover Decision: the final decision of selecting a particular network from 
the candidate list is the responsibility of this module. A dynamic score function is 
calculated in this phase for each network i as below; . Where  is 
calculated by the GC module and  is calculated in the ND module. The network 
with the highest value of  is selected as the best network to handoff to. 
It is very important to mention that, the network selection process will depend on a size 20 
First-In-First-Out (FIFO) list, as shown in Figure 3-3. The Model checks a maximum of 20 AP’s 
at a time, and compares the new comers with the ones saved in the list, only if the preferred 
AP exist. Introducing such a list will reduce the chances of increasing the size of any 
temporary file, which might be used to save the details of any AP the MN visits. What’s 
more, such list will reduce the chances of complexity in the introduced model, as it will 
make the computation process easier to the GC and improves the ability to get the 
preferred AP using our model. Any new comer is to be added to the top of the list and all 
entries after the 20th entry will be deleted, which will insure a better chance to the 
newcomers and never leave any old APs behind.  
Finally, we can summarize the algorithm of the HVHM to four main phases: network 
discovery, network analysis, Game Controller and network selection and execution. The 
network discovery phase is used to remove all the unwanted and ineligible networks from 
the prospective candidate networks. This is done by adding all available networks into 
candidate list, scanning them and recording each network RSS. This will be followed by 
recording the speed of the MN and removing networks which do not satisfy cretin RSS and 
mobility. The network with higher RSS will be assigned with higher priority as compared to 
other networks in the list, and the list will be forwarded to the next phase. The network 
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analysis phase is used to accommodate user-specific preferences, which is expressed in 
terms of weight factors, regarding the usage of network interfaces. First, current system 
status are collected from SM component and the weight factor determined, then these 
information to be collect from every wireless interface in the candidate list collected in the 
previous phase. Before continuing to the final phase, the game-based cost function is 
calculated for every network. Finally, the network selection and execution phase is used to 
select the “best” network and executing the handoff to the selected network. 
 
 
Figure 3-3: FIFO Access Points table. 
 
3.5 Simulation Scenario 
 
In order to evaluate the proposed HVHM, several application scenarios are written in 
MATLAB. A heterogeneous network systems where two cellular systems GPRS and UMTS 
and WLAN and Bluetooth form an overlay structure, as shown in Figure 3-4. A MN with four 
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network interfaces can move around the shown structure through any network during 
simulation.  
Throughout our scenarios, the MN can be in any of the regions shown in Figure 3-4, A, B, C, 
D, E or F and can access the networks according to their coverage area as follow; 
1. Access to UMTS network only when the MN in region A. 
2. Access both UMTS and GPRS networks when the MN in region B. 
3. Access UMTS, GPRS and 802.11b networks when the MN in region C. 
4. Access all networks when the MN in region D. 
5. Access UMTS, GPRS and Bluetooth networks when the MN in region E. 
6. Finally, access GPRS network only when the MN in region F. 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Simulation scenario. 
 
The simulation results are based on different scenarios, the MN is assumed moving 
around all networks with different speed, different weight values of service cost, available 
bandwidth and energy consumption varies as well. The simulation start with 10000 packets 
transmitted with the assumed parameters shown in Table 3-2, where we assume that the 
battery life varied from one access technology to another [26]. Based on the fact that the 
MN will require more time to communicate using the Bluetooth interface as compared to 
other networks because of its low data rate, thus it will consume its power faster.  The same 
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assumption works for the rest, keeping in mind that this factor is based on the assumption 
that the whole MN (i.e. its interfaces and applications) uses the battery not only the 
interface to access different services.  
The simulations are repeated for four models; standard VHO model (with two cases, 
one when the VHO decision model is based on static factors, and when the decision model 
is based on the dynamic factors) [16-17 and 28-29], UVSH [14] and our HVHM. The results 
are carried out for the number of handoffs in each scenario and the number of lost packets 
over the simulation time. 
 
Table 3-2: Simulation Assumption. 
 UMTS 802.11b Bluetooth GPRS 
Battery Consumption 4  3  2  3.5  
Power to Transmit one bit 300  200  140  260  
Power to Receive one bit 300  200  140  260  
Service Cost 0.8    0.5  
Bandwidth 2  5  0.8  150  
RSS Threshold 130  60  20  120  
Mobility Threshold  20  10  2  16  
Delay 2  11  16  4  
 
3.6 Simulation Results 
 
The results presented in this section, are compared to highlight the advantages of 
using the proposed mechanism all the way through reducing the number of handoffs, end-
to-end delay and number of packets lost/dropped during the simulation time. We assume 
that the MN always starts from the 802.11b coverage and moves around all coverage areas. 
Moreover, the weights of the factors mentioned in Table 3-2 are changed with different 
speeds for the MN (i.e. starting from 1 m/sec, 5 m/sec and 10 m/sec.). These results are to 
be compared with the USHA, introduced in [3] and two vertical handoff schemes, one using 
static factors to decide whether a handoff is needed or not and the other using dynamic 
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factors only. The radius of each coverage area as follows; UMTS radius of 2600m, GPRS 
coverage radius of 1400m, 802.11b radius of 120m and Bluetooth coverage radius of 15m.  
Firstly, it is assumed that both the power and service cost weights are equal and the 
bandwidth requirement is changing during the simulation time. Secondly, we set both the 
power and bandwidth weights to be equal and assume that the service cost needs are 
changing over simulation time. Finally, the bandwidth and service cost weights are set to be 
equal and the power weight is to be changed. Keeping in mind that the simulation results 
are examined based on three different speeds, as we mentioned earlier, and the simulation 
is tested over 10 minutes for each case. Results are shown in Figures 3-5, 3-6 and 3-7: 
 
 
Figure 3-5: Handover rate, when Wc=Wp, MN’s velocity=1m/sec. 
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Figure 3-6: Handover rate, when Wc=Wp, MN’s velocity=5m/sec. 
 
 
Figure 3-7: Handover rate, when Wc=Wp, MN’s velocity=10m/sec. 
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From Figures 3-5, 3-6 and 3-7, we can see that the handover rates (i.e. number of 
handovers per minute during simulation time) increases as the velocity of the MN increases. 
However, using HVHM, the number of handoffs reduced to less than 50% in some cases. 
This is because we have introduced a decision model where the MN will decide whether a 
handoff is needed or not. Moreover, we can see that the number of handoffs increases as 
the weights of different factors increases, and as the number of factors taking into account 
increases as well. Interestingly, DVH mechanism shows a slight increase in the number of 
VHO’s as compared to the SVH when the mobile speed goes up to 10 m/sec. This is due to 
the fact that the handover decision in the case of DVH is based on dynamic factors and the 
RSS from the around AP’s plays a major role in deciding whether a handover is needed or 
not. When the MN moves in a fast speed, the probability of handing over to the surrounding 
AP’s will increase thus increasing the chance of facing the ping-pong effect. 
 
 
Figure 3-8: Handover rate, when Wbw=Wp, MN’s velocity=1m/sec. 
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Figure 3-9: Handover rate, when Wbw=Wp, MN’s velocity=5m/sec. 
 
 
Figure 3-10: Handover rate, when Wbw=Wp, MN’s velocity=10m/sec. 
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Once again, looking to Figures 3-8, 3-9 and 3-10, we can see very clearly that the 
handoffs rate increases as the speed of the MN increases and once the number of factors 
increases. It can be seen that there is a slight increase in the number of VHO’s compared to 
the previous scenario as the MN will be much interested in handing over to an AP which 
offers a better bandwidth and it will not be worried about the service costs at some points. 
Again, our HVHM provide a massive reduction in the number of handoffs as compared to 
the other models for the same reasons mentioned earlier.  
 
 
Figure 3-11: Handover rate, when Wbw=Wc, MN’s velocity=1m/sec. 
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Figure 3-12: Number of handoffs when Wbw=Wc, MN’s velocity=1m/sec. 
 
 
Figure 3-13: Handover rate, when Wbw=Wc, MN’s velocity=5m/sec. 
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Figure 3-14: Handover rate, when Wbw=Wc, MN’s velocity=10m/sec. 
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shows better results as compared to the SVH, however, when the MN velocity increases the 
number of handovers increases as the handoff decision is based on RSS values received 
from the AP’s which would increase the unnecessary handoffs. Finally, our HVHM shows the 
minimum end-to-end delay as compared to the other mechanisms, because of its ability to 
use both static and dynamic factors in order to decide whether a handoff is needed or not 
and to chose the right AP if the handoff is needed. 
Finally, Figure 3-15 shows the rate of lost packets during the simulation time. 
Similarly, the number of packets lost over the simulation time increases as the number of 
HO’s increase, which considered as one of the major reasons behind the lost of 
transmitted/received packets and number of retransmissions during communication time. 
For the same reasons discussed in previous sections, HVHM shows much better results as 
compared to other mechanisms, which will improve the overall communication experience 
of the MN over the entire simulation time. Furthermore, DVH mechanism shows better 
results as compared to SVH when the MN speed is low and the opposite is true when the 
velocity of the node increases. 
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Figure 3-15: Overall delay when using different VHO mechanisms. 
 
 
Figure 3-16: Rate of lost packets over different VHO mechanisms. 
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To sum up this section, the HVHM presented in the previous sections adapts three 
phases approach to improve the MN VHO’s experience during the communication time, this 
approach consist of the priority phase, the normal phase and the decision phase. The 
discovery of all available networks, filtering out illegible APs based on RSS and MN’s speed 
and assign priorities to these APs is done within the priority phase. The differences between 
the RSS and RssT and the MN speed measures the priority of each AP, the more the 
difference the higher the priority. The normal phase checks the user and the application 
needs to record the static factors (i.e. offered bandwidth, power consumption and service 
cost) of each AP. Finally, calculating the score function based on the weights from the 
previous phase is done within the decision phase to choose the right access point. The 
results show how this model managed to reduce the number of VHO’s and the end-to-end 
delay and the overall number of lost packets during the simulation time. 
 
3.7 Power Consumption in Multihomed Wireless Portable Nodes 
 
So far, the VHO problem has been discussed in multihomed mobile devices. 
However, we must mention another drawback of such devices that is all its wireless 
interfaces are kept ‘ON’ over the entire communication time. This will consume a huge 
amount of its battery life, keeping in mind that the majority of mobile wireless devices 
depend on its battery to keep itself going. Each interface consumes cretin amount of energy 
for transmitting or receiving packets from the AP, as shown in Table 3-2, which depends on 
the technology the interface is operating on [26]. In order to solve such a problem, we 
present our Green Hybrid Vertical Handover Model (GHVHM). In this model the MN’s 
interfaces will be turned ‘ON’ only to check if there is a chance to switch to a better AP 
when the HO is needed. Figure 3-16 below shows these two decision points defined in our 
design. 
Traditionally, the HO mechanism initiated when the RSS value goes beyond a 
threshold value (i.e. RssT). However, since we have multiple interfaces, we defined another 
point (i.e. RssONT), which will be used by a controller as a trigger point for the other 
interfaces (different values of this point have been used and they all lead to similar results). 
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The mechanism works as follows; once the MN starts looking for a connection all the 
interfaces are turned ‘ON’. 
 
 
Figure 3-17: HO decision points. 
 
The cost function defines the ‘winner’ AP, the communications start and the rest of 
the interfaces switched ‘OFF’. Once the RSS value reached the RssONT point, the game 
controller will turn the rest of the interfaces and the cost function will work again, a new 
‘winner’ will be defined and the HO mechanism will be executed once the RSS goes below 
the RssT point and the rest of the interfaces will turned ‘OFF’ again. One drawback of this 
mechanism is that, while only one interface is ‘ON’ and the rest are ‘OFF’, the MN might 
move across a better coverage in terms of QoS and the MN will not receive any 
advertisement from that AP as its compatible interface is switched ‘OFF’. However, keeping 
in mind that the introduced mechanism will keep ongoing communication with acceptable 
QoS achieved from the current AP and save a considerable amount of energy during the 
communication time, this mechanism can be considered as a great success. Figure 3-17 
below shows the mechanism works. 
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Figure 3-18: Structure of GHVHM mechanism. 
 
In order to test this mechanism, we assumed that the MN has a 15000 Joule of 
energy in its battery and we repeated the previous scenario with the same HO mechanisms 
in order to measure the reaming energy in the MN after 24 minutes of communication time. 
We only take into account the power consumed by the MN interfaces, we did not take into 
consideration the amount of power consumed by the MN applications. The mechanisms will 
be compared over three different speeds (i.e. 1 m/sec, 5 m/sec and 10 m/sec) and the static 
factors weights are assumed to be as the following; Wp = Wc = 0.35 and Wb=0.3.  
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Figure 3-19: Power consumption using different VHO mechanism. 
 
From Figure 3-19, we can easily recognize the massive amount of power saved by 
GHVHM as compared to the other mechanisms. This is simply because we managed to 
merge the advantages of both HVHM in the GHVHM reducing the number of unnecessary 
handoffs and choosing the AP that gives the best QoS at the right time. Moreover, forcing 
the interfaces that are not engaged in any communication to be switched ‘OFF’ until a 
handoff is needed. The MN will face a similar problem, as in the previous section, when 
MN’s speed increases, the number of handovers increases as well, which means that the 
interfaces will be turned ‘ON’ more often and more energy to be consumed. However, since 
our GHVHM mechanism manages to reduce the number of handoffs to more than 50% as 
compared to the rest, the amount of power saved when the MN velocity is 10 m/sec is more 
than double the amount saved using other mechanisms. The DVH mechanism shows the 
worst results in terms of saving energy when the MN velocity reaches 10 m/sec, this is due 
to the same reasons explained earlier where the MN will face repeated HO’s because the 
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number of advertisements received from the around APs will increase while the node is 
crossing several coverage areas. 
 
3.8 Summary 
 
Throughout this chapter, Green Game-Based Hybrid Vertical Handover Model for 
heterogeneous wireless networks is proposed and explained in details. This model works as 
a game-based extension to the Hybrid Vertical Handover Model, which combines both 
dynamic and static factors to decide when a handover is needed. The model aims to reduce 
the number of unnecessary handovers and reduce the energy consumed from the mobile 
node’s battery. A game theory-based decision model is introduced, which controls the 
handover decision process and insures that the mobile node will choose the right access 
point at the right time. A simulation-based comparison is made between different vertical 
handover models to show the advantages of the proposed model over other models. 
The proposed model shows a novel advantage over previously introduced models by 
reducing the node power consumption. The model combines both static and dynamic factor 
in the handoff management process rather than using other works when authors used static 
factors only [7-10] or dynamic factors only [11, 13, 27-28], or using a server-based 
applications in order to deal with the scenario as a seamless handoff [14]. 
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4  
 
Design of a Green Game-Based Multi-Interface Fast-
Handover Mobile IPv6 Protocol 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In recent years, we have seen an increasing demand from end-users to access 
network resources from anywhere and at anytime from all kinds of devices. Mobile 
computing has become an important area of computer networking and is expected to play a 
fundamental role in the ubiquitous access of Internet resources in the future. A greater 
degree of connectivity is almost becoming mandatory in today’s business world. In addition, 
mobility of end-users is placing further requirements on network systems and protocols to 
provide uninterrupted services.  
Mobile IP is an open standard, defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
RFC 2002 that allows users to keep the same IP address, stay connected, and maintain 
ongoing communications while roaming between IP networks. Mobile IP is scalable for the 
Internet because it is based on IP—any media that can support IP can support Mobile IP [1]. 
Roaming is a general term in Wireless Communications that means the ability of MN to 
extend connectivity in a location that is different from its home location where the service 
was registered. Mobile IP provides efficient, scalable mechanisms for roaming within the 
internet [2-3]. Moreover, the use of Mobile IP, allow MN’s to randomly change their point of 
attachment and maintain ongoing communication with their destinations without changing 
their IP addresses.  
Mobile network protocols such as Mobile IPv4 have emerged as one of the 
promising solutions capable of providing uninterrupted connectivity. It allows the users to 
Chapter 4 
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travel beyond their home network while still maintain their own home IP address. Similarly, 
Mobile IPv6 is the protocol that deals with the mobility for the IPv6 nodes. This protocol 
allows an IPv6 node to be mobile, and randomly change its location on the IPv6 Internet 
while still maintaining its existing connections [3]. The following sections include brief 
definitions of some of the most important terms used within this chapter.  
 
4.2 Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6 
 
4.2.1 Care-of-Address 
 
In brief, Mobile IP works as follows; each MN can have tow addresses home address and 
a Care of Address (CoA), where the Care of Address is required by the MNs when it moves 
away from its home networking and getting a service from a new network known as the 
Foreign Network. Each MN can acquire this address in two ways:  
a) FACoA (Foreign Agent CoA): which is the case where each MNs in the Foreign 
Network will have the same IP address provided by the Foreign Agent.  
b) Collocated CoA: In this case, each MN will have its own IP address provided by the 
Foreign Agent. 
 
4.2.2 Mobility Support in MIPv6 
 
Mobility support in IPv6 is particularly important, as mobile computers are likely to 
account for a majority or at least a substantial fraction of the population of the Internet 
during the lifetime of IPv6 [4]. In fact, Mobile IPv6 allows MNs to move away from its home 
network without the need of changing their Home Address. Packets and data may be routed 
to the MN using its address regardless of the current location of the MN. Moreover, the MN 
may also continue to communicate with other nodes (Mobile or Stationary) after moving to 
the new link. 
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The Mobile IPv6 is just as suitable for mobility across heterogeneous media as 
suitable for mobility across homogeneous media [5]. For example, in the case of a MN 
running IPv6 protocol will keep the same communicate capability while it moves from 
Ethernet segment to another Ethernet segment or the case where the MN moves from 
Ethernet segment to a wireless local area network (WLAN) cell. In both cases, the MN IP 
address will remain the same. 
 
4.2.3 Packet Forwarding 
 
As mentioned above, each MN will have two addresses. The home address, which is 
visible to all the users and the other one, is the care-of-address, which is known only by the 
home agent. Where the care-of-address is a temporary address assigned to the MN, and any 
user or their applications do not know it. Both, Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6 share the same 
ideas, but their implementations are somewhat different [6]. In the case of Mobile IPv4, the 
foreign agent is responsible for assigning a care-of-address to the MN dynamically, and 
forwarding the packets to it. All the packets destined to the MN will be encapsulated and 
tunnelled by the home agent and sent to the foreign agent. The foreign agent then de-
capsulate the packets and send them to the MN. On the other hand, the Mobile IPv6 data 
delivery works in a similar way as Mobile IPv4 delivery, but if the Correspondent node is 
Mobile IPv6 compatible, then the data packets are sent directly to the MN's location on the 
IPv6 network. Moreover, if the correspondent node is not Mobile IPv6 compatible, data 
packets are sent to the MN's home address. The home agent then intercepts the data 
packets and tunnels them using IPv6-over-IPv6 tunnelling to the MN's care-of address. The 
data packets include a new routing extension header that contains the MN's home address. 
 
4.2.4 Movement Detection in MIPv4 
 
In the case of mobile IPv4, detection the movement of MNs is fundamental issue. If 
the MN does not act on moving, its connection to the Internet may be lost at any time. 
Furthermore, may the MN find itself in range of more than one access point, which means 
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that, it must decide which one to connect with? The MN may choose to register with more 
than one foreign agent simultaneously, but that is not a very effective approach [7]. 
As a result, MNs need to make sure that they have moved from one foreign agent to 
another. The Mobile IP standard [8] specifies three such algorithms, lazy cell switching, 
eager cell switching, and prefix matching. In all three of these cases, a MN must hear a 
router advertisement from the new foreign agent before considering changing foreign 
agents [7]. 
 
4.2.4.1 Lazy Cell Switching 
 
Using lazy cell switching the MN waits until the lifetime of its registration with the 
current foreign agent expires and then tries to reregister or discover a new foreign agent to 
register with [6]. In general, each router advertisement includes a lifetime, the duration of a 
routing advertisement. With lazy cell switching, a MN will never switch its foreign agents 
unless it does not hear another router advertisement from the agent to which it is 
connected within that agent’s last router advertisement lifetime. This does not prevent the 
MN from listening to other agents’ advertisements. Indeed, a MN may immediately register 
with another agent once its previous agent’s advertisement expires. Generally speaking, the 
lifetime is at least three times the interval between router advertisements. This means that 
a MN may remain disconnected for as long as 40 or more seconds before re-registering with 
another agent. Clearly, this is not ideal for rapidly moving nodes. However, for slow moving 
nodes, it does provide stability [9]. 
 
4.2.4.2 Prefix Matching 
 
Using prefix matching the MN analyzes the network prefix in the agent 
advertisements that it receives. In case the network prefixes changes, the MN determines 
that it has changed its network and tries to discover a new agent or obtain a new collocated 
address [6]. This algorithm uses routing advertisements, which may optionally contain a 
prefix length option, which, in combination with the advertisement’s source address, may 
be used to calculate the originating subnet of the foreign agent. A MN may use this subnet 
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to determine whether it is crossing into another foreign agent’s domain and, therefore, 
needs to re-register with the new agent, or whether it remains within the same domain and 
does not need to re-register. Of course, this presumes that both the old and the new foreign 
agent include the prefix matching option in their advertisements [9]. It also implies that 
each foreign agent presides over its own subnet, which may not be the case. 
 
4.2.4.3 Low Latency Handover 
 
Using eager cell switching the assumption is that the MN is moving towards the new 
network; therefore the best strategy is to register with a foreign agent of that cell as quickly 
as possible [6]. The strategy is to register with new foreign agents as soon as they are 
discovered. This makes it possible to maintain a constant connection to the Internet. In 
general, nodes tend to move along the same direction they are travelling. This simple, yet 
key, fact means that once a node hears from a new foreign agent, it will likely enter and 
cross that new foreign agent’s domain and, likewise, quit its previous foreign agent’s 
domain. Under eager cell switching, a MN registers with a new foreign agent as soon as it 
hears that agent’s first advertisement. It will remain with that agent until it hears an 
advertisement from a new agent. A new foreign agent in this context means either an agent 
whom the node has never heard before or an agent, which has not sent a new 
advertisement before the expiration of its previous advertisement. In this way, the eager 
cell-switching algorithm avoids oscillating registration between two foreign agents when 
both are reachable by the MN. It does not, however, prevent oscillation in the case where 
foreign agents become visible and invisible for periods longer than their router 
advertisement lifetimes. 
 
4.2.5 Movement Detection in MIPv6 
 
To detect a movement, Mobile IPv6, like Mobile IPv4, relies on Router 
Advertisements, but extends and modifies them to better support mobility [10]. Firstly, it 
reduces the minimum Router Advertisement advertisement interval from 3 seconds to 0.05 
seconds and the maximum from 1800 seconds to 1.5 seconds. Secondly, MNs may send 
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Router Solicitations messages more often than the specified three every 4 seconds. Thirdly, 
it adds a Router Advertisement Interval option, which contains the maximum interval at 
which advertisements are sent. MNs can assume they have missed at least one 
advertisement if the interval passes without receiving an advertisement [11]. Router 
Advertisements are just one piece of the IPv6 Neighbour Discovery mechanism. Mobile IPv6 
nodes can use Neighbour Unreachability Detection (NUD) to detect link failures by receiving 
hints from upper layer protocols as to whether connections are making “forward progress” 
[12]. In this way, the MN knows whether it is still attached to its default router. MNs can 
also use link-layer information to guess whether the MN has changed its IP links, however, 
changing link-layer cells does not mean that the IP link has changed [10]. Indeed, many sites 
use one IP subnet per group of cells. For this reason, MNs should send Neighbour 
Solicitations messages to determine whether they have actually changed IP links. 
MNs may use any policy to decide whether they have actually changed links. Mobile 
IPv6 MNs will likely have more movement information available to them than Mobile IPv4 
nodes, so they will have more algorithms available than the eager and lazy cell switching 
algorithms in Mobile IPv4. 
 
4.2.6 Route Optimization 
 
Using Mobile IP protocol, all datagram’s destined to a MN are routed through that 
MN's home agent, which then tunnels each datagram to the MN's current location through 
the new foreign agent [13+. These indirect routing delays the delivery of the datagram’s to 
MNs, and places an unnecessary load on the networks and routers along their paths through 
the Internet. To reduce such delays, datagram’s can be routed directly from a 
correspondent node to a MN without going to the home agent first [11], collectively 
referred as Route Optimization. Route Optimization extensions provide a means for nodes 
to reserve the binding update of a MN and to then tunnel their own datagram’s designated 
to the named MN directly to the care-of address indicated in that binding, ignoring the MN's 
home agent.  Extensions are also provided to allow datagram’s in flight when a MN moves, 
and datagram has sent based on an out-of-date cached binding, to be forwarded directly to 
the MN's new care-of address [13]. However, this binding messages is then used to modify 
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the handling of outgoing (as well as the processing of incoming) packets, leading to security 
risks [14].  
When a MN’s home agent receives a datagram from the home network, it tunnels it 
to the MN via the foreign agent. Meanwhile, the home agent may find that the original 
source of the datagram does not have the binding cache entry for the destination MN. In 
this case, the Home agent should send a binding update message to the source node, 
informing it of the MNs current car-of-address (the current mobility binding). No 
acknowledgment for such binding update messages is needed, because the home agent 
may receive additional future datagram when the MN changes its location. For security 
reasons, both the MN and its home agent must have established a mobility security 
association in order to the binding update messages to be authenticated. 
Finally, the MN is responsible for frequently retransmitting a binding update 
message to its previous foreign agent until the matching binding acknowledge message is 
received by the MN, or until it make sure that foreign agent has expire its binding. 
Moreover, the MN is likely the one how select a small timeout value for these frequent 
binding messages to be sent to the previous foreign agent, as shown in Figure 4-1 below.  
 
 
Figure 4-1: Route optimization in MIP. 
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4.3 Recent Development to MIPv6 Protocol 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
Nowadays wireless technologies are widely used in IPv6 [15] communications. In 
addition to sharp increase of mobile terminals, various kinds of wireless technologies are 
available for MNs. Therefore, many MNs begin to have multiple wireless interfaces and 
every user wants to use them simultaneously to reinforce connectivity to the Internet.  
Selection of the most efficient and suitable access network to meet a specific application’s 
QoS requirements has thus recently become a significant topic, the actual focus of which is 
maximizing the QoS experienced by the user. The main concept is that users will rely on 
intelligent network selection decision strategies to aid them in optimal network selection. 
Fast-handover Mobil IPv6 (FMIPv6) [16] already offers some rudimentary handover 
features. For instance, a MN may send a Binding Update to its Present Access Router (PAR). 
This causes the PAR to redirect packets towards the new Care-of-Address (CoA) of the MN. 
In the present context, while the MN moves around a certain area, it keeps checking the 
around Access Routers (AR’s), once it receives that there is an AR around it, it will start the 
handover procedure between the PAR and the New Access Router (NAR). Yet, there is no 
way for the user and/or the application to force the MN not to make the handover in order 
to stay with the AR that offers a better service. On the other hand, Game Theory [17] is a set 
of tools developed to model interactions between agents with conflicting interests, and is 
thus well suited to address some problems in communications systems, which might be 
related to interface and/or network selection mechanisms. Game theory skills can be easily 
adapted for use in radio resource management mechanisms in a heterogeneous 
environment. Accordingly, the following sections present a mechanism for combining 
interface and/or network selection mechanisms and game theory. In such a way that the 
user and/or the application will have the ability to dynamically control which network to 
access while moving around different AP’s. 
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4.3.2 Recent Extensions to MIPv6 
 
Recently, various kinds of wireless technologies are available for the MNs. Mobile 
IPv6 [1] describes the protocol operations for a MN to maintain connectivity to the Internet 
during its handover from one AR to another. As mentioned earlier that the solution of 
keeping ongoing connectivity on the move is by using several interfaces and use them 
simultaneously. However, the basic Mobile IPv6 protocol [15] cannot support the 
simultaneous usage of multiple interfaces, because MIPv6 does not allow a MN to register 
multiple CoA’s corresponding to multiple attachments of several interfaces. The reason why 
everybody is looking to add multiple wireless technologies to a MN is clearly, that they can 
be used for various purposes. For example, an interface can be used as backup to recover 
from possible loss of Internet connectivity of another interface. Moreover, two or more 
interfaces can be used simultaneously to increase the aggregate bandwidth, or load sharing 
of different applications. Lately, the multiple CoA registration protocol [18] extends Mobile 
IPv6 protocol with an option called “Binding Unique Identifier (BID) sub option” to associate 
multiple CoA’s with one home address.  Although the Mobile IPv6 protocol describes a 
procedure to maintain connectivity to the Internet during handover, the involved handover 
latency may degrade the quality of the Internet applications, which are delay-sensitive or 
throughput-sensitive. However, in the case of Mobile IPv6 using multiple CoA registration, 
packet tunnelling to a NAR during handover of one interface can incur performance 
degradation due to severe packet reordering when multiple interfaces are simultaneously 
used for load sharing. This is because the partial traffic flow destined to the interface 
involved in handover is suspended during the handover process and later tunnelled to NAR, 
but the MN may receive continuously the other partial traffic flow through another 
interfaces not involving handover. That could incur severe reordering if the handover 
procedure is delayed or unstable by ping-pong effects, the repeated handoffs between two 
access points caused by rapid fluctuations in the received signal strengths from both access 
points. In case the traffic is a TCP flow, this reordering severely degrades the throughput 
performance by turning on the TCP congestion control. This could also affect real-time 
applications. 
As a result, the fast handover Mobile IPv6 (FMIPv6) protocol [16] has been proposed 
to reduce the handover latency. Generally, FMIPv6 tries to reduce the movement detection 
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latency and the new CoA configuration latency by processing the handover signalling in 
advance. The basic idea behind the FMIPv6 is that the PAR forwards the arriving packets 
designated to the MN to the NAR by setting up a tunnel to the NAR in order to prevent 
packet losses incurred by handover latency during handover procedure. For the same 
reason, it is necessary for the multiple interface Mobile IPv6 [15] protocol to adopt a fast 
handover procedure to enhance its handover performance by reducing handover latency 
and packet losses. The FMIPv6 Protocol works as follows; essentially the handover 
procedure starts when a MN sends an RtSolPr (Router Solicitation for Proxy, which is a 
message from the MN to the PAR requesting information for a potential handover [16]) 
message to its AR through a handover-interface to resolve one or more Access Point 
Identifiers to subnet-specific information. In response, the AR sends a PrRtAdv (Proxy Router 
Advertisement, which is a message from the PAR to the MN that provides information about 
neighbouring link facilitating expedited movement detection [15]) message containing one 
or more access point ID and information. The MN may send an RtSolPr as a response to 
some link-specific event (a "trigger") or after performing router discovery. However, prior to 
sending RtSolPr, the MN should have discovered available APs by link-specific methods such 
as AP scanning procedure in IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN. The RtSolPr and PrRtAdv messages 
do not establish any state at the AR [16]. The exact details about the packet format are out 
of the scope of this thesis. However, more details about them can be found in [15]. With the 
information provided in the PrRtAdv message, the MN formulates a prospective NCoA (New 
CoA) and sends an FBU (Fast Binding Update) message. For a single interface FMIPv6, the 
main purpose of the FBU is to inform PAR of binding PCoA (Previous CoA) to NCoA (New 
CoA), so that arriving packets can be tunnelled to the new location of the MN. The PAR will 
send FBack (Fast Binding Acknowledgment) message to the MN and NAR to initiate the 
handover mechanism. The MN disconnects from the PAR and sends FNA (Fast Neighbour 
Advertisement) message to the NAR in order to start the communication and that will 
reduce the handover latency. Figure 4-2 shows the handover procedure for the FMIPv6 
protocol. 
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Figure 4-2: Handover procedure in FMIPv6 protocol. 
 
In the literature [19] a Multi-interface Fast Handover Mobile IPv6 (MFMIPv6) 
protocol have been proposed. As an extension to the FMIPv6 that can mitigate the 
reordering problem during handover when MN’s have multiple wireless interfaces and 
multiple CoA registrations. This procedure can indicate a specific tunnelling destination 
except the NAR, for example, one of the other interfaces (or CoA’s) in the same MN. One of 
the main advantages of the MFMIPv6 protocol is that the throughput of a TCP flow would 
increase by avoiding the unnecessary congestion control. Moreover, the named mechanism 
can improve the handover signalling performance because data traffic is redirected to 
another interface during handover signalling. After the successful handover of the 
corresponding interface, the redirected traffic flow is restored to be directed to the NAR and 
finally to the original interface. In general, the MFMIPv6 Protocol works very similar to the 
FMIPv6. However, instead of forwarding the packets to the NAR during the handover 
process, the packets are forwarded to the other interface of the same MN. However, for a 
multi-interface FMIPv6, tunnelling packets to NCoA may degrade traffic performance by 
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severe reordering as mentioned before. In the propose extension, the FBU message not only 
carries the NCoA but also a “tunnel destination” mobility option which could be another 
CoA that is registered for other interface of the same MN. This message is called as “Multi-
interface Fast Binding Update (MFBU) message” to distinguish it from the FBU message of 
the basic FMIPv6 protocol, as shown in Figures 4-3 and 4-4. 
 
 
Figure 4-3: FBU message. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-4: MFBU message. 
 
More details about each field of these two messages in [16-18]. However, the Tunnel 
Destination option SHOULD be included as a mobility option in the MFBU message in order 
to inform the PAR of the tunnel destination address to redirect traffic toward the handover 
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interface of the MN to other interface CoA. This option is valid only in MFBU message. The 
format of the Tunnel Destination option is shown below in Figure 4-5. 
Where the type filed is to be determined by IANA (Internet Assigned Number 
Authority). The length filed represents the length of an IPv6 address and the tunnel 
destination is the CoA of an interface of the MN to which traffic to the handover interface is 
tunnelled in MFMIPv6 protocol.  
 
 
Figure 4-5: Tunnel destination option in the MFBU message. 
 
When the MN composes an MFBU message, it first checks the number of CoAs 
registered for multiple interfaces. Then, the MN selects candidate CoAs for tunnel 
destination, which are not being involved in handover. Among them, the MN checks each 
interface whether or not it has appropriate characteristics for the traffic to be tunnelled. 
The MN also examines the available bandwidth of candidate interfaces whether they can 
accommodate the traffic. Finally, the CoA of the selected interface is inserted into the 
“tunnel destination” mobility option of the FBU message and the flag “T” is set to indicate 
the existence of the “tunnel destination” option. After the PAR receives the MFBU message, 
the PAR begins tunnelling packets arriving for PCoA to the “tunnel destination”, in other 
words, to the CoA of the other interface of the MN. Such a tunnel remains active until the 
MN completes the registration of a new CoA with its Home Agent or correspondents. After 
that, the HI (Handover Initiate), HACK (Handover Acknowledge), FBAck (Fast Binding 
Acknowledge) and FNA (Fast Network Attachment) messages are used in the protocol as the 
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same way in the basic FMIPv6 protocol [16]. The overall handover procedure of MFMIPv6 is 
illustrated below in Figure 4-6. 
 
 
Figure 4-6: Handover procedure in MFMIPv6 protocol. 
 
After the successful handover of the corresponding interface, the redirected traffic 
flow is restored to direct to the NAR and finally to the original interface. In this protocol, a 
mobility option that indicates a tunnel destination point for the coming traffic flow to a PAR. 
The ARs should recognize the tunnel destination option and redirect the traffic flow to 
another AR that is connected to another active interface of the same MN. There are no 
special requirements for a home agent to behave differently with respect to the basic 
FMIPv6 procedure. 
 In a handover scenario, the second interface of the MN (IF2) is about to begin 
handing over from one AR to another. The first interface (IF1) is attached to PAR and 
remains stable. If the MN runs the original FMIPv6, the NAR begins buffering the traffic to 
the MN when it receives the FBU message and tunnelling to the NAR starts after exchanging 
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the HI and HAck messages.  During this fast handover procedure, half of the traffic is 
continuously transferred to the MN through the first interface (IF1). This process MAY cause 
severe packet reordering if the handover delay is large or traffic load is heavy. For example, 
it is assumed that the characteristics of the two paths such as delay and bandwidth between 
the HA and two interfaces of the MN are similar, and the HA divides the traffic alternatively 
to If1 and If2 as follows [19]: 
 
IF1 (CoA1):  1    3    5    7    9    11    13    15...... 
IF2 (CoA2):             2               4               6              8              10             12             14...... 
                                                                        | 
                                                                        |< handover instant 
                                                                                   (FBU or MFBU message arrival to PAR) 
                                                                                                                                | 
                                                                          FNA message arrival to NAR > |  
 
 Then, the MN can receive in-order packets when the MN is not involved in any 
handover. However, when IF2 starts handing over from one AR to another and the MN runs 
the original fast handover procedure, the order of packet arrivals may become as follows if 
the MN's handover events occur as 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 7 9 11 6 8 10 12 13 14 15...... 
 
 Then, because it is assumed that the traffic is a TCP flow, the above reordering 
issues three duplicate ACK’s when the MN receives packet number 11. The corresponding 
node (CN) receives these three duplicate ACKs, takes this event as a packet loss and starts a 
congestion control procedure. Therefore, the CN reduces its sending rate, which causes 
performance degradation. In contrast, when the MN runs the MFMIPv6, the traffic toward 
IF2 is redirected to CoA1 of IF1 when the PAR receives the MFBU message that includes 
"tunnel destination" option equal to CoA1. Then, the order of packet arrivals may become 
as follows if the MN's handover events occur,  
 
        1 2 3 4 5 7 9 6 11 8 13 10 15 12 14...... 
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 In this scenario, although the packet reordering could occur, three duplicate ACKs 
do not occur frequently because the CoA1 is not involved in the handover process at this 
moment and stable. Even if the handover latency of the handover interface becomes very 
large, only one or two duplicate ACKs may occur. This event does not trigger the TCP 
congestion control in the CN because the TCP regards three or more duplicate ACKs as a 
packet loss. Thus, the congestion window does not decrease during handover and 
performance is not degraded. 
However, neither FMIPv6 nor MFMIPv6 protocols offer the MN any ability to choose 
the right AR at the right time. Moreover, as the two interfaces in the case of the MFMIPv6 
are ‘ON’ all the time that will add the power consumption problem as another drawback to 
this protocol. Furthermore, both protocols uses only static factors to decide whether the 
handover is needed or not and both suffer from the ping-pong effect.  
 
4.4 Game-Based Dynamic Network Selection Mechanism for MIPv6 
Wireless MN’s 
 
Admission control schemes are the decision making part of networks with the 
objective of providing services to users with guaranteed QoS in order to reduce the network 
congestion and call dropping probability and achieve as much resource utilization as 
possible [20]. When several radio technologies may at the same time attend the user 
services demand, a decision is necessary to select the most suitable radio access technology 
on a per user basis. The decision about the target network can be based on either user or 
network/operator criteria. This section presents a game theory based network selection 
mechanism for a MN equipped with two wireless interfaces. The mechanism consists of two 
steps; the first step focuses on finding factors indicative of each network’s weak points. 
Qualitative relations between the QoS parameters must be defined in this step in order to 
calculate the weight of each parameter and how it affects the overall QoS obtained. When 
this step is finished, priorities should be assigned to each parameter according to their 
weight. The higher a weight is, the higher the priority that should be given to the 
corresponding parameter. The second step investigates all available networks in order to 
find the optimal choice. A questionnaire filled by the users of the networks might give a 
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great understanding of the weight of each QoS parameter mentioned earlier. To estimate 
how each parameter fails to satisfy the system specifications, the ratio   is used 
to determine how much worse the network’s performance as compared to the desired one. 
Where ( ) is a set of values, which considered as optimal, and ( ) is the measurement 
mean value of each QoS parameter, ( ) is always assumed to be worse than ( ) (i.e.  
 for the values considered to be larger or smaller than the better 
respectively). With this ratio, the mechanism manages to assign each parameter a weight 
proportional to the extent at which it fails to satisfy the specifications. Moving forward to 
find the optimal solution where matrices are used to synthesize all problem-deciding 
factors. With the matrix form, the elements are compared in each level of the hierarchy in 
order to provide a degree of preferences of one parameter against the other, as shown in 
Figure 4-7.  
 
 
Figure 4-7: Matrix format of the game mechanism. 
 
More specifically, depending on the factors from each interface under comparison, the 
following cases exist: 
1) , when a factor is compared to itself. 
2) , then factor  is assumed to be more important than factor . 
3) , then it’s the opposite, when factor  is more important than . 
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Relative weights generated after a repetitive process with which the decision elements 
participate in the configuration of the final objective of the mechanism. 
The mechanism consists of two main parts, Network Discovery and Network Analysis. In 
the Network Discovery model, all available networks are identified and priorities are 
assigned to them. This process is divided into two parts: Firstly, the networks are added to 
the candidate list if the Received Signal Strength (RSS) is higher than its threshold value and 
its mobility threshold is greater than the velocity of MN. We assume that 
 is the set of available network interfaces in our MN. 
 is the set of threshold values of RSS of respective networks. The set of 
values of difference between the RSS and its threshold value is represented by 
. The set of eligible candidate networks into which the handoff can take 
place is represented by CN.  is the set of priorities of the jth 
network, and . The network Access Point (AP) and MN is observed for the RSS 
and mobility respectively at the specified time intervals and the decisions are taken as the 
algorithm below to select the candidate networks, assuming that MN is currently in network 
: 
 
If  then 
For all  where  
If  then 
 
 
 
Then, the network with the highest RssDiff will be assigned with a higher priority. 
This is because a higher RssDiff means the MN is nearer to the AP of the named network 
and hence the MN can stay in that cell for longer before looking to handoff to another 
network. This will reduce the number of unnecessary handoffs and improve the overall 
performance of the system. The priorities are assigned according to the following algorithm, 
assuming that  networks are available in the list; 
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While  Do 
if  then 
 
else if  then 
 
else if , the list will be ordered in an ascending order then 
 
 
Secondly, the Network Analysis model is based on a static score function SC, which is 
a function of the offered bandwidth by the network (BWn), interface energy consumption 
(Pn) and service charge (Cn). 
    (4-1) 
where, SCn is the static score function of network . Normalization is needed to 
ensure that the sum of the values in different units is meaningful. If there are  factors to be 
considered in the score function, the score function of the interface  will be a sum of  
weighted factors. 
 (4-2) 
In equation (4-2),  represent the weight of factor  of interface , and  is the 
normalized score value of factor  for interface . For our model; 
                      (4-3) 
where , , and  are the weight factors of the offered bandwidth, service 
cost, and the power consumed by the network interface respectively. , , and  are 
the normalized values of interface s offered bandwidth, power consumption and service 
cost respectively. Whereas; 
                            (4-4) 
    (4-5) 
     (4-6) 
The coefficients , , and  are defined same way as in chapter three. The 
exponential functions used to increase the sensitivity of the functions to the respective 
parameters they are related to. Finally, they are inversed in order to bind the functions to a 
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value between zero and one. It can be observed from these equations that high bandwidth 
value contributes proportionately to the SC function, whereas cost and power consumption 
contribute inversely to SC. This is because, an interface with a better bandwidth is a better 
choice to the MN, while an interface costing more or consuming more power is a poor 
choice to the MN. 
Given that the two interfaces are wireless, thus all requested services are of equal 
priority, therefore are characterized by similar requirements, we aim to distribute a set of 
requests to a number of access networks so that all of them gain the maximum payoff. The 
information needed in order to deduce the user preferences and thus the optimal 
distribution of service requests involves two parameters: network efficiency and network 
status. Network efficiency is taken into consideration based on the static and dynamic 
factors mentioned earlier to decide whether the handover is needed or not. A normalized 
value of each element of the mentioned factors is to be considered in order to get an overall 
weight factor to represent each individual AP. On the other hand, the second parameter, 
network status, that affects user preferences, is involved taking into account information 
such as the static and dynamic factors needed to decide the handoff process [7]. Therefore, 
network preferences are roughly reflected by the following equation: 
       (4-7) 
NE will be calculated the same way the cost function been calculated, as in equation 
(4-1), so NE can be represented as; 
     (4-8) 
Where  is the normalized value of the RSS, 
    (4-9) 
However, NC should indicate the network’s current capability to fulfil the request’s 
requirements and therefore should include both the network’s available bandwidth, as well 
as the service’s required bandwidth. This will lead us to the following fact: 
     (4-10) 
Then, combining the two equations will give us; 
      (4-11) 
The proposed game can be represented as , where 
 is the number of players in the game, in this case AP’s. The number of actions is 
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represented by .  denotes the set of strategies for each player, i.e. all 
possible choices of a specific request from set . Finally,  denotes the payoff assigned to 
the MN by selecting player after choosing resource . This payoff can be modeled as 
described in equation (4-11). The game is played in rounds, in each round of the game the 
MN decide which request will maximize its own payoff and then select it. Another aspect 
that needs to be clarified is the one where more than one network provides the same 
services. In this case, we randomly let the network with the highest payoff handle the 
service and move on to the next round of the game, without removing a second request. In 
the case of multiple Nash equilibriums, for simplicity reasons, we will assume that the MN 
will choose the first one, since it possesses chronological priority. The proposed game is also 
a non-zero sum game. 
The proposed extension to the MFMIPv6 is shown below in Figure 4-8, and works as 
follows: as the MN receives the PrRtAdv messages from the PAR as it moves around, the 
game controller will be responsible of extracting the QoS parameters of them. The network 
interface receives all the packets at the node channel from other nodes or access points. 
Each transmitted packets is stamped by the interface with the meta-data related to the 
transmitting interface [21]. The meta-data in the packet header includes information such as 
transmitting power, wavelength, available QoS, security authentication etc., of the 
transmitted packets. The Game Controller is to be inserted at the network interface in the 
MN. The game controller extracts the packet header in the same way used in the 
propagation model, where the meta-data in the packet header is used by the propagation 
model to determine if the packet has the minimum power to be received and/or captured 
and/or detected. When the MN sends and receives the RtSolPr and PrRtAdv messages, the 
game controller will know the source of each PrRtAdv message and extract the QoS 
information from it and by using the mechanism mentioned earlier. The MN will decide 
which AR is the best to go with. The MN will send the address of the NAR to the PAR by the 
MFBU message.  
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Figure 4-8: Using game mechanism to choose the best AP. 
 
Similar to the MFMIPv6 [19], the game decision is based on the information obtained 
from the PrRtAdv message (as discussed in section 4.3.2). Then, using the MFBU message, 
the winner (i.e. the access point that offers the best services) ID will be sent to the PAR in 
order to forward the packet to it, as shown in Figure 4-8. During the game, the MN might 
face different cases. If there were two or more AP’s offering the same services to the MN 
(i.e., multiple-Nash equilibrium case), the MN will not face any problem in choosing any one 
of them at that point. On the other hand, if one of the AP’s managed to improve the offered 
QoS to the MN, the MN will switch to it (i.e., the Pareto efficient case explained in (chapter 
2, section 2.4), where it is impossible to improve the utility of one player without harming 
the others. However, the last point that we need to look at will be the energy consumption 
in the MN as the two interfaces are ‘ON’ all the time to insure getting the full advantage of 
the MFMIPv6 protocol. In order to solve such an issue, we used the following scheme 
(similar to one introduced in section 3.7): 
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Received Signal Strength ‘ON’ Threshold (RssONT) point; with this method, one of the 
interfaces will be turned OFF until the RSS from the AP reaches a certain point “RSSONT”, 
which means that the MN is moving away from the AP and reaching the boundaries of its 
coverage, as shown in Figure 4-9. Once the MN reaches the named point, the game 
mechanism will work as explained earlier saving more energy to the MN by keeping the 
other interface ‘OFF’ most of the time. However, the drawback of the RSSONT point model 
will be the chance that the MN might lose to handoff to a better network within the 
coverage of the bigger network. To solve this problem, the first interface will trigger the 
second interface once it receives any advertisement messages from the around APs. The 
game mechanism will work to check whether a handover is needed or not, if so, the game 
process will proceed, if not, the second interface will be turned ‘OFF’ and wait for either the 
RSSONT point or forced by the other interface. 
 
 
Figure 4-9: Handover decision points. 
 
Finally, the previous additions to the MFMIPv6 protocol leads to our proposed 
Game-based Multi-interface Fast-handover Mobile IPv6 (GMFMIPv6). By adding game 
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theory to the MFMIPv6 the MN will choose the “best” AP at the right time, making the 
handover decision more accurate and save the MN more energy. 
To this end, in order to evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanism, we 
implement a similar design of the MFMIPv6 simulator introduced in [19] using NS-2 [21] and 
its extension MobieWan [22]. One more wireless interface was added and one channel, the 
game controller was added between the network interfaces (NetIF0 and NetIF1 shown in 
Figure 4-10), which will decide which AR to go with. 
 
 
Figure 4-10: Multiple-Interfaces mobile node. 
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4.5 Simulation Scenario and Results 
 
 
Figure 4-11: Simulation Scenario. 
 
The network topology for our simulation is shown in Figure 4-11, five 802.11b access 
points are assumed to cover the simulation area of ( ) with different 
characteristics. At the beginning of the simulation, the MN is assumed to be settled within 
the coverage area of access point number one. Throughout the simulation time, which is set 
to be 24 minutes, the MN is assumed to have a data of 50000 packets to transmit. The MN is 
assumed to cross all coverage areas several times and it will never stop in one position with 
an average speed of 1 m/sec. Table 4-1 below shows our scenario assumptions starting with 
the service cost, available bandwidth, delay and power consumption of each AP in the 
network. The MN battery is assumed to have 10 KJ of energy. 
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Table 4-1: Simulation statistics. 
 QoS parameters 
Service 
Cost (£/h) 
Bandwidth 
(Mbps) 
Delay 
(µsec) 
Power consumption per 
every transmitted bit 
Power consumption per 
every received bit 
AP#1  4.5 12 320  300  
AP#2  4 16 250  230  
AP#3  4 16 250  230  
AP#4 1.5 8 4 200  170  
AP#5  5 11 320  300  
 
 
Simulation results compare the number of successfully received packets, the number 
of dropped packets, the overall end-to-end delay and the MN power consumption using 
four different protocols namely MIPv6, FMIPv6, MFMIPv6 and GMFMIPv6.  
Figures 4-12 and 4-13 compare the number of acknowledgements of every 
successfully delivered packet and the number of dropped packets over the simulation time 
using four different protocols. Both MFMIPv6 and GMFMIPv6 show the same number of 
acknowledgments received and the same number of dropped packets over the simulation 
time. The two protocols show a much better performance as compared to both MIPv6 and 
FMIPv6, as both GMFMIPv6 and MFMIPv6 use two interfaces to pack up the communication 
link as compared to other protocols.  
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Figure 4-12: Number of received ACK's. 
 
 
Figure 4-13: Number of dropped packets. 
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Figure 4-14 shows the total number of handovers the MN forced to go through during the 
simulation time when using the four protocols one at a time. It can be easily observed that 
GMFMIPv6 protocol shows a sharp decrease in the number of handoffs as compared to the 
other three protocols and this is because of the game-controller introduced in the previous 
section. Since the MN is using GMFMIPv6 protocol, it has the ability to decide whether 
switching to another AP will achieve a better QoS or not. By reducing the number of 
handovers, the communication link will not be disturbed, thus a better end-to-end quality. 
Moreover, reducing the number of handovers will reduce the need to switch the other 
interface ‘ON’, accordingly, saving more energy. 
 
 
Figure 4-14: Overall number of handovers. 
 
Figure 4-15 shows the end-to-end delay of the four protocols, GMFMIPv6 shows the 
lowest end-to-end delay as compared to the other protocols. This is because of its ability to 
decide whether a handoff is needed or not and the fact that the MN is using two interfaces 
to pack up its communication. FMIPv6 shows a better response when compared with MIPv6 
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protocol, as the MN tries to reduce the movement detection latency and the new CoA 
configuration latency by processing the handover signalling in advance. As explained earlier, 
when the MN uses FMIPv6, the PAR forwards the arriving packets designated to the MN to 
the NAR by setting up a tunnel to the NAR in order to prevent packet losses incurred by 
handover latency during handover procedure. 
 
 
Figure 4-15: End-to-End delay over the simulation time. 
 
Finally, the amount of energy consumed by the MN is a very critical factor as the MN 
depends exclusively on its battery to keep its communications and applications active for a 
longer time. In order to test the protocol ability to consume less energy, a modification has 
been done to the EnergyModel Class in NS2 [21] to calculate the amount of energy 
consumed per every transmitted and received bit through the MN interfaces. 
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class EnergyModel : public TclObject { 
public: 
  EnergyModel(double energy) { energy_ = energy; } 
  inline double energy() { return energy_; } 
  inline void setenergy(double e) {energy_ = e;} 
  virtual void DecrTxEnergy(double txtime, double P_tx) { 
    energy_ -= ((P_tx/8) * txtime); 
  } 
  virtual void DecrRcvEnergy(double rcvtime, double P_rcv) { 
    energy_ -= ((P_rcv/8) * rcvtime); 
  } 
protected: 
  double energy_; 
}; 
 
Where, energy_ is the single class variable and represents the level of energy in the 
MN at any given time. The constructor EnergyModel(energy) requires the initial_energy to 
be passed along as a parameter. The other class methods are used to decrease the energy 
level of the node for every bit transmitted (DecrTxEnergy(txtime, P_tx)) and every bit 
received (DecrRcvEnergy(rcvtime, P_rcv)) by the MN. Moreover, P_tx and P_rcv are the 
transmitting and receiving power respectively, required by the MN's interface. At the 
beginning of simulation, energy_ is set to initialEnergy_ (set to be 10000 joule), which is 
then decremented for every transmission and reception of packets at the MN. When the 
energy level at the node goes down to zero, no more packets can be received or transmitted 
by the node, i.e. the node is dead.  
Figure 4-16, shows the amount of energy left in the MN battery during the 
simulation time.  Both MIPv6 and FMIPv6 show more energy left in the battery when 
compared to the MFMIPv6 protocol, this is because the MFMIPv6 protocol uses two 
interfaces and keeping them ‘ON’ during the entire simulation time to achieve a better 
communication. However, the GMFMIPv6 protocol shows almost similar results as 
compared to the MIPv6 and FMIPv6 and a much better results as compared to the 
MFMIPv6. This is again because of its ability to use one interface at a time and use the other 
interface only when a handoff is needed.  
Although, the amount of energy consumed by the GMFMIPv6 protocol is slightly 
more as compared to the MIPv6 and FMIPv6 protocols, it can be easily deduce the 
magnificent advantage throughout the fact that the MN is using two interfaces at the same 
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time. Thus, reducing the number of dropped packets all the way through the 
communication time. The other advantage of this protocol is by reducing the number of 
unnecessary handoffs (i.e. eliminating the problems of the ping-pong effects), thus reducing 
the end-to-end delay and improving the QoS throughout the entire communication time. 
 
 
Figure 4-16: Energy consumption in the mobile node. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
360
720
1080
1440
R
e
m
a
in
in
g 
E
ne
rg
y
/J
ou
le
Simulation Time/Sec
MIPv6
FMIPv6
MFMIPv6
GMFMIPvc
Chapter 4: Design of a Green Game-Based MFMIPv6 Protocol. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 94 
4.6 Summary 
 
This chapter presents a novel methodology for combining Game Theory and wireless 
network selection mechanisms in multiple-interfaces MIPv6 wireless portable devices. 
What’s more, it presents an extension to the MFMIPv6, by which the MN can decide 
whether to make the handover or not when it have multiple CoA’s and/or multiple wireless 
interfaces. The proposed mechanism can indicate the best access point to choose during the 
handover procedure by sending the “winner” destination address (i.e. the NAR address) to 
the PAR using the FBU message. Moreover, the mechanism switches the mobile nodes 
interfaces ‘ON’ and ‘OFF’ when needed to control the mobile node’s energy consumption 
and improves the handover latency.  
A simulation-based comparison is made between the introduced protocol along with 
MFMIPv6, FMIPv6 and traditional MIPv6 protocols. The introduced protocol shows an 
improvement in the overall system performance when compared to other protocols in 
terms of reducing unnecessary handovers, reducing the end-to-end delay, reducing the 
number of dropped packets and increasing the number of received acknowledgment all the 
way through the communication time. The introduced protocol shows consumes less power 
when compared to other protocols, which gives the node a better chance to increase its 
active time when compared with the named protocols.  
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5  
Novel Game-Based Resource Allocation and Routing 
Mechanisms in Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
A wireless Ad-Hoc network is characterised by a distributed, dynamic, self-organizing 
architecture. In such a network, each node is capable of independently adapting its 
operation based on the current environment according to predetermined algorithms and 
protocols. In multi-hop wireless Ad-Hoc networks, networking services are provided by the 
nodes themselves. Generally, the nodes must make a mutual contribution to packet 
forwarding in order to ensure an operable network. If the network is under the control of a 
single authority, as is the case for military networks and rescue operations, the nodes 
cooperate for the critical purpose of the network. However, if each node is its own 
authority, cooperation between the nodes cannot be taken for granted; on the contrary, it is 
reasonable to assume that each node has the goal to maximise its own benefits by enjoying 
network services and at the same time minimising its contribution. In this chapter, we 
investigate the case where a group of wireless nodes in an Ad-Hoc network are interested in 
some information within server node. In order to get such information, the nodes will 
compete between each other, using auction theory, to grant the access to these data. The 
node that appreciates the offered data more, will value it more, and win the bid. In this 
chapter, we have discussed the first and second price auctions [1-3]. Generally, the 
mechanisms works as follows; the destination will pay some money to the source and the 
source will try it is best to compensate the intermediate nodes in order to insure the 
reliability of the end-to-end route. The intermediate nodes will decide whether to 
participate on this route or not depending on the price the source will pay and on how much 
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energy is needed to forward the packets to the next hop. We will see that there are two 
kinds of sources, cooperative and selfish source. Where the first will accept any positive 
payoffs and will do it’s best to cooperate with the destination to insure the reliability of the 
route. On the other hand, the selfish source will try to maximise its own profit without 
taking care of choosing the most reliable path.  
 
5.2 Auction Theory: A Brief History 
 
Economists consider auctions as one of oldest surviving classes of economic 
institutions [4]. One of the earliest reports of an auction was from interpreting the biblical 
account of the sale of Joseph (the great son of Abraham) into slavery as being an auction 
sale [5]. Another report was by the Greek historian Herodotus, who described the sale of 
women to be wives in Babylonia around the fifth century B.C. [6-7] these auctions use to 
begin with the woman the auctioneer considered the most beautiful and progressed to the 
least. In fact, at that time, it was considered illegal to allow a daughter to be sold outside of 
the auction method. During the closing years of the Roman Empire; the auction of 
plundered booty was common, following military victory, Roman soldiers would often drive 
a spear into the ground around which the spoils of war were left, to be auctioned off. Later 
slaves, often captured as the "spoils of war", were auctioned in the forum under the sign of 
the spear, with the proceeds of sale going towards the war effort [6]. Moreover, the 
personal belongings of deceased Buddhist monks were sold at auction as early as the 
seventh century A.D. in China. In some parts of England during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries auction by candle was used for the sale of goods and leaseholds. This 
auction began by lighting a candle after which bids were offered in ascending order until the 
candle spluttered out. The high bid at the time the candle extinguished itself won the 
auction [8]. During the end of the 18th century, French started auctioning art, soon after the 
French Revolution, daily in taverns (which was used to be considered as a place of business 
and social activities) and coffeehouses, during these auctions, catalogues used to be printed 
to show available items. Which lead us to mention the oldest auction house in the world, 
known as “Stockholm Auction House”, it was established in Sweden in 1674 *9-10]. 
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As impressive as the historical facts of auctions is the remarkable range of situations in 
which they are currently used in our day-to-day life. There are auctions for livestock, 
auctions for rare and unusual items like diamonds, work of arts and other collectibles. 
Reports from recent researches can be seen in the United States in the 1980’s, where every 
week, the U.S. treasury sells billions of dollars of bills and notes using a sealed-bid auction. 
The Department of the Interior sells mineral rights on federally-owned properties at 
auction. Furthermore, many examples can be seen throughout the public and private 
sectors, purchasing agents solicit delivery-price offers of products ranging from office 
supplies to specialized mining equipment; sellers auction antiques and artwork, flowers and 
livestock, publishing rights and timber rights, stamps and wine and many other market 
transactions [4]. From the academic point of view, [11-12] can be considered as one of the 
influential contributions of auction theory; it was followed by a large amount of literature, 
which examined the behaviour of competitive bidders in auctions. [13-15] define an auction 
to be a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and 
prices on the basis of bids from the market participants. Consequently, the auctioned good 
is to be sold with a price resulted from direct competition of the potential buyers, who know 
exactly their individual willingness to pay better than the seller. Finally, the development of 
the internet, however, has led to a significant increase in the use of auctions as sellers can 
seek for bids via the internet (such as the bidding system in eBay [16-17]) from a wide range 
of buyers in a much wider range of commodities than was previously practical [6]. 
It is important to mention that for several reason this work is restricted to the 
discussion of a single object auctions. On one hand, in order to analyze such auctions, it 
might get rather difficult if multiple objects are to be allocated. On the other hand, the 
results derived for single unit auctions definitely give a good understanding over the effects 
auction rules and behavioural assumptions have on the bidding behaviour. 
Generally speaking, there are four standard auctions that are discussed in the 
literature [2-5]. These standards are; the ascending-bid auction (known as the English 
auction), the descending-bid auction (known as the Dutch auction), first-price auction and 
the second-price auction (known as Vickery auctions). All of these auctions apart from 
Vickery auction are used in business transactions, while Vickery auctions is rarely used but it 
has some theoretically appealing properties. These mechanisms assigns the highest bidder 
to be a winner, however, they can be classified basically by two main factors. Firstly the 
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bidders can submit open or sealed bids; secondly the price may be determined by the 
highest or the second highest bid. 
The ascending-bid auction is the most common auction form. In this type of auctions, 
the price is successively raised until only one bidder remains. This can be done either by the 
auctioneer, announcing prices, or by the bidders calling for higher bids themselves. Thus, 
the remaining bidder receives the object paying only the second highest bid. A very 
important feature of this auction is that each bidder knows the current highest bid at any 
point in time. 
The descending-bid auction is the converse of the ascending-bid auction. The seller 
begins by announcing a price that exceeds the willingness to pay of every bidder (i.e. a very 
high price). Then he lowers the price until one bidder accepts the actual offer. This bidder 
pays the price at which he claimed the object. 
In the first-price sealed-bid auction bidders submit sealed bids and the highest bidder 
gets the object for the price he bid. In the second-price sealed-bid auction, however, the 
highest bidder is awarded the item and pays the second highest bid. 
 
5.3 Proposed Auction Mechanism 
 
In order to reflect user  valuation about the data information in the server, a simple 
valuation function is proposed: 
     (5-1) 
where  is the importance of the data information offered by the source node; which 
is assumed to be known to all destinations and its set by each destination randomly 
according to the need of each individual node.   is the normalized channel capacity, which 
can be expressed as the tightest upper bond on the amount of information that can be 
reliably transmitted over a communication channel, and  is user  valuation to the data 
offered by the source about his strategic situation defined in percentage. Shannon Channel 
capacity is defined as:  
    (5-2) 
where  is the channel coefficient between user  transmitter and user  receiver 
(i.e. the transmission data rate between the two points over the named channel).  is the 
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channel bandwidth in ;  is the amount power that the source need to transmit the 
data to the next hop, and  is the mean channel noise power (The mean noise power in the 
receiver N is given by ; . Where  is the Blotzmann’s Constant 
and  is the system temperature, which is generally assumed to be ). Then 
each user valuation can derived from equation (5-2) and expressed as: 
     (5-3) 
The valuation of the data information can be interpreted that user  uses the 
importance of the data (already known to all users) as a ruler to set his bid in the auction. 
This valuation measures the destination (if he wins the auction) capabilities to bid more for 
the offered data keeping in mind the capacity of his channel. We can see that when the 
channel condition is good (according to equation (5-2)), the user will be more willing to 
increase his bid for the offered data. As a result, a higher bid would be expected from him 
and vice versa. 
It must be mentioned that the auction mechanism is designed in such a way that  
does not represent the real price that a destination node has to pay during the auction. 
Simply it is an interpretation of the strategic situation that a node is facing. In fact reflects 
the relationship between the node valuation and the channel condition. Additionally, since 
the channel coefficient  is a constant random variable with a known distribution to each 
user, the distribution of the valuation  is also known (according to their relationship 
shown in equation (5-2)), which means that;  lies in the interval [ ]. 
 is defined as the bid space in the auction, , which 
represent the set of possible bids submitted to the source. We can simply assign  to zero 
without loss of generality, as it represent the null bid. Accordingly,  is the lowest 
acceptable bid, and  is the highest bid. The bid increment between two adjacent bids is 
taken to be the same in the typical case. In the event of ties (i.e. two bidders offer the same 
final price), the object would be allocated randomly to one of the tied bidders. 
To find the winner of the first-price sealed-bid auction, a theoretical model is defined 
based on the work of H.J. Parrsch and J. Robert [1]. The probability of detecting a bid  is 
denoted as , the probability of not participating in the named auction will be denoted as 
. Then the vector , which equals to , and it is denoted as probability 
distribution over , where  . Now we introduce the cumulative distribution 
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function, which is used to find out whether a user will bid with or less,  , 
all of them are collected in the vector , which equals to . 
Then, any rational potential bidder with a known valuation of  faces a decision 
problem of maximizing his expected profit from winning the auction; i.e. 
            (5-4) 
The equilibrium probability of winning for a particular bid  is denoted as , and 
these probabilities are collected in , . Using , the elements of the vector 
 can be calculated. It can be easily found that is known to be zero, as if any bidder 
submitted a null bid to the source, he is not going to win. We can calculate the remaining 
elements of  as it can be directly verifying that the following constitute a symmetric, Bayes-
Nash equilibrium of the auction game: 
           (5-5) 
Throughout this chapter, we will use the notation of Bayes-Nash equilibrium as 
defined in [3], there approach is to transform a game of incomplete information into one of 
imperfect information, and any buyer who has incomplete information about other buyers’ 
values is treated as if he were uncertain about their types.  
From equation (5-5), it can be seen that the numerator is the probability that the 
highest bid is exactly equal to , while the denominator is the expected number of user 
how are going to submit the same bid (i.e. ). For any user in the game, the best 
response will be to submit a bid which satisfies the following inequality; 
  
The above inequality shows that user  profit is weakly beat any other user  
profit. The above inequality is the discrete analogue to the equilibrium first-order condition 
for expected-profit maximization in the continuous-variation model [1], which takes the 
form of the following ordinary differential equation in the strategy function ; 
         (5-6) 
where  and  are the probability density and cumulative distribution 
functions of each bidder valuation respectively. We assume that they are common 
knowledge to bidders along with , the number of bidders in the system. The reserve price 
is denoted by , (In many instance, sellers reserve the right not to sell the object if the price 
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determined in the auction is lower than some threshold amount [2-3], say ), and the 
above differential equation has the following solution; 
    (5-7) 
In order to get to equation (5-7), we simply multiply both sides of equation (5-6) by 
 . This will lead us to; , which can be easily arranged 
to;  , and based on the fact that , it 
can be easily shown that the solution is straight forward and lead us to equation (5-7). 
In the case of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the bidder  will submit a bid of 
 in equilibrium and he will pay a proportional price to his bid if he wins. On the 
other hand, for the second-price sealed-bid auction, a user will submit his valuation 
truthfully. This is because the price a user has to pay if he wins the auction is not the 
winning bid but the second highest one. Therefore, there is nothing to drive a user to bid 
higher or lower than his true valuation to the data offered by the server. In this case, 
, shown in equation (5-3), and the payment process is the same as in the first-price 
auction. 
 
5.4 Modelling of Traditional Routing Techniques 
 
One of the recent application of game theory to Ad-Hoc routing [18-26] focuses on the 
analysis of the effectiveness of three Ad-Hoc routing techniques, namely link state routing, 
distance vector routing and multicast routing (reverse path forwarding), in the event of 
frequent route changes. The objective of the analysis is to compare and contrast the 
techniques in an Ad-Hoc setting. These techniques are evaluated in terms of: 
1. Soundness – whether routers have a correct view of the network to make the correct 
routing decisions under frequent network changes; 
2. Convergence – length of time taken by the routers to have a correct view of the 
network topology as nodes move; and 
3. Network overhead – amount of data exchanged among routers to achieve 
convergence. 
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Routing is modelled as a zero sum game between the two players; the set of routers 
and the network itself. In a zero-sum game [27-28] the utility function of one player 
(minimizing player’s utility) is the negative of the other’s (maximizing player’s utility). The 
game has equilibrium when the  value of any player’s payoff is equal to its 
 value. In a zero sum game, the  value is defined as the maximum 
value that the maximizing player can get under the assumption that the minimizing player’s 
objective is to minimize the payoff to the maximizing player. In other words, the  
value represents the maximum among the lowest possible payoffs that the maximizing 
player can get; this is also called the safe or secure payoff. 
In the routing game, the payoff to each player (i.e. wireless nodes) consists of two 
cost components, one being the amount of network overhead and the other varying with 
the performance metric under consideration. For example, for evaluating soundness the 
cost to the routers is “0” if all routers have a correct view of the topology when the game 
ends and “1” if any one router does not. The objective of the routers is to minimize the cost 
function. The action for the routers involved is to send routing control messages as dictated 
by the routing technique and update their routing information, and for the network to 
change the state of existing links from up to down and vice versa. The game is solved to 
determine the  value of the cost function. It serves to compare the different 
routing techniques in terms of the amount of routing control traffic required to achieve 
convergence and the soundness of the routing protocol to network changes. One of the 
main conclusions reached in the comparative analysis was that reverse path forwarding 
requires less control traffic to achieve convergence, against traditional link state routing. 
Another issue related to routing involves studying the effect of selfish nodes on the 
forwarding operation, as to be discussed in the following sections. 
 
5.5 Selfish Behaviour in Forwarding Packets 
 
The establishment of multi-hop routes in Ad-Hoc networks relies on nodes’ forwarding 
packets for one another. However, a selfish node, in order to conserve its limited energy 
resources, could decide not to participate in the forwarding process by switching off its 
interfaces. If all nodes decide to alter their behaviour in this way, acting selfishly, this may 
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lead to the collapse of the network. The works of [29-34] develop game theoretic models for 
analysing selfishness in forwarding packets. Under general energy-constraint assumptions, 
the equilibrium solution for the single-stage game results in none of the nodes’ cooperating 
to forward packets. A typical game theoretic model that leads to such equilibrium is 
parameterized in this section. 
Generally, in wireless games,  is the number of wireless nodes in the network,  is 
the actions set for node  in the network; . 
                      (5-8) 
 Where,  is the joint action set; . .  is the 
benefit accrued when other nodes participate; .  is the energy 
consumption of the node when it participate; .  is the utility function for 
each node: 
          (5-9) 
However, in practical scenarios, Ad-Hoc networks involve multiple interactions 
among nodes/players with a need for nodes to participate. In order to account for such 
interactions, the basic game is extended to a repeated game model. Different repeated 
game mechanisms such as tit-for-tat [36] and generous tit-for-tat are investigated in [22, 30 
and 33] to determine conditions for a desirable Nash Equilibrium – one in which all nodes 
would forward packets for one another leading to a high network-wide social welfare. The 
tit-for-tat based mechanisms provide an intrinsic incentive scheme where a node is served 
by its peers based on its past behavioural history. As a result, a node tends to behave in a 
socially beneficial manner in order to receive any benefit in the later stages. 
The work in [36-37+ extends this concept of exploiting the intrinsic ‘fear’ among 
nodes of being punished in the later stages of the game by deriving the conditions under 
which a grim-trigger strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game where nodes are asked to 
voluntarily provide services for others (examples of these include peer-to-peer networks 
and distributed clusters, as well as Ad-Hoc networks). A node following the grim trigger 
strategy in a repeated game is characterized by a behaviour wherein it continues to 
cooperate with other nodes until a single defection by any of its peers, following which it 
ceases to cooperate for all subsequent stages. The sustainability of the equilibrium for this 
strategy depends on the number of nodes in the network and the exogenous beliefs that 
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the nodes have regarding the possible repetitions of the game. The authors conclude that 
the greater the number of nodes in the network the higher the chances of achieving a 
desirable equilibrium, even if the likelihood that the game will be repeated is low. These 
games are different from those analysed in [30-34] as the decisions of the nodes are not 
based on an external incentive scheme such as reputation. 
Other functions related to the network layer or to the management plane, such as 
service discovery and policy-based network management, are also amenable to a game-
theoretic analysis. There is scarce literature on those issues, with the notable exception of 
[14], which studies management in a sensor network. 
The algorithm represented in this chapter is mainly focusing on keeping the defined 
path stable, where all the participating nodes are faithful to forward the packets to the next 
hop all the time is really important in this case. Game theory defines such a point as Nash 
Equilibrium. Adding some suitable modifications to the well known  
[42], a polynomial-time solution to find the Nash Equilibrium is shown in the following 
sections, as shown in Figure 5-1. Simulations have been presented to evaluate the reliability 
of the obtained route as a function of the destination and source offered payments, the 
source to intermediate nodes payments, power consumption and degree of source-
destination cooperation for different network parameter settings. 
Finally, we have to mention that these investigations are motivated by the works of 
Kannan, Sarangi and Lyengar on reliable query routing [38-41]. To the knowledge of the 
authors, they are the first to formulate a game where the node utilities show a tension 
between path reliability and link costs, and they have considered different interesting 
variants of this problem. A key difference in this work is that we explicitly allow the null 
strategy in which nodes may choose not to forward packets to any next-hop neighbour. This 
allows us to provide a polynomial time algorithm for obtaining an efficient Nash equilibrium 
path. Another key difference in our work is that we consider the notion of destination and 
source payments and the amount of consumed power in each intermediate node when 
participating in any defined path and incorporate them into the utility functions. Every 
intermediate node will have the right to decide whether to participate in a route or not, 
based on the amount of energy the node has by the time the request is received from the 
source. The nodes will not argue with any request if it has more than 50% of its battery life, 
it will take into account the source compensation when it has less than 50% and will not 
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participate in any route if it has less than 30% of energy. Finally, we used auction theory to 
decide the winner of the data information offered by the source. 
 
5.6 Price and Power-Based Routing Algorithm 
 
In this section, we define the destination driven pricing and power saving routing 
problem formally. A wireless network is modelled as non-cooperative game  
where  denotes all the nodes in the network and  represents the link set. Each node  in 
 is associated with a reliability parameter ; .  indicates the node 
availability and stability – the probability that it can forward a packet sent to it. Each link 
 has a link cost parameter  , which represent the communication set up 
cost between two end nodes. Each link  has a link power consumption 
parameter , which represent the power consumed by node  when it communicate with 
node  (i.e. node  forwards a packet  to node ). 
There are three kinds of nodes in the network: destination node  (i.e. the winner 
of the auction), source node  (i.e. the server node, which offers the data information) 
and other intermediate nodes  (where ) that are candidates for 
participating in a route between the source and the destination. We assume that both 
destination node and source node always have node reliability (While the destination does 
play a role in offering the payment  (  must be more than or equal to the source reserved 
price ), this is a constant that only affects the utility of the source). The destination 
node offers to the source node a payment of , which is equal to  defined in equation (5-
3) (i.e. ). The source in turn offers a payment  (for each successfully delivered 
packet) that will be given to any intermediate node if it participates in the routing path. 
Similarly, we are assuming that each node in the network, which will participate in any 
defined path, will lose some of its power  when forwarding any packets to its neighbours. 
To formulate the core game, we now give the definition of the triplet (  ) 
where  is the set of players;   is the set of available actions with  be the non-empty set 
of actions for player ; and  is the set of payoff functions. In this game, we define 
 which means that all nodes except the destination are players (While the 
destination does play a role in offering the payment , this is a constant that only affects 
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the utility for the source). In an  nodes network (including source and destination nodes), 
for each node , its strategy is an -tuple  where: 
   (5-10) 
It should be mentioned that and . Each strategy tuple has at 
most one 1. That is, .  
If node  strategy tuple contains all zeros, node does not participate on packet 
forwarding in the game. A system strategy profile  is a profile which contains all 
players’ strategies in the network. Given this strategy profile, there is either no path from 
the source to the destination, or else, there is exactly one path  (since each node can 
point to only next-hop). Without loss of generality, let’s denote 
. Here  denotes the number of hops between the source 
node and the destination node (not inclusive). The utility function for each player is defined 
as follows: 
For the source node: 
 (5-11) 
The utility of the source node equals to the difference between the expected income 
of the source and the link set up cost from the source node to the first next hop routing 
node. The expected income of the source is the destination payment (i.e. ) minus the 
source pay to all the intermediate nodes (i.e. ) minus the power lost to transmit packets 
to the next hop ( ) times the probability that the packet is successfully delivered (i.e. ). 
For each other node : 
 (5-12) 
  is the  node in the path if the named node is going to participates in the 
defined path. The utility of each intermediate routing node equals to the expected payment 
(i.e. ) it obtains from the source node times the ongoing route reliability (i.e. ) 
minus the transmission cost per packet to its next hop neighbour (i.e. ) minus the 
power lost to forward the packets to the next hop (i.e. ). 
It should be mentioned that the cost is made proportional to the square of the 
distance between two nodes if they are in each other’s transmission range and how much 
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power is consumed. If the two nodes are out of each other’s transmission range, the link 
cost between these two nodes is set to be infinity. The mathematical representation is as 
follows: 
   (5-13) 
where  is the distance between node  and node ; and  is the transmission 
range of the wireless nodes. In the simulation settings,  is set to 0.1 (we also did extensive 
simulations for different  values, similar curve trends are observed). 
The link reliability can be represented in the form; 
    (5-14) 
The link reliability between two nodes (i.e. ) is defined as the ratio of the 
number of packets forwarded to the total number of received and generated packets the 
two nodes at time . 
If the node does not participate in the routing, it gains (and loses) nothing. We now 
develop an algorithm to obtain an efficient Nash equilibrium for this game. We have to 
mention that both values of  and  must be normalized in order to get the normalized 
value of the utility for each node. The following two equations shows how the more the 
source pays to the intermediate nodes the more the nodes participate in forwarding packets 
to its neighbours. Furthermore, the more power and cost the node have to consume in 
order to forward the source packets the less the node will be willing to contribute in the 
path.  , and  , where, . 
The exponential functions have been used to increase the sensitivity of the functions to the 
respective parameters they are related to. Finally, they are inversed in order to bind the 
functions to a value between zero and one. 
 
5.7 Improvement Schemes for the Auction and Routing Algorithms 
 
The auction mechanism mentioned earlier, is repeated every time the offered data 
have been successfully delivered to the destination node, the winner of the auction. We are 
assuming that the source has different types of data that he offers to other nodes, the 
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reservation price will change according to the data the source is offering for sale. We also 
considered the case of winner retreat (i.e. Pareto Efficiency case, section (2.4)), by which the 
winner is not interested anymore in the offered data (for example; link failure, the node run 
out of power, etc.). In such a case, a counter with a random value is introduced in the server 
to check whether the winner node is still interested in the offered data or not. Once the 
source finishes sending the data to the winner, it should wait for an acknowledgement that 
the data been received and starts a new auction for another pair of data, and that’s when 
the counter value is set. If there is no acknowledgement been received when , 
the source send a message to the winner node to confirm the receiving of the data. If no 
reply been received after this message, the source will assume that the node is no longer in 
the network and starts a new auction.  
From the routing point of view, our goal is to develop an algorithm for computing an 
efficient Nash equilibrium path that provides maximum reliability while ensuring that all 
nodes obtain non-negative payoffs (We should note that in our model even any shortest-
hop path that ensures non-negative payoffs to all nodes are in Nash equilibrium). The 
algorithm we present could be potentially modified to provide such a shortest-hop Nash 
equilibrium path; however, our interest is in finding an efficient equilibrium path that also 
provides maximum reliability. This allows us to characterize the performance of the most 
efficient equilibrium path that can be obtained under different prices). The link between 
non-negative payoffs and the equilibrium path is given by the following simple lemma. 
: If a path exists and it is a Nash Equilibrium, every node on the path must 
have non-negative payoff. 
The proof for this lemma is straightforward. According to the payoff function, a node 
would rather choose not to participate in routing (with payoff 0) if joining the routing makes 
its payoff negative. However, it must be noted that it is not necessary for all the paths with 
non-negative payoff to be Nash equilibrium. Such path is defined as PPP (Positive Payoff 
Path). On the other hand, a path with all routing nodes having non-positive payoff is defined 
as NPP (Negative Payoff Path). 
To find a PPP, we first simplify the problem to a more concise representation. 
According to the definition, we need that for each intermediate routing node , its utility 
. This implies: 
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     (5-15) 
where  is the link reliability. In order to convert the product to summation, we take the 
logarithm of both sides and get: 
                 (5-16) 
Notice that ; we take the inverse of each  to make each term in the 
summation positive. The original formula now transforms to; 
    (5-17) 
For each . Replacing  by  (when ) and replacing  by , 
we formulate the problem of finding a PPP in the original graph to an equal problem of 
finding an NPP in a transformed network graph, where each node has a positive value  
and each edge is assigned a value  , according to the following transformed utility 
functions . For the intermediate node, 
    (5-18) 
For the source node, we get 
                (5-19) 
Replacing  by  and replacing  by , we will have 
       (5-20) 
With these log-transformed formulae, in the following, we will first find an NPP of 
smallest  from each neighbour of source node. Then, if the source node is selfish, it 
picks up a feasible path provided by neighbours that gives it smallest  or else 
if cooperative with the destination, it picks the path with the smallest . In either case, 
the source only participates in routing if its own original expected utility will be positive. 
A polynomial time algorithm modified from  can be applied to 
find the NPP with the smallest  from each neighbour of the source to the destination. 
The pseudo code for the algorithm is given below. Note that the original source does not 
participate in this algorithm, so we denote the neighbour in question as  in the 
algorithm. In brief, the algorithm starts labelling nodes from the destination, applying 
, with adding negative utility checking step. In the algorithm, each 
node has a label, which is a tuple (  ). The first item in the tuple indicates 
Chapter 5: Game-Based Resource Allocation in Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 113 
from which node the label comes (i.e., the next hop of current node starting from source). 
The second term in the tuple records the summation of  , which is analogous to the length 
in . The third term tracks the current  value. This algorithm is 
applied in turn for each neighbour of the source before the source picks one of these 
neighbours to form the path, as described above. Since the  value is related to nodes 
instead of the links, we need a definition of neighbourhood set for vertices in a given game 
. 
  The path found by the algorithm is a Nash equilibrium path in the PPP 
finding problem. 
Proof (by contradiction): Assume that the algorithm returns a path 
, which is not a Nash equilibrium. Without loss of 
generality, suppose only one node  wants to switch his next hop from  to , where 
. 
Path  is also a PPP, since the payoff of the nodes 
before  increases by the increase of path reliability (remember ) and the 
payoff after  (including  ) keep unchanged. Thus path  is one of the feasible paths. 
Since the path abandoned some intermediate nodes, the path reliability of  is larger 
than . This would imply that the algorithm should return path  instead of , 
which contradicts the assumption. By construction, the node has no incentive to switch its 
next hop to a node that is not on the returned path since those nodes do not pick any next-
hop neighbour. 
As we mentioned before, the algorithm runs to obtain a positive payoff path to 
destination from each neighbour of the source node. If the source node is selfish, among all 
the feasible paths reported from its set of neighbours, it will pick the one that gives its 
maximum profit according to the source’s utility function. If the source node is cooperative, 
it will pick the path, which gives the highest path reliability. 
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Finding an NPP with Minimum in Transformed Network Game 
1) Initialization: 
Set  
All other nodes labeled as ,  
2) while  
• for each  
– while (  such that ) 
_ , 
 let  be the corresponding next hop 
node 
 if : delete edge . 
 else: update the label triplet to ; 
add  to FS; 
break 
– end while 
• end for 
end while 
 
Figure 5-1: Modified Dijkstra Algorithm to fir the defined auction-game scheme. 
 
5.8 Simulation Results 
 
This section shows the introduced auction mechanism and the improvement scheme 
added to it in the previous section, along with the dynamic routing algorithm in Ad-Hoc 
networks. We used a fixed  as our simulation area and a maximum of 35 
intermediate nodes within the network. The node’s transmission range is set to an average 
of 21 meters with very low mobility speed (<1m/sec). The node reliability is uniformly 
chosen at random in interval [0.1, 1]. Furthermore, we assumed that the packets length is 
1000 bytes, and the bandwidth of the channel to be 1MHz, all nodes to use  
transmitting power. The importance of the data is defined in each user, for simplicity, each 
user will choose the importance of the data at random from the interval [1, 95]. The 
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importance of the data information offered by the source is measured in percentage, the 
user need will change whenever a new auction is announced by the source. 
The model is compared with similar model with a game-based model only, which is 
similar to the ones introduced in [38-41], where the source will assign the data to the first 
buyer without waiting for any other offers and pays all intermediate nodes the same 
amount of compensation. Also the model is compared with a similar combination of Auction 
and Game theories, but with using first and second-price sealed-bid auctions. 
Figure 5-2; below shows a very simple example of an auction scenario. Where the 
source node announces the auction and waits for the users’ bids. 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Example of an auction scenario. 
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Figure 5-3: Source revenue with few competitors. 
 
 
Figure 5-4: Source revenue with large number of competitors. 
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Figure 5-3 shows the source revenue when the number of users competing between 
each other is low, where the auction only starts when there are two users or more 
competing with each other. If there is only one user interested in the offered data, then it’s 
up to the source to accept his offer when it’s more than the reserved price. The revenue is 
measured on how much the source will gain more than the reserved price. 
From the two Figures 5-3 and 5-4, it is clearly shown that when the number of 
competitors increase the source revenue will increase dramatically. The second-price 
sealed-auction gives better revenue to the seller as it force the buyers to offer their true 
valuation of the offered good. This might not be so obvious in the first-price sealed-auction, 
as the bidder is trying to maximize their own profit from winning by lowering the bid below 
its true valuation. However, in equilibrium, as every bidder adopts the same strategy, the 
bidder with the highest valuation still stands out. Compared with the game-based random 
allocation scheme, introduced in [38-41]. Where the source sells the data to the first node 
that offers a price, any price, and pays in advance for all the intermediate nodes and waits 
for their response whether to participate or not (all intermediate nodes will receive the 
source payment, which is why the source revenue will go down when the number of 
intermediate nodes rise). We can observe that the auction-based schemes are significantly 
better in terms of improving the seller’s revenue and improving the system efficiency.  
Figure 5-4 illustrates the path reliability versus source pay for intermediate nodes 
when fixing  to  of the reserved price (a sufficient large amount). From this figure, 
we can see that the density of the deployments increases, the maximum reachable path 
reliability increases. This result is expected; when the source pays more to intermediate 
nodes, the expected path reliability increase too. It should be noticed that in both cases that 
when  exceeds some threshold point; the path reliability will remain almost constant. We 
must mention that the source payment to the intermediate nodes is measured in 
percentage, of how much the source is ready to offer the network of his revenue. 
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Figure 5-5: Path reliability versus source pay to each routing node when changing number of nodes in a fixed area. 
 
 
Figure 5-6: Source gain versus source pay to each routing node for different destination pay, when fixing number of 
nodes and area size. 
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Figure 5-5 plots the source gain versus the source pay to the intermediate nodes 
with fixed number of nodes (25 nodes) and the area size. Recall that from the source utility 
function in section 5.7, source utilities in most cases are dominated by the term of 
. Increasing  can lead to decreasing of   and increment of 
. Figure 5-4 shows that there exists a best strategy point for the source to 
maximize its payoff, which is at the same routing price no matter how much destination pay 
is given in a fixed network topology. The other observation of Figure 5-5 is that; the portion 
of source gain increases as the destination pays increases. This indicates that even if the 
destination increase the pay to the source to request a certain reliability path, most of the 
money goes to the source instead of the routing nodes. It implies that even if the 
destination increases the pay, it will not get a path with more reliability. 
If we examine Figures 5-4 and 5-5 together, we will find that at the maximum gain of 
the source node, the path reliability is close to the maximum path reliability which the 
network can reach. 
 
 
Figure 5-7: Behaviour of selfish source node effect on the path reliability. 
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Figure 5-8: Behaviour of cooperative source node effect on the path reliability. 
 
Figures 5-7 and 5-5 show a comparison of source node behaving cooperatively and 
selfishly. This gives us an important insight: selfish behaviour of source node in such system 
will not hurt system performance much. These figures demonstrate that there exist some 
improvement to the path reliability when the source acts cooperatively, but the 
improvement is not significant. We also see that the maximum path reliability will not have 
significant improvement for any fixed network parameter when destination pay exceeds 
some threshold (around  more of the reserved price) that is necessary to obtain a 
path. On the other hand, the routing path reliability will increase significantly (from 0.35 to 
0.64) when changing network parameters (in this particular simulation, we increase the 
number of nodes in the fixed area). 
Figure 5-9 shows the probability that a positive payoff Nash equilibrium path exists 
as a function of the price offered by the source. For each case, we see that the curve 
increases to a point where it is close to one. This shows the existence of critical threshold 
prices (independent of the exact configuration) that ensure the existence of a Nash 
equilibrium path with high probability. It should also be seen that this price threshold 
decreases with the density, a trend that is concrete visualized in the distance-based model, 
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which is affected by node distance more seriously. This trend is because with growing 
density, there are more choices to pick the path from, and there are a greater number of 
high quality links, which incur low transmission cost. 
 
 
Figure 5-9: Cumulative distribution function for the existence of Nash Equilibrium path when increasing source pay to 
each routing node. 
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5.9 Summary 
 
This chapter presents a game theory based routing algorithm, which involves three 
types of nodes in the network: the destination node, the source node and all the 
intermediate nodes. Defining the best route based on the power consumption that each 
intermediate node will suffer to forward a packet, the price the destination will pay to the 
source and the amount of compensation the source will pay to each intermediate node. The 
paper also presents a polynomial time algorithm that can give a Nash Equilibrium path and 
use it to evaluate the performance of the performance of the game with respect to 
parameters mentioned earlier. We can summarize the key findings of the introduced 
mechanism by; 
1. The auction mechanism insures a fare allocation of the data to the user who values it 
the most. 
2. The second-price sealed-bid auction gives better revenue to the source when 
compared to the random allocation scheme and the first-price sealed-bid 
mechanism. 
3. The game mechanism combines both source compensation to the intermediate 
nodes and the power consumption to improve the path reliability between the 
source and the destination (i.e. the winning bidder). 
4. The source payoff will increase once the network density increases (i.e. the number 
of intermediate nodes increases). This is because the routing paths become cheaper 
and more reliable and even if the source is acting selfishly, the path reliability will 
not be downgraded significantly. 
Finally, the simulation results prove that the introduced auction mechanism dramatically 
increases the seller’s revenue whether he decide to choose the first or second-price auction. 
Moreover, the results briefly evaluate the reliability of predefined route with respect to the 
data prices and source and destination cooperation for different network settings. 
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6  
 
Auction and Game-Based Spectrum Sharing in 
Cognitive Radio Networks 
 
 
6.1 Spectrum Sharing and Cognitive Radio: A Brief History 
 
One of the main reasons behind the concurrent increase in the demand for and 
congestion of Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum is the rapid development of radio networks of 
all kinds in our world, which has defiantly changed the public feeling about radio. 
Nowadays, almost everybody has a mobile phone and radio stations are literary 
everywhere. Someone can argue that our world is becoming a radio world where waves are 
weaving everywhere around the Earth. What’s more, this congestion has created a battle 
between the public, private and military sectors over frequency ownership and has put a 
premium on the cost of spectrum. According to a recent research introduced by the FCC 
(Federal Communications Commission) and Ofcom, it was found that most of the frequency 
spectrum was inefficiently utilized [1-2]. The existing spectrum allocation process, denoted 
as Fixed Spectrum Access (FSA), headed for static long-term exclusive rights of spectrum 
usage [3] and shown to be inflexible [4]. Studies have shown, however, that spectral 
utilization is relatively low when examined not just by frequency domain, but also across the 
spatial and temporal domains [5]. Thus, an intelligent device aware of its surroundings and 
able to adapt to the existing RF environment in consideration of all three domains, may be 
able to utilize spectrum more efficiently by dynamically sharing spectral resources [6 and 7]. 
Since the 19th century, when the laws of electromagnetic have been discovered and 
described by the set of Maxwell’s equations and technical devices been invented to produce 
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and use these electromagnetic waves predicted by theory, man has added his own man-
made waves to the natural ones [7]. 
It is fair to say that, from the very beginning of wireless telephony, maritime radio 
systems has always used shared channels [7-8]. For example, 2,182 KHz is used as a calling 
frequency as well as emergency signalling frequency and other frequencies are used as 
working frequencies. If two ships want to communicate, one should identify a working 
frequency and make a call. By specifying a channel or channels, that ships keep watch on, 
both emergency and establishing connections between ships can be facilitative. In fact, 
channel sharing was necessary and effective because of the lack of sufficient channels 
offered to every single ship and due to the fact that, the typical ship will require far less than 
a full channel of capacity [7-8]. Around the mid of 1970’s, the FCC permitted land mobile 
operation on some of the lower UHF channels in several large cities, in order to expand land 
mobile services. One group of channels was made available to Radio Common Carriers 
(RCCs) to provide mobile service on a common carrier basis. The FCC adopted rules 
permitting open entry for these channels and requiring carriers to monitor the channels and 
select unused channel to carry each conversation. In essence, exclusivity was provided on a 
first come, first-served basis one conversation at a time [7-9]. 
Another example of spectrum sharing is the second generation of cordless telephone 
(CT2), developed by the British industry and government in the mid of 1980’s. CT2 was 
designed to be used in both in home and in public and uses a pool of 40 channels. To 
establish a call, any equipment will automatically identify a vacant channel or a channel with 
the minimum interference and begins operation on that channel [7-8]. No one can ignore 
one of the main advantages of the radio, it can be used anywhere, at any time, capable of 
building links at very short distances as well as on a cosmic scale. Radio is a unique tool to 
connect men and things without any material medium. It is a wonderful tool for social 
progress. Having said all these facts about spectrum sharing, spectrum management can 
now be seen as a major goal for telecommunications efficiency. It is necessary that this 
natural and public resource be utilized for the profit of as many users as possible, taking 
care of the largest variety of needs.  
In order to explain Cognitive Radio (CR), then someone must mention Software 
Defined Radio (SDR), which is a transmitter in which operating parameters including 
transmission frequency, modulation type and maximum radiated or conducted output 
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power can be altered without making any hardware changes. The sophistication possible in 
an SDR has now reached the level where a radio can possibly perform beneficial tasks that 
help the user, the network and help to minimize spectral congestion [7]. In order to raise an 
SDR’s capabilities to make it known as a CR, it must support three major applications [7]: 
1. Spectrum management and optimization. 
2. Interface with a wide range of wireless networks leading to management and 
optimization of network resources. 
3. Interface with human providing electromagnetic resources to aid the human in his 
and/or her activates.  
To truly recognize how many technologies have come together to drive CR 
technologies, few of the major contributions that have led us to today’s CR developments 
must be studied. The development of Digital Signal Processing (DSP) technologies arose due 
to the efforts of the research leaders [10-14], who taught an entire industry how to convert 
analog signal processes to digital processes. In the meantime, the simulation industry used 
in the radio industry was not only practical, but also resulted in improved radio 
communication performance, reliability, flexibility and increased value to the user [15-18].  
The concept of CR emerged as an extension of SDR technology.  Although, definitions of 
the two technology’s are different, most radio expert agree with the fact that a CR device 
must have the following characteristic in order to be distinguished from an SDR one: 
1. The named device should be aware of its environment. 
2. The device must be able to change its physical behaviour in order to adapt to the 
changes of its current environment. 
3. The device must be able to learn from its previous experience. 
4. Finally, the device should be able to deal with situations unknown at the time of the 
device design. In another word, the device should be able to deal with any 
unexpected situations. 
That being said, up to the authors knowledge, the idea of CR was first discussed 
officially in 1999 by [19]. It was a novel approach in wireless communications that the 
author describes it as “The point in which wireless personal digital assistants (PDA’s) and the 
related networks are sufficiently computationally intelligent about radio resources and 
related computer-to-computer communications to detect user communications needs as a 
function of use context, and to provide radio resources and wireless services most 
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appropriate to those needs.” *19+. What’s more, the work introduced in [19] can be 
considered one of the novel ideas which discussed CR technology. The work was based on 
the situation in which wireless nodes and the related networks are sufficiently 
computationally intelligent about radio resources and related computer-to-computer 
communication to detect the user communication needs as a function of use context and to 
provide resources and wireless resources most required. In another word, a CR is a radio 
that has the ability to sense and adapt to its radio environments. This work defined two 
basic characteristics of any CR device, which are cognitive capability and re-configurability. 
In order for the device to detect the spectrum parameters, the device should be able to 
interact with its environment. The spectrum needs to be analysed for spectrum 
concentration, power level, extent and nature of temporal and spatial variations, 
modulation scheme and existence of any other network operating in the neighbourhood. 
The CR device should be capable to adopt itself to meet the spectrum needs in the most 
optional method. The recent developments in the concept of software radios DSP 
techniques and antenna technology helped in this flexibility in CR devices design.   
Finally, the intelligent support of CR’s to the user arises by sophisticated networking of 
many radios to achieve the end behaviour, which provides added capability and other 
benefits to the user. 
 
6.2 Game Theory and Spectrum Sharing 
 
Players in cooperative games try to maximize the overall profit function of everyone in 
the game in a fair fashion. This type of games has the advantage of higher total profit and 
better fairness. On the other hand, in non-cooperative or competitive games players try to 
maximize their own individual payoff functions. If such a game has a designer with 
preferences on the outcomes, it may be possible for the designer to decide on strategy 
spaces and the corresponding outcomes (i.e. the mechanism) so that the players' strategic 
behavior will not lead to an outcome that is far from desirable [20 and 21]. Recent studies 
have shown that despite claims of spectral insufficiency, the actual licensed spectrum 
remains unoccupied for long periods of time [8]. Thus, cognitive radio systems have been 
proposed [22] in order to efficiently exploit these spectral holes. 
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Previous studies have tackled different aspects of spectrum sensing and spectrum 
access. In [23], the performance of spectrum sensing, in terms of throughput, is investigated 
when the secondary users (SUs) share their instantaneous knowledge of the channel. The 
work in [24] studies the performance of different detectors for spectrum sensing, while in 
[25] spatial diversity methods are proposed for improving the probability of detecting the 
Primary User (PU) by the SUs. Other aspects of spectrum sensing are discussed in [26-27]. 
Furthermore, spectrum access has also received increased attention, e.g. [28-34]. In [28], a 
dynamic programming approach is proposed to allow the SUs to maximize their channel 
access time while taking into account a penalty factor from any collision with the PU. The 
work in [30] and [35-43] establishes that, in practice, the sensing time of CR networks is 
large and affects the access performance of the SUs. In [29], the authors model the 
spectrum access problem as a non-cooperative game, and propose learning algorithms to 
find the correlated equilibria of the game. Non-cooperative solutions for dynamic spectrum 
access are also proposed in [30+ while taking into account changes in the SUs’ environment 
such as the arrival of new PUs, among others. 
Auctions of divisible goods have also received much attention [32] and [44-49]. 
Where the authors address the problem of allocating a divisible resource to buyers who 
value the quantity they receive, but strategize to maximize their net payoff (i.e. value minus 
payment). An allocation mechanism is used to allocate the resource based on bids declared 
by the buyers. The bids are equal to the payments, and the buyers are assumed to be in 
Nash equilibrium. When multiple SUs compete for spectral opportunities, the issues of 
fairness and efficiency arise. On one hand, it is desirable for an SU to access a channel with 
high availability. On the other hand, the effective achievable rate of an SU decreases when 
contending with many SUs over the most available channel. Consequently, efficiency of 
spectrum utilization in the system reduces. Therefore, an SU should explore transmission 
opportunities in other channels if available and refrain from transmission in the same 
channel all the time. Intuitively, diversifying spectrum access in both frequency (exploring 
more channels) and time (refraining from continuous transmission attempts) would be 
beneficial to achieving fairness among multiple SUs, in that SUs experiencing poorer channel 
conditions are not starved in the long run. 
The objective of the work in this chapter is to design a dynamic mechanism that 
enables fair and efficient sharing of spectral resources among large number of SUs, as most 
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of the current research consider relatively low number of SU’s in the model desgin. Firstly, a 
spectrum access model in cognitive radio networks as a repeated cooperative game must be 
designed. The theory and realization of cooperative spectrum sharing is presented in detail, 
where it must be assumed that there is one PU and several SUs. The case of dynamic games 
was also considered, where the number of SUs changes. The advantages of cooperative 
sharing are proved by simulation. Secondly, a discussion of the case of large number of SUs 
competing to share the offered spectrum is discussed and how the cooperative game will 
reduce the sellers and bidders revenue. Finally, a competitive auction and game-based 
mechanism is introduced to improve the overall system efficiency in terms of a better 
fairness in accessing the spectrum. 
Throughout this chapter, an adaptive competitive second-price pay-to-bid sealed 
auction game is adapted as solution to the fairness problem of spectrum sharing between 
one primary user and a large number of secondary users in cognitive radio environment. 
Three main spectrum sharing game models are compared, namely optimal, cooperative and 
competitive game models introduced as a solution to the named problem. In addition, this 
chapter prove that the cooperative game model is built based on achieving Nash equilibrium 
between players and provides better revenue to the sellers and bidders in the game. 
Furthermore, the cooperative game is the best model to choose when the number of 
secondary users changes dynamically, but only when the number of competitors is low. As 
in practical situations, the number of secondary users might increase dramatically and the 
cooperative game will lose its powerful advantage once that number increases. As a result, 
the proposed mechanism creates a competition between the bidders and offers better 
revenue to the players in terms of fairness. Combining both second-price pay-to-bid sealed 
auction and competitive game model will insure that the user with better channel quality, 
higher traffic priority and fair bid will get a better chance to share the offered spectrum. It is 
shown by numerical results that the proposed mechanism could reach the maximum total 
profit for SUs with better fairness. Another solution is introduced in this chapter, which is 
done by introducing a reputation-based game between SUs. The game aims to elect one of 
the SUs to be a secondary-PU and arrange the access to other SUs. It is shown by numerical 
results that the proposed game managed to give a better chance to SUs to use the spectrum 
more efficiently and improve the PU revenue. 
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6.3 Assumptions and System Model 
 
6.3.1 Primary Users and Secondary Users and Allocation Function 
 
In the following sections, we consider a spectrum overlay-based cognitive radio 
wireless system with one PU and  SU’s (as shown in Figure 6-1). The PU is willing to share 
some portion (bi) of the free spectrum (F) with SU . The PU asks each SU a payment of  per 
unit bandwidth for the spectrum share, where  is a function of the total size of spectrum 
available for sharing by the SU’s. The revenue (profit) of SU is denoted by µi per unit of 
achievable transmission rate. A simple example is shown in Figure 6-1. 
 
 
Figure 6-1: System model for spectrum sharing. 
 
Both centralized and distributed decision making scenarios are considered in this 
work. In the former case, each SU is assumed to be able to observe the strategies adopted 
by other users (i.e., either the users have the ability to discuss their shares between them, 
or the PU sends update of each SU share). In the latter case, the adaptation for spectrum 
sharing is performed in a distributed fashion based on communication between each of the 
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SUs and the PU only (i.e., the secondary users are unable to observe the strategies and 
payoffs of each other). 
 
6.3.2 Cost Function, and Wireless System Model 
 
A wireless transmission model based on adaptive modulation and coding (AMC) 
where the transmission rate can be dynamically adjusted based on channel quality is to be 
assumed in this chapter. With AMC [16], the Signal-to-Interference Noise Ratio (SINR) at the 
receiver is denoted as γ and equals to; 
                                  (6-1) 
Where  is the channel gain from the user  transmitter to user  receiver,  is 
the transmitting power of user , and  is the thermal noise level. The achievable 
transmission rate for user (in bits/sec) is given by; 
ri=log2(1+γi)                        (6-2) 
The spectral efficiency Is of transmission by a secondary user can be obtained from [16]; 
Is= log2(1+Kγi)                                (6-3) 
where k=1.5/ (ln0.2/BERtar), BERtar is the target bit-error-rate of the system. The pricing 
function *17+ which the SU’s pay is given by; 
c(B)= y(b1+b2+…+bn)
z           (6-4) 
y and z are assumed to be positive constants and greater than one so that the function is 
convex (i.e., the function is continues and differentiable), knowing that  is the set of bids 
for all SU’s (i.e., Bid={bid1, bid2, …., bidn}). Now let us denote  as the worth of the spectrum 
to the PU (  is the worth of each portion of the offered spectrum). Then, the condition 
  must be satisfied in order to ensure that the PU is willing to share 
spectrum of size    with the SU’s (if it is equal, then PU will not gain any profit). 
 The overall revenue of any SU can be explained as the combination of the user 
revenue of achievable transmission rate, the spectral efficiency and the shared portion of 
the spectrum (i.e., ri×Is×bi). While the cost the user must pay is bi× c(B). Then, the profit 
(revenue) of every SU can be represented as; 
µi= ri×Is×bi - bi× c(B)      (6-5) 
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 The marginal profit ( ) of SU i can be obtained from; 
  (6-6) 
 Knowing that, the optimal size of allocated spectrum to one SU depends on the 
strategies other SU’s are using. Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution of the game 
to ensure that all SU’s are satisfied with it. By definition, Nash equilibrium of a game is a 
strategy profile with the property that no player can increase his payoff by choosing a 
different action, given the other players’ actions. In this case, the Nash equilibrium is 
obtained by using the Best Response (BR) function, as shown in equation (6-7), which is the 
best strategy of one player given others’ strategies. Let ST-i denote the set of strategies 
adopted by all except SU  (i.e., ST-i = {stj |j=1, 2, …, N; j≠i} and ST = ST-i ⋃{sti}). The best 
response function of SU given the size of the shared spectrum by other SU’s bj, where j≠ i, 
is defined as follows; 
BRi=arg maxbi µi (ST-i ⋃ {bi})      (6-7) 
Then the game is in Nash Equilibrium if and only if the strategy of user i is his/her BR as 
compared to other users strategies, which means; 
bi= BRi (ST-i), ∀i      (6-8) 
 
6.4 Spectrum Sharing Strategies 
 
Cognitive radio is an intelligent wireless communication system that is aware of its 
surrounding environment and can be used to improve the efficiency of frequency spectrum 
by exploiting the existence of spectrum holes [22]. Spectrum management in cognitive radio 
aims at meeting the requirements from both the primary user and the secondary users. 
There are three strategies in spectrum sharing optimal, competitive and cooperative 
models. 
 
6.4.1 Optimal Spectrum Sharing Model 
 
The objective of optimal model is to maximize the profit sum, which may make some 
secondary users have no spectrum to share [28, 32 and 50]. Therefore, it is unfair for all 
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secondary users. From equation (6-6), the total marginal profit function for all the SU’s can 
be denoted as follows: 
    (6-9) 
In order to get the solution of the biggest profit for all the secondary users, an optimal 
equation is built, as (6-10); 
Maximize:     (6-10) 
Subject to:  bi ≥ 0,  
 The assumption works as follow, the initial sharing spectrum is bi(0) for the SU , 
which is sent to the primary user. The PU adjusts the pricing function c, and then it is sent 
back to the SU. Since all secondary users are rational to maximize their profits, they can 
adjust the size of the requested spectrum bi based on the marginal profit function. In this 
case, each secondary user can communicate with the primary user to obtain the 
differentiated pricing function for different strategies. The adjustment of the 
requested/allocated spectrum size can be modelled as a dynamic game [48] as follows: 
 (6-11) 
 where bi(t) is the allocated spectrum size at time  to SU i and ηi is the adjustment 
speed parameter (i.e., which can be expressed as the learning rate) of SU i. f(.) denotes the 
self-mapping function. The SU can estimates the marginal profit function in the actual 
system by asking the price for share a spectrum from the PU of size bi(t) ±π, where π is a 
small number (i.e., π is 0.0001). Simply after that the SU observes the response price from 
the PU c-(.) and c+(.) for bi(t)-π and bi(t)+π , respectively. Then, the marginal profits for the 
two cases µi 
–(t) and µi 
+(t)are compared and the marginal profit can be estimated from; 
      (6-12) 
The overall optimal profit can be estimated using equation (6-10). 
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6.4.2 Competitive Spectrum Sharing Model 
 
The main objective of competitive model is to maximize the profits of individual SU’s 
by a game [48-49 and 53-55]. The result is Nash equilibrium. In the distributed dynamic 
game, SU’s may only be able to observe the pricing information from the PU; they cannot 
observe the strategies and profits of other SU’s. The Nash equilibrium for each SU is built 
based on the interaction with the PU, similar to the case of the optimal sharing model. Since 
all SU’s are rational to maximize their own profits, they can adjust the size of the requested 
spectrum bi based on the marginal profit function (i.e., equation (6-6)). In this case, each SU 
can communicate with the primary user to obtain different pricing function for different 
strategies. The adjustment of the requested/allocated spectrum size in competitive games 
show only a slight difference with optimal games, as each individual user is looking at 
improving his/her own profit. So equation (6-9) can be rewritten as; 
Maximize:       (6-13) 
Subject to:  bi ≥ 0,  
In a similar way to the optimal game, an SU can estimate its marginal profit using the 
following equation:  
 (6-14) 
when bi (t + 1) = bi (t) is satisfied, the Nash Equilibrium points (b0, b1, b2, …, bN) can be 
obtained. 
 
6.4.3 Cooperative Spectrum Sharing Model 
 
As explained in previous sections, in the model of competitive spectrum sharing, Nash 
equilibrium obtained at the maximum of the individual profit of SU. The result is not the 
best because they do not consider the interaction on other users [45-56]. For cooperative 
spectrum sharing, the SU’s can communicate with the consideration on the behaviour to 
other users. 
In this chapter, we assume that players can reach in common by communicating with each 
other. Decreasing the size of sharing spectrum a little for all the SU’s on Nash equilibrium, 
(i.e., a factor σi (0 <σi < 1) is multiplied on each SU strategy of Nash equilibrium). Although 
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the size of shared spectrum has decreased, the cost which the PU charges to the SU 
decreases too, which results in the increase of the overall profit for all SU’s and the total 
profits increase as well, but it might reduce the PU revenue. 
 SU’s Nash equilibrium strategy can be got from equation (6-11). All SU’s will 
negotiate and multiply σi, the cooperative strategy is obtained (i.e., σ1b1, σ2b2, ….., σNbN). σi 
is chosen in such a way that both the overall and individual profit is maximized, which we 
called as the Nash state; 
Maximize:  and    (6-15) 
Subject to:  bi ≥ 0,  
However, the problem of instability of this model must be raised. It is possible that one or 
more SUs may deviate from Nash equilibrium. For example, suppose u1 to be the first SU to 
share the spectrum and want to deviate, its profit may increase by setting its marginal profit 
function of equation (6-6) to zero. If another SU u2 does not change its strategy, the profit 
of u2 will decrease. Therefore, any SU has the motive to deviate from Nash state. In order to 
solve this problem, a mechanism needs to be applied to encourage the SUs not to deviate 
from the Nash state by computing the long term profit of the SU. Suppose SU i is looking 
deviate from the Nash state, while SU j (j≠i) is still in the named state. Before SU i deviate, it 
will compute the long term profit. The mechanism will multiply the future profit of SU i (if 
decided to deviate) with a weight εi (0 < εi <1), which would make the profit in future stages 
are not higher than that of the previous stages, which means that the current profit is more 
valuable than future stages.  
For any SU i, µi
Ns, µi
N, µi
d denotes the profits of Nash state, Nash Equilibrium and deviation, 
respectively. There are two cases: one is that they all in Nash at all stages, no SU to deviate 
from the optimal solution, the long term profit of any SU i is shown in equation (6-16). The 
other case is that SU i deviates from the optimal solution at the first stage, it will be in Nash 
equilibrium state in the following stages, and the long term profit of SU i is shown in 
equation (6-17). 
   (6-16) 
   (6-17) 
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 The Nash state will be maintained if the long-term profit due to adopting the state is 
higher than that caused by deviation. 
 
i.e., 
          (6-18) 
From equation (6-16), we know that the Nash state will be kept because of low long 
term profit for the SU who wants to deviate. The weights σi are the vindictive factors to 
inhabit the motive of leaving the cooperative state. 
 
6.5 Dynamic Cooperative Model 
 
In reality, the number of SUs may change. Sometimes there are more secondary users 
to apply for the spectrum offered by the primary user, and sometimes the secondary users 
have finished the communication and drop out of the spectrum as it has taken up. For 
example, let us suppose that there are two SUs, which have been in Nash state. Now there 
is another (newcomer) SU to apply for the offered spectrum. We assume that the PU has no 
more spectrum to share. This will lead us to one solution, which is that the two SUs should 
make some of their spectrums exist to the newcomer. 
During the process of reallocating, an adaptive method is applied with the following 
requirements. The total profit for all the SUs should be the biggest and it should be fair for 
the reallocation. Being prior users it is rational for them to have priority in spectrum 
allocation than those who comes later. In order to keep the total profit to maximum, those 
with better channel quality could take up more spectrum space. Therefore, the SUs with 
better channel quality could stop spectrum retreating earlier than those with worse channel 
quality. When the SUs reach optimal solution, the fairness will not be as good as the three 
SUs getting into Nash state directly. The reason is that these SUs coming at different time do 
not have the same priorities. 
When SUs have finished the communication and exited the spectrum they had shared, 
an adaptive method is applied. A fixed part of the spectrum is allocated to the remaining 
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SUs for each step. It is possible for SUs with better channel quality acquire more spectrum in 
order to make the total profit bigger. 
 
6.6 Simulation Results 
 
6.6.1 Static Game (Two SU’s only in the game) 
 
In this section, a CR environment with one PU and two SUs sharing a frequency 
spectrum of 20MHz to 40MHz is to be considered. The system has the following settings; for 
the pricing function, c(B), we use y=1 and z=1. The worth of spectrum for the PU is assumed 
to be one (i.e. w=1). The revenue of a SU per unit transmission rate is ri = 10,  . The target 
average BER is BERtar = 10-4. The initial value is bi(0)= 2 . The adjustment speed parameter ηi 
=0.09. The SNR for SUs u1 and u2 are denoted by γ1, γ2 where γ1 =11dB, γ2=12dB. 
 
6.6.1.1 Optimal and Competitive Models 
 
As explained in the previous section, the total profit is represented by µ(B) = µ1(B) + 
µ2(B) . In Figure 6-2, the total profits in optimal model arrived at its biggest value 228.7333 
when (b1, b2) = (4.1, 15.6). 
The trajectories of optimal model and competitive model are shown in Figure 6-3, 
(with γ1 =11dB, γ2=12dB), the initial value is (2, 2) for the two models. In competitive model, 
the shared spectrum is determined by a game, where the two SUs have been in Nash 
equilibrium. In our simulation, the Nash equilibrium is at (13.8591, 24.1302). The sum of 
spectrum sharing is 37.9893 with the total profit of 228.2378. 
It can be seen that the total profit for optimal model is higher than that of 
competitive model obviously. But one SU has no spectrum sharing for the optimal model, 
which means the lack of fairness. The advantage of competitive model is fair with a lower 
profit sum. 
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Figure 6-2: Total profit and spectrum share using optimal game. 
 
6.6.1.2 Cooperative Spectrum Sharing Game 
 
Based on the Nash equilibrium, we set the weight σi in the range of [0.5, 1]. In order to 
keep the fairness, we assume | σ1 – σ2 | ≤ 1 to guarantee the size of sharing spectrum is 
similar for both two SUs. Two SUs got their Nash equilibrium at (18.2591, 19.1302). At σ1 
=0.70, σ2 =0.80, the total profit of 234.4963. Compared with the competitive model, we 
found that the shared spectrum in cooperative model is less than that of competitive model; 
it has a bigger total profit than that of Nash equilibrium, as shown in Figure 6-3. 
The reason is that we set (σ1 b1, σ2 b2) as the strategies to share the spectrum, the 
price is lower, and the total profit will increase. Now, let us suppose the SU u1 deviates from 
the optimal solution. The strategy of SU u2 does not change. SU u1 adopts the strategy based 
on the marginal profit function. The profit for the two SUs will change when SU u1 deviated. 
The comparison of the individual profit in cooperative model, competitive model and 
deviation is shown in Figure 6-4. The total profit for the SUs is shown in Figure 6-5. γ1 is a 
variable, which changes in the range of 8~11dB, γ2 =12dB. 
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Figure 6-3: Optimal and competitive games. 
 
It can be seen that µ1, µ2 are bigger in the cooperative model, compared with the 
competitive model. Therefore, the total profit is bigger too in the cooperative model. When 
SU u1 deviates from the cooperative state, µ1 is higher, and µ2 is lower, and the total profit 
is lower (i.e. the amount of µ1 increasing is smaller than that of µ2 decreasing) as well. 
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Figure 6-4: Total profit with different modes. 
 
 
Figure 6-5: User Profit with different modes. 
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6.6.1.3 Dynamic Spectrum Sharing Game 
 
The pervious results were based on two SUs. The analyzing method is similar for more SUs. 
In practice, the number of SUs may change. For example, there is another secondary user 
denoted by u3 looking to apply for the offered spectrum. We assume that the channel 
quality for u3 is the same with secondary user u2 (γ1 is a variable, γ2=γ3 =12dB). There is no 
more free spectrum for the primary user to share with others. The previously mentioned 
adaptive method is applied in the allocation of spectrum. First u1 and u2 exit a fixed ratio of 
spectrum to u3, and the total profit is computed. If the total profit could increase, the 
process will go on. If the total profit decreases, the SU with a better channel state will stop 
the process of exit. The trajectory of the process is shown in Figure 6-6. In addition, the 
corresponding total profit is shown in Figure 6-7. When a new SU applies for spectrum 
sharing, it would converge to the point of (3.418948, 5.4642, 0.4936). The total profit is 
62.3421, which is a little bigger than the case with two SUs. When the third SU exits the 
spectrum, an adaptive method is applied to reallocate the spectrum. The left two SUs 
converge to (2.2148, 5.9393) with a total profit of 73.9867, as shown in Figure 6-8. 
 
 
Figure 6-6: Spectrum sharing in dynamic game. 
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Figure 6-7: Dynamic game and user profit. 
 
 
 
Figure 6-8: Spectrum Share when user retreats. 
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6.7 Is the Cooperative Game Visible? 
 
So far we have discussed three game models to solve the problem of spectrum sharing 
in CR systems. We proved that the optimal game would improve the overall profit of the 
players in the game, which might lead to unfair distribution of the offered spectrum. The 
competitive game shows a lower overall profit, but gives a better share to the user with 
better channel quality, who ask for a share earlier and stays active for longer period (i.e., a 
higher priority as compared to new comers). Finally, the cooperative game gives the best 
overall individual profit and it is the best way to insure a fair share between multiple users 
in any CR system. However, does the cooperative game model works in an actual CR 
system? 
In practical CR environment, the communication between competitors (i.e., players) is 
very hard to achieve. Individual users tend to contact the PU and ask for service [49], users 
can only observe the pricing function form the PU, but not the strategies and profits of 
other users. Nevertheless, achieving a cooperative scheme between the SUs (either, the PU 
forces the SU to get a fair share or using the model mentioned earlier) would improve both 
the seller and users revenue. Let us use the same assumption used in the previous section, 
where a PU have a 30MHz of free spectrum to offer to a group of users. The cooperative 
mode will work when the number of players is relatively small, so each player can discuss a 
fair share with the rest of the players. However, when the number of SUs increases, let say 
20 or more SUs, the cooperative mode will not be useful anymore. If the PU or the users in 
such a scenario would decide to use the cooperative mode, the individual profit and share 
will be very low as compared to competitive game, taking into account the channel quality, 
user need and priority. 
In order to solve such a problem, two solutions are proposed in the following sections. 
Firstly, a second-price pay-to-bid (or sometimes called as pay-as-bid) sealed auction 
mechanism is introduced to insure a fair competitive game between SUs. Secondly, 
reputation-based auction game is introduced as non-cooperative game to assign a SU to be 
a secondary-PU between other SUs. More details in the following sections: 
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6.7.1 Pay-to-Bid Competitive Auction 
 
The allocation mechanism works as follows, let W= [w1, w2, …, wn] be the non-
negative bids (i.e., user valuation) that the SU will pay in order to get a share of the offered 
spectrum and let X= [x1, x2, …., xn] be the  amount of the spectrum per unit bandwidth they 
are allocated as a result. We assume that the PU will announce the auction per unit 
bandwidth, for example the SUs will offer a bid for every 1MHz they will be allocated. 
This allocation is made according to a cost-based allocation mechanism , so that with the 
given payment w, the allocation to SU  is given by xi = τi (w), as shown in Figure 6-9. r will be 
assumed to be the reserved price of the PU, any SU bidding less than that will be withdrawn 
from the auction. 
In order to reflect user s valuation of the offered spectrum, a simple valuation 
function is proposed: 
vi = Is × upi        (6-19) 
where vi is user s valuation to the offered spectrum per unit bandwidth, Is is the 
spectral efficiency and upi defines how much the user needs to get the desired share of the 
spectrum, which is a function of user traffic priority (tpi) and the channel SNR (γi); 
upi= tpi × γi         (6-20) 
 
 
Figure 6-9: Pay-to-bid allocation mechanism. 
 
The user valuation can be interpreted that user  uses the importance of his traffic 
and the channel quality (already known to all users) as a ruler to set his bid in the auction. 
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This valuation measures the SU (if he wins the auction) capabilities to bid more for the 
offered spectrum keeping in mind the capacity of his channel. We can see that when the 
channel condition is good (according to equation (6-3)), the user will be more willing to 
increase his bid. As a result, a higher bid would be expected from him/her and vice versa. 
It must be mentioned that the auction mechanism is designed in such a way that vi 
does not represent the real price that an SU has to pay during the auction. Simply it is an 
interpretation of the strategic situation that a node is facing. In fact vi reflects the 
relationship between the user valuation and the channel condition. The distribution of the 
valuation vi is also known (according to their relationship shown in equation (6-19)). This 
means that vi lies in the interval [vmin, vmax]. We defined Bid as the bid space in the auction, 
{bid1, bid2, …, bidN}, which represent the set of possible bids submitted to the PU. We can 
simply assign bid0 to zero without loss of generality, as it represents the null bid. 
Accordingly, bid1 is the lowest acceptable bid, and bidN is the highest bid. The bid increment 
between two adjacent bids is taken to be the same in the typical case. In the event of ties 
(i.e. two bidders offer the same final price), the object would be allocated randomly to one 
of the tied bidders. 
To find the winner of the first-price sealed-bid pay-to-bid auction, a theoretical 
model is defined based on the work of [51]. The probability of detecting a bid bidi is denoted 
as ξ1, the probability of not participating in the named auction will be denoted as ξ0. Then 
the vector ξ, which equals to (ξ1, ξ2, …., ξN), denotes the probability distribution over Bid, 
where ( ∑i
N
=0
 ξi = 1). Now we introduce the cumulative distribution function, which is used to 
find out whether a user  will bid with bidi or less, ∑j
i
=0
 ξj = ξ , all of them are collected in the 
vector ξ. 
Then, any rational potential bidder with a known valuation of vi faces a decision 
problem of maximizing his expected profit from winning the auction; i.e.; 
    (6-21) 
The equilibrium probability of winning for a particular bid  is denoted as θi, and 
these probabilities are collected in , . Using ξ, the elements of the vector 
 can be calculated. We can easily find that is known to be zero, as if any bidder 
submitted a null bid to the source, he is not going to win. We can calculate the remanning 
elements of   as it can be directly verified that the following constitute a symmetric, Bayes-
Nash equilibrium [52] of the auction game: 
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    (6-22) 
The notation of Bayes-Nash equilibrium is used in this section as defined in [53], 
there approach is to transform a game of incomplete information into one of imperfect 
information, and any buyer who has incomplete information about other buyers’ values is 
treated as if he were uncertain about their types. From equation (6-22), we can see that the 
numerator is the probability that the highest bid is exactly equal to , while the 
denominator is the expected number of users how are going to submit the same bid (i.e., 
). For any user in the game, the best response will be to submit a bid which satisfies the 
following inequality; 
   
The above inequality shows that user s profit is weakly beat any other user s profit. The 
above inequality is the discrete analogue to the equilibrium first-order condition for 
expected-profit maximization in the continuous-variation model [51], which takes the form 
of the following ordinary differential equation in the strategy function ; 
           (6-23) 
Where  and  are the probability density and cumulative distribution function of 
each bidder valuation respectively. We assume that they are common knowledge to bidders 
along with , the number of bidders in the system. The reserve price is denoted by r, (In 
many instance, sellers reserve the right not to sell the object if the price determined in the 
auction is lower than some threshold amount [52], say ), and the above differential 
equation has the following solution; 
       (6-24) 
In the case of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the bidder  will submit a bid of 
 in equilibrium and he will pay a proportional price to his bid if he wins. On the 
other hand, for the second-price sealed-bid auction, a user will submit his valuation 
truthfully. This is because the price a user has to pay if he wins the auction is not the 
winning bid but the second highest one. Therefore, there is nothing to drive a user to bid 
higher or lower than his true valuation to the data offered by the server. In this case, 
, shown in equation (6-19), and the payment process is the same as in the first-
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price auction. Once the winner has been announced, the PU will send an update message to 
all the SUs with the second highest price they need to pay in order to gain access. All SUs 
must pay the winning bid per unit bandwidth. To insure that the winner will get a higher 
priority than the rest of competitors, PU will send the winning bid to everyone and treat 
their replies according to the first bid was offered by the SUs in the first place. 
This mechanism will offer a better competition in terms of fairness between players, 
the user with a better channel quality, a higher priority traffic and honest valuation will get a 
much better chance than other users to gain access to his/her desired share. Moreover, the 
named mechanism will improve the seller and winners revenue as compared to the optimal 
and cooperative game models. 
Finally, the named mechanism is tested with similar scenario assumptions as in the 
previous section. We are comparing three models; first, when the spectrum is offered to the 
users using a cooperative game. Second, using a similar setting but with a competitive game 
and finally a competitive second-price pay-to-bid sealed auction. We will study the effects in 
two simple scenarios; one, a SU (named u1) who is competing with other bidders to get a 
share of the spectrum since the PU announce the auction. Two, a new comer is joining the 
game (the newcomer will join the game as the eleventh user onward) and how the 
introduced mechanism will improve his/her revenue, taking into account that the new 
comer has an excellent channel quality and a fair bid. 
Figure 6-10, proofs what have been discussed in section 6.6.1.3 in terms of individual 
user revenue. Although the cooperative games shows a better start (i.e., when the number 
of bidders is low), the cooperative game tries to improve the player’s revenue and keep a 
fair share between all bidders. This would cause a sharp decrease in the seller revenue 
when the number of bidders increases. On the other hand, the competitive game takes into 
account the channel condition and the user ability to grab his/her share before the others, 
that’s why it shows better revenue when compared to the cooperative model.  
 For the second scenario, Figure 6-11 shows the dramatic improvement in the 
newcomers’ revenue; keeping in mind that his/her priority is rather high. Clearly, the 
introduced mechanism helped in improving spectrum share in terms of fairness, massively 
improving the players’ revenue when compared to the other models and gives the PU a 
better deal by using the second-price sealed-auction. 
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Figure 6-10: SU revenue vs. number of users with different models. 
 
 
Figure 6-11: Newcomer revenue vs. number of users. 
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6.7.2 Reputation-Based Non-Cooperative Auction Games 
 
With this game, PU will assign the spectrum to the winner of the second-price 
sealed-bid auction process. The revenue of the PU will not change, as using the second-price 
auction insures that all bidders will bid around the real value of the offered spectrum. The 
winner of the auction will be a new PU between the rest of the SUs, and will have the right 
to decide whether to share the spectrum with the rest or not. However, a penalty factor is 
introduced to insure that not only paying more will guarantee a share of the spectrum but 
also reputation will be combined with each bid. This factor will be forwarded to the PU and 
will show whether the winner of the last auction was popular or not, which is done by 
helping other SUs to share the offered spectrum. 
In this section we will represent the infinitely repeated version of game  by  (i.e. 
this is the case when  is going to be played over and over again in successive time periods). 
We are assuming that the PU is offering a single frequency band to be shared by other SU’s. 
However, if the PU is planning to offer more bands then the proposed mechanism must be 
repeated for the other bands between the secondary users. We will define the user 
reputation as  which will depends on user performance during any time period  as well as 
in prior time periods. Reputation of player  in some time period  is denoted by . 
Formally, we define node reputation as follows: 
            (6-24) 
where  is the history of the user, it depends on the user reputation in the previous 
periods according to user behaviour. “ is equal to “1” when player  at time  is interested 
in sharing the offered spectrum and “0” otherwise. Therefore, , i.e. the 
reputation value of each player varies between “0” and “1” (including) ( ). 
Moreover, the reputation value of all players is equal to “0” when . A high value of  
means the more importance is assigned to a player’s need in sharing the spectrum with the 
PU (higher priority) during the current period than its previous need record, and vice versa. 
Thus, when  is high, a user with even low reputation value in the current time period , can 
significantly improve his/her reputation when it realises that it needs a better share of the 
spectrum. 
As the Nash equilibrium case has been defined earlier, the evaluation of the Nash 
equilibrium of the repeated game  will be engaged. By finding the Nash equilibrium of 
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 it leads to the deduction of the Nash equilibria of G. The proposed incentive mechanism 
is based on a player’s links reputation . The benefit of which is that a player draws from 
the system to its contribution, the benefit is a monotonically increasing function of a 
player’s contribution. Thus, this is a non-cooperative game among the players, where each 
player with high priority traffic wants to maximize his/her utility. The classical concept of 
Nash equilibrium points a way out of the endless cycle of speculation and counter-
speculation as to what strategies the players should use. The intent is to deduce a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium because all the players belong to the same population/network 
(i.e., assume the same role) and it is therefore easier (i.e., require no coordination among 
players) to achieve such an equilibrium. If the players in a game either do not differ 
significantly or are not aware of any differences among themselves (i.e., if they are drawn 
from a single homogeneous population) then it is difficult for them to coordinate and a 
symmetric equilibrium, in which every player uses the same strategy, is more compelling. 
The argument of a single homogeneous population implies that all the peers in a CR 
network have equivalent responsibilities and capabilities as everybody else. We assume that 
if the player chooses the action , this will assign him a probability of  , and 
if the player chooses the action , this will assign one a probability 
of . 
It must be mentioned that in the action profile, a time and money saving Nash 
equilibrium case is defined, if all players choose the action . As 
this will mean that, players are not interested in sharing the spectrum for the entire 
communication time. That is to say, users have low priority traffic and accessing the 
spectrum will be by chance, players will not compete to send their data and will not offer 
more money to the PU to get the spectrum. If any other player decided to switch to the 
action , its payoff will be –  which is less than a payoff of “0” that the 
node gets when decided not to share the spectrum. An undesirable Nash equilibrium case is 
generated, if all the players choose the action . This is easy to see because 
all nodes will have to compete against each other again, this will waste time and the winner 
will be the PU, as one of the SU’s should pay more to share the offered spectrum. 
The expected payoff of any player in period  when it selects the action 
{ } is: 
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                      (6-26) 
This payoff is denoted as ,  is the nodes utility. Similarly, the payoff for 
any player selects the action  will be: 
                               (6-27) 
This will be denoted as . It is easy to show that the term 
 captures the notation that the probability of SU becoming a secondary PU by sharing the 
offered spectrum is directly proportional to node’s reputation. 
  is player  reputation when he/she wants to share the offered spectrum at 
time  (i.e.  in equation (6-25)), and   is player  reputation when he/she 
decides to take the action  at the same time period  (i.e.  
in equation (6-25)), from equation (6-25), the reputation value will be:  
 
and 
                 (6-29) 
Generally, each player’s expected payoff in equilibrium is his/her expected payoff to 
any of its actions that he/she uses with positive probability. The above useful 
characterization of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium yields to: 
                  (6-30) 
Using equations (6-26), (6-27), and (6-28); 
     (6-32) 
Solving equation (6-32) to get the final value of ; 
             (6-33) 
It must be mentioned that the value  obtained above is not a constant, but varies in 
each time interval depending upon a node’s reputation at the end of the previous time 
interval . 
Finally, the mixed strategy pair  for actions  
respectively, is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the players 
(i.e. nodes in the network). Assuming no collusion among nodes, if all the other nodes 
follow the above strategy, then the best strategy for any node is to follow one of the above 
strategies. Actually, this is a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for any , as well as 
. In fact, it is a more stable equilibrium than the one in which no node is interested in 
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sharing the offered spectrum. This is caused by two reasons. First, when none of the SUs is 
interested in sharing the spectrum, the network is not useful to any user. Second, in real-
time scenarios, users that derive finite utility from altruism would always send some 
messages irrespective of how much they obtain in return. Therefore, it is unlikely to have a 
scenario in which no node is looking to contact the PU to share the spectrum. 
 
6.7.3 Properties of the proposed Nash Equilibrium 
 
This section presents some of the interesting properties of the Nash equilibrium 
derived in the section above. 
 
6.7.3.1 Simplicity of Calculating the Nash Equilibrium  
 
In section ‘6.7.2’, the probability of achieving the equilibrium point between the SUs 
has been calculated. This was based on which node will decide to share the spectrum with 
the PU and become a secondary PU. In each round of the game (or time period ) players 
decide whether they should ask to share the offered spectrum or not, based on their 
reputation at the end of the prior time period. This probability, as one can see, does not 
remain constant from one period to another. Moreover, it depends on a player’s reputation 
at the end of the last time period. Players can calculate their reputation using equation (6-
25), since they know precisely their actions at each round of the game. Thus, determining 
the Nash equilibrium strategy is fairly straightforward for any player.  However, it must be 
noted that there is an inherent assumption that nodes are serviced based on their current 
reputation. 
Figure 6-12, shows how players’ reputations change in every time interval depending 
on their Nash strategy. At the beginning of the communication time, both, player 1 and 2 
are competing with each other to guarantee access to the offered spectrum. However, 
player 1 uses the spectrum but at the same time managed to help player 2 (i.e. player 1 will 
be the secondary PU and will manage the access of players 2 and 3 to the offered 
spectrum). Player 3 shows his interest in the offered spectrum after the third time interval, 
and managed to use the spectrum once both player 1 and 2 finished using it or they are not 
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interested anymore in sharing it. The figure shows the players (nodes) reputation values 
 over ten time intervals. 
 
 
Figure 6-12: Change in player’s reputation controlled by their Nash equilibrium strategies. 
 
On the other hand, Figure 6-13 shows the same result but over a longer time period, 
around nine hundred time intervals. Similarly, three nodes are competing with each other, 
player one with the highest reputation and player three with the lowest. Player 1 will act as 
the secondary PU over the other two users (i.e. player 2 and 3). In this figure we used a 
random matrix generator to show different reputations when player 1 is interested to share 
the spectrum for 80% of the time, player 2 for 50% of the time and player 3 for 8% of the 
time only. 
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Figure 6-13: Changing player reputation over a longer time period. 
 
6.7.3.2 Addressing the Spectrum to the right User 
 
The simple game theoretic model presented in the previous sections, wherein node 
reputation is used as a basis for deciding who will share the offered spectrum, predicts that 
it is in every peer’s best interest to serve others. This includes the nodes that are not 
interested to share the spectrum at the current time period. Our simulations support this 
behaviour as it was found that the total service received by a node is balanced by the total 
service that it has to offer to others, as shown in Figure 6-12. 
 
6.7.3.3 Addressing the Problem of Competitive Sharing 
 
An important property of the equilibrium emerges from equation (6-30) that 
predicts the probability with which one node will be a secondary PU and it should serve 
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others. If we set the value of  in away such that,  (i.e.  can be ignored from 
equation (6-30)), then equation (6-30) becomes: 
                                     (6-31) 
That would lead us to the conclusion that . Then, Nash equilibrium of the 
proposed game predicts that players should help each other less than fifty percent of the 
time when PU offers the spectrum. This, although it appears to be very restrictive, is a 
consequence of the fact that all nodes are selfish and are better off trying to share the 
spectrum than serving others. Intuitively, if a node knows that everyone else in the network 
behaves selfishly, i.e., provide as little service as possible, then the best strategy for the 
named node cannot be to serve others most of the time (i.e., with probability greater than 
0.5). 
 
6.7.3.4 Fairness and Equal Sharing of Cost and Spectrum 
 
From the previous section, it can be concluded that serving with a priority of less 
than 0.5 (i.e. when ) is an optimal point, the observer can notice that the overall 
system efficiency is severely reduced. This is because most of the nodes in the network act 
selfishly and at least half of the service requests from other nodes are not fulfilled. On the 
other hand, this equilibrium strategy provides fairness in the sense that the cost of system 
inefficiency is not burn by a single node (i.e. has one positive side), but it is shared among all 
nodes. This is because each node’s request is likely to be turned down by the serving node 
(i.e. selfish secondary PU). In this work, we assume that if a node’s request at one node is 
turned down, the node tries at some other candidate node capable of serving the request. 
On average, the probability that a node’s request is successfully served in a time period is 
proportional to its current reputation. 
 
6.7.3.5 Decreasing α for a Better Share of the Spectrum 
 
Figure 6-14 shows the effects of  on the reputation probability of the nodes in the 
case where the node is not interested in sharing the spectrum. On the other hand, the node 
in Figure 6-15 is looking to keep its share of the spectrum (derived from equation (6-27)). 
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Figure 6-14: Players reputation with respect to α and the node is not interested in sharing the offered spectrum. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 6-14, a lower value of α shifts the reputation probability 
curve upwards. However, that all depends on whether the node is interested in using the 
offered spectrum or not. If the node is looking to give its share of the spectrum to other 
nodes, a low value of  will gradually help the node to lose its share, however a high value 
of  will guarantee a faster release of the spectrum. This is true for Figure 6-15 as well, 
which is to be expected since  determines how much importance is given to a node’s 
current performance as compared to its past service record. A low value of  (i.e., giving 
more importance to nodes past actions up to the current time period ) means that nodes 
need to continually provide service to be able to maintain high reputation and access 
spectrum offered from the PU. If however  is high, nodes can easily increase their 
reputation in any period in which they provide service to other nodes. This is irrespective of 
how cooperative they have been in the past with regards to providing service to others. 
Therefore a simple way to improve the system efficiency is to set  as low as possible. 
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Figure 6-15: Players reputation with respect to α and the node is definitely interested in sharing the offered spectrum 
from the PU. 
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6.8 Summary 
 
Cognitive radio is regarded as the key technology for next generation of wireless 
network. Dynamic spectrum sharing is one of the most important problems related to 
Cognitive Radio networks. We can summarize the key findings of applying game tools in 
dynamic spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks by: 
1. An adaptive dynamic competitive game and auction-based spectrum sharing 
mechanism is presented in this chapter. 
2. The advantages over the optimal, cooperative and competitive static-models have 
been proved by simulation. 
3. A general solution for the instability problem has been proposed and an adaptive 
method is used for the case when the number of secondary users is small by using 
cooperative game model. 
4. Another solution for the same problem has been proposed as an adaptive 
competitive auction-based model to be used for the case when the number of 
secondary users (i.e. competitors) is large. 
5. Another solution to the same problem is presented by using a non-cooperative 
reputation-based game model combined with second-price sealed-bid auction to 
choose a secondary primary user between group of secondary users. Such decision is 
based on user reputation and user’s valuation of the offered spectrum. 
The above facts offer such solution aiming at improving the primary and secondary 
revenue and offer a better experience to the secondary users in terms of fairness. The 
introduced mechanism maintains the same results even when the number of competitors 
dynamically increases.  
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7  
 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 
7.1 Conclusions  
 
The aim of this thesis was to resolve some of the issues in Cognitive Wireless 
Applications. This work introduced a green cooperative game-based vertical handover 
mechanism for heterogeneous multihomed wireless portable devices that improves the 
overall end-to-end QoS and offers a better experience the user during the communication 
time. The mechanism controls the power consumption in such devices and shows a better 
power saving architecture when compared to other mechanisms. Moreover, the thesis 
introduces a similar cooperative game to manage handovers in multi-interface fast 
handover MIPv6 wireless devices by introducing game-based multi-interface fast-handover 
MIPv6 protocol. Similar to the vertical handover model, this protocol provides an improved 
QoS experience for the user and consumes relatively the same amount of power when 
compared to single interface mobile node. 
Applying cooperative games in the above two scenarios allow the user and/or 
application the ability to manage the handover process and control the node power 
consumption. Such a model help the node to easily define a dominate strategy (i.e. 
dominate access point or technology, based on the received QoS) that will help the game to 
reach its Nash equilibrium faster and improve the chance of keeping the node in the Nash 
state. 
On the other hand, the thesis proposes competitive Auction game-based mechanisms 
to allocate resources in Ad-Hoc networks between competitors in a fairly manner and 
improve the overall routing reliability in such networks using competitive power and price-
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based routing games. This mechanism gives abetter allocation chance to users/nodes who 
value the data more. It applies both first and second-price sealed-bid auctions to announce 
the winner user and improve the source revenue. The mechanism gives the source the 
chance of improving the link reliability between the source and the winner of the bid by 
compensating the intermediate node in the Ad-Hoc network. The mechanism consider the 
nil strategy, where intermediate nodes might decide not to participate in forwarding 
packets if that will cost them more power and the source compensation is not enough. 
Finally, the thesis proposes two competitive Auction game-based mechanisms aiming 
at offering a fare spectrum share between secondary users and improves primary and 
secondary users’ revenue. The thesis adopts an adaptive dynamic competitive game and 
auction-based sharing mechanism that insurers any secondary user with high priority traffic, 
better channel quality and a reasonable valuation to the offered spectrum will have a better 
chance in gaining access to the offered spectrum. By using an adaptive auction games, the 
mechanism overcomes the disadvantages of previously static defined models, namely 
optimal, competitive and cooperative. The second mechanism adopted in this thesis is a 
competitive reputation-based Auction game model, which will propose a secondary primary 
user from a group of secondary users. Users will compete between themselves to win this 
position based on their reputation on previous time-periods added to the use of the second-
price sealed-bid auction. These two mechanisms successfully shows a noticeable 
improvement in both primary and secondary user revenue and it insures a fair share of the 
spectrum when the number of competitors is changing dynamically during the time.   
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7.2 Future Work 
 
7.2.1 Green Game-based Hybrid Vertical Handover Model for Heterogeneous 
Multihomed Wireless Portable Devices 
 
The game-based green hybrid vertical handover model introduced in Chapter 3 serves 
as a game-based extension to the traditional vertical handover model used in 
heterogeneous wireless networks. Without this extension, portable devices with multiple 
wireless interfaces will suffer from what is called handover latency [1-2], which is the time 
the MN needs to establish a new point of attachment until the handover ends.  
In order to reduce the handover latency effects, a few mobile host multi-homing 
protocols supporting handovers between interfaces have been proposed (3-8). The most 
advanced protocols are able to move single traffic flows independently of each other. 
However, the current solutions do not propose any means for the user to be able to 
dynamically influence the interface selection during operation. For example, different access 
technologies offer several types of price and quality, and a mobile user must be able to 
affect the interface selection so that the most suitable available interfaces are used. For this 
reason, HVHM was proposed, which is a game-based handover scheme that maintains the 
connectivity of all applications on the wireless mobile device when the handoff occurs. It 
aims to provide continuous end-to-end data service in the face of any link outages or 
handoff events, which should provide low latency and minimum packet loss. 
In this model, the best network is chosen based on both static and dynamic factors. 
Static (fixed) factors are the channel capacity, service cost and power consumption. 
Dynamic factors include the RSS from the around AP and the speed of the MN.  The reason 
behind using game theory in this extension is that it is a mathematical concept that deals 
with the formulation of the correct strategy that will enable an individual or entity (i.e. 
player), when confronted by a complex challenge, to succeed in addressing that challenge. 
The game mechanism used in this model is not complicated and the winner AP can be easily 
calculated throughout a game-based score function. In order to control the size of any 
temporary files, which might be used to store the information of the APs the MN will visit 
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during simulation time, a size 20 FIFIO matrix is used for this purpose. This will also reduce 
the complexity factor of calculating the winning AP. 
However, so far all extensions that have been proposed managed the traffic flow 
between the nodes’ interfaces and ignore the energy consumption caused from the use of 
all interfaces in the MN.  In a multi-interface MN, all interfaces are kept ‘ON’ over the entire 
communication time, which will consume a massive amount of its battery life. In order to 
solve this problem, the GHVHM was proposed. In this model the MN’s interfaces will be 
turned ‘ON’ only to check if there is a chance to switch to a better AP when a HO is needed. 
This mechanism works in the following steps; once the MN starts looking for connection, all 
the interfaces will be turned ‘ON’, the cost function will define the ‘winner’ AP, the 
communications start and the rest of the interfaces will be forced to switch ‘OFF’. The main 
drawback of this model is that, while only the active interface is kept ‘ON’ and the rest are 
switched ‘OFF’, the MN might move across a network that offers a better service and the 
MN will not be able to switch to it as the compatible interface is switched ‘OFF’. Yet, keeping 
the communication going with some acceptable QoS and saving a substantial amount of 
power is an advantage of this model.  
The proposed game-based extension model, although proven to provide satisfactory results, 
has some issues which if addressed can further add to the improvement of proposed work.  
1. As mentioned earlier, the simulation results compare four coverage technologies, 
namely UMTS, Bluetooth, GPRS and 802.11b wireless technologies. Different 
simulation scenarios and including more access technologies will give a better 
understanding of what the model can offer to the MN. This will include more 
interfaces to be taken into account in the game and a chance of a better service to 
the MN. 
2. In this model, we used the RssONT point as a trigger to decide when to switch all 
interfaces in the MN. Another approach would be useful when using a QoS-based 
point to decide when the interfaces should be turned ‘ON’, taking into account the 
RSS from the around the APs. 
3. In this model, we took into account the power consumed by the MN’s interfaces 
during the communication time. The energy consumed by other applications working 
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in the MN was not considered. Taking into account the amount of power consumed 
by other factors would give a bigger picture of the advantages of the introduce 
model. This would be done by a real time measurement of what the MN will 
consume on different scenarios and multiple applications working in the 
background. 
 
7.2.2 Green Game-Based Multi-Interface Fast-Handover MIPv6 Protocol 
 
The MFMIPv6 protocol proposed [9] aims at reducing the reordering problem during 
handover when a MN has multiple wireless interfaces and multiple CoA registrations. In this 
protocol, the TCP throughput flow increases through avoiding unnecessary congestions. 
Moreover, the handover signalling performance would increase using this protocol as traffic 
is redirected to another interface during handover signalling. However, this protocol does 
not give the MN the ability to choose the right AP at the right point. Moreover, the protocol 
consumes a huge amount of the nodes’ power as it keeps the MN’s interface ‘ON’ all the 
time. For these reasons, game theory would be very useful to control the two interfaces and 
help the MN to decide which AP to go with. The game-based mechanism consists of two 
steps; first, the mechanism focuses on finding factors indicative of each network’s weak 
points. Qualitative relations between the QoS parameters must be defined in this step in 
order to calculate the weight of each parameter and how it affects the overall QoS obtained. 
When this step is finished, priorities should be assigned to each parameter according to 
their weight. The higher a weight is, the higher the priority that should be given to the 
corresponding parameter. In the second step, the mechanism starts investigating all 
available networks in order to find the optimal choice. This game-based extension forms the 
GMFMIPv6 protocol, discussed in Chapter 4. 
Another vital point needed to be fixed in the GMFMIPv6 protocol is energy 
consumption, as it uses two interfaces during the simulation time in order to get the full 
advantage of the MFMIPv6 protocol. This is solved using the RssONT point. In this method, 
one of the interfaces will be turned OFF until the RSS from the AP reaches a certain point 
“RSSONT”, which means that the MN is moving away from the AP and reaching the 
boundaries of its coverage. Once the MN reaches the named point, the game mechanism 
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will work, as explained earlier, saving more energy to the MN by keeping the other interface 
‘OFF’ most of the time. Yet, one drawback of this method will be the chance that the MN 
might lose handoff to a better network within the coverage of the bigger network. To solve 
this problem, the first interface will trigger the second interface once it receives any 
advertisement messages from the around the APs. The game mechanism will work to check 
whether a handover is needed or not; if so, the game process will proceed, if not, the 
second interface will be turned ‘OFF’ and wait for either the RSSONT point or to be forced by 
the other interface. 
Similar to the work in Chapter 3, the proposed green game-based extension to the 
multi-interface fast-handover MIPv6 protocol shows pleasing results in terms of both TCP 
throughput performance and energy saving. However, there are some issues which if 
addressed can further add to the improvement of the proposed work. This includes taking 
into account the energy consumed by other applications working in the MN. This would be 
done by a real time measurement of what the MN will consume in different scenarios and 
multiple applications working in the background. 
 
7.2.3 Auction and Game-Based Resource Allocation and Routing in Ad-Hoc Wireless 
Networks 
 
In Ad-Hoc wireless networks, each node is capable of independently adapting its 
operation based on the current environment according to predetermined algorithms and 
protocols, and the nodes themselves provide networking services. Problems arise when 
nodes in such networks have their own authority; it is reasonable to assume that each node 
has the goal to maximize its own benefits by enjoying network services and at the same 
time minimizing its cooperation with other nodes. To this extent, Chapter 5 proposes a 
dynamic auction-based resource allocation mechanism in ad-hoc wireless networks. This 
auction-based mechanism works as follows: nodes will compete between each other to gain 
access to the data stored in the server node. The winner is the node that values the data the 
most. The server will try to compensate all intermediate nodes to improve the reliability of 
the route. The intermediate nodes will have the chance to decide whether they should 
participate in the named route or not, according to the amount of source compensation and 
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how much energy is needed to forward packets to the next hop. This mechanism works in 
both first and second-price sealed-auctions. Finally, two types of sources have been defined: 
cooperative and selfish sources. The first will accept any positive payoff and will always keep 
the route more reliable by increasing the compensation provided to all intermediate nodes. 
Then again, the selfish source will try to maximize his/her own profit without paying any 
attention to the route quality. 
In ad-hoc wireless networks, the establishment of multi-hop routes relies on nodes’ 
forwarding packets for one another. Yet, if a selfish node decided to conserve its limited 
energy resources, it might decide not to participate in the forwarding process by switching 
off its interface. If all nodes decide to behave the same way, it may lead to the collapse of 
the network. Different game-based theoretic models have been proposed for analysing 
selfishness in forwarding packets [10-15]. Under general energy-constraint assumptions, the 
equilibrium solution for the single-stage game results in none of the nodes cooperating to 
forward packets. 
The game-based mechanism proposed in Chapter 5 is mainly focused on keeping the 
defined path stable, where all the participating nodes are faithful to forward the packets to 
the next hop all time. A polynomial-time solution to find the Nash Equilibrium is shown by 
adding some suitable modifications to the well-known Dijkstra algorithm.  
Simulation results prove the magnificence of the second-price sealed-auction 
mechanism in terms of improving the source revenue, especially when the number of 
competitors increases. The results compare both auction schemes with a random allocation 
mechanism, where the source offers the data to the first interested node and compensates 
all intermediate nodes in advance. Nonetheless, there are some issues which if addressed 
can further add to the improvement of the proposed mechanisms: 
1. Applying the game-based routing mechanism on heterogonous wireless ad-hoc 
networks would show results that are more interesting, as using different 
technologies to forward packets between nodes might reduce the overall power 
consumption of the node; hence, more power to be saved in the entire network. 
2. First and/or second-price open-auction mechanisms would increase the source 
revenue, as it will push the bidders to increase their bids. However, using such 
mechanisms would raise the chances of more complex mechanisms and might 
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require some time to decide the winner. Adding such mechanisms might need the 
addition of more restrictions to the mechanism such as the number of bidders in 
each round and the time of each round, keeping in mind that some nodes might 
require urgent information and cannot wait for a long time.  
  
7.2.4 Auction and Game-Based Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks 
 
The rapid development of radio networks of all kinds in our world, which have 
defiantly changed the public feeling about radio, is one of the main reasons behind the 
concurrent increase in the demand for and congestion of the Radio Frequency (RF) 
spectrum. However, according to recent research introduced by the FCC and Ofcom, it was 
found that most of the frequency spectrum was inefficiently utilized [16-17]. Chapter 6 of 
this thesis proposes an auction and game-based mechanism to improve the spectrum 
sharing in cognitive radio networks in terms of fairness. In fact, recent studies have shown 
that despite claims of spectral insufficiency, the actual licensed spectrum remains 
unoccupied for long periods of time [18]. Thus, cognitive radio systems have been proposed 
[19] in order to efficiently exploit these spectral holes. 
The aim of the work presented in Chapter 6 is to design a mechanism that enables the 
fair and efficient sharing of spectral resources among secondary users. Throughout the 
chapter, a theoretical comparison is made between three spectrum sharing game models, 
namely optimal, cooperative and competitive models. The comparison is based on how 
much the named model will improve the primary user and the secondary users’ revenue 
and fairness between secondary users themselves. The theory and realization of 
cooperative spectrum sharing is presented in detail, where it is assumed that there is one 
primary user and several secondary users. The case of dynamic games is also considered, 
where the number of secondary users changes. The advantages of cooperative sharing 
games are proved by simulation. Moreover, the case of large numbers of secondary users 
competing to share the offered spectrum and how the cooperative game will reduce 
primary user and bidders’ revenue is also discussed in detail. Finally, a competitive auction 
and game-based mechanism to improve the overall system efficiency in terms of a better 
fairness in accessing the spectrum is introduced. 
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In addition, Chapter 6 proves that the cooperative game model is built based on 
achieving Nash equilibrium between players and provides better revenue to the sellers and 
bidders in the game. Furthermore, the cooperative game is the best model to choose when 
the number of secondary users changes dynamically, but only when the number of 
competitors is low. As in practical situations, the number of secondary users might increase 
dramatically and the cooperative game will lose its powerful advantage once that number 
increases. As a result, the proposed mechanism creates a competition between the bidders 
and offers better revenue to the players in terms of fairness. Combining both second-price 
pay-to-bid sealed auction and competitive game models will insure that the user with better 
channel quality, higher traffic priority and fair bid will get a better chance to share the 
offered spectrum. It is shown by numerical results that the proposed mechanism could 
reach the maximum total profit for secondary users with better fairness. 
Throughout Chapter 6, we proved that the optimal game would improve the overall 
profit of the players in the game, which might lead to the unfair distribution of the offered 
spectrum. The competitive game shows a lower overall profit, but gives a better share to 
the user with better channel quality, who asks for a share earlier and stays active for a 
longer period (i.e. a higher priority as compared to newcomers). Finally, the cooperative 
game gives the best overall individual profit and it is the best way to insure a fair share 
between multiple users in any cognitive radio system. However, in a practical cognitive radio 
environment, the communication between competitors (i.e. players) is very hard to achieve. 
Individual users tend to contact the primary user and ask for a service [20]; users can only 
observe the pricing function from the primary user, but not the strategies and profits of 
other users. Nevertheless, achieving a cooperative scheme between the secondary users 
(either the primary user forces the secondary user to get a fair share or uses the model 
mentioned earlier) would improve both the seller’s and users’ revenue. 
In order to solve such a problem, two solutions were proposed in Chapter 6. Firstly, a 
second-price pay-to-bid (or sometimes called as pay-as-bid) sealed auction mechanism is 
introduced to insure a fair competitive game between secondary users. Secondly, a 
reputation-based auction game is proposed as a non-cooperative game to assign a 
secondary to be a secondary-primary user between other secondary users. 
Nevertheless, there are some issues which if addressed can further add to the 
improvement of the proposed solutions: 
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1. Looking at adding both first and second-price open-auctions, as it would increase the 
primary user’s revenue. This option would be interesting for long-term contracts, 
where the primary user is looking to lend part of the spectrum for a long time. 
However, this option will not work in the case of short-term contracts or the case of 
using the spectrum whenever it becomes free. 
2. Another approach would be looking at different scenarios of how secondary users 
can approach the primary user rather than the allocation function defined in the 
chapter. 
3. Another auction scenario can be added for the game-based reputation model, where 
the secondary primary user can offer some of the shared spectrum to other 
secondary users. However, such modification requires changing the reputation 
model as the winning secondary user will not help others unless they pay for the 
service. 
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